Addressing gambling harms by reducing the supply of electronic gambling machines a comparative
Addressing gambling harms by reducing the supply of electronic gambling machines: a comparative study of Italy and Finland
An electronic gambling machine (EGM) is one of the most harmful gambling. The high possibility of obtaining EGM has also led to an increase in consumption. In order to reduce the burden of EGM for public health, it has recently introduced a policy of reducing the number of EGMs in Italy and Finland. In this study, we compare the purpose and legitimacy of these laws and the overall impact on total consumption.
Methods
The purpose and legitimacy of the policy to reduce the number of EGM are based on a qualitative media analysis. The impact on total consumption was measured using the financial values provided by Gambling providers of Italy and Finnish.
Results
As a result, the reduction of the EGM number in both countries was justified by public health concerns, but the amplitude of the policy varied. In Italy, more ambitious reductions than Finland, and the number of gambling facilities was reduced. Nevertheless, the financial data has pointed out that the reduction range was not sufficient.
Conclusions
Initially, public health concerns were emphasized in the media discussion, but in the end, both countries were not so ambitious due to the lobby activities of the industry and the national revenue stake. As a result, it did not seem to reduce the total consumption and reduce the burden on public health.
Background
Gambling is being understood as a public health problem (for example, [1, 2]). Therefore, the initiative of Har m-reduction should be targeted at the population level. Some of these initiatives aim to spread more harmful products, and to make harmful products less harmful. The latter approach has recently been held in Italy and Finland, which reduces the possibility of using electronic gambling machines (EGM). Reduction of usable possibilities is an important policy to restrict gambling exposure and consumption, in addition to the mandatory identity verification and restrictions on product characteristics [4]. In particular, EGM and casino gambling have a very low price elasticity in demand, so the price setting and tax (widely used in cigarettes and alcohol regulations, see [4, 5]) are not very relevant [6]. < SPAN> electronic gambling machine (EGM) is one of the most harmful gambling. The high possibility of obtaining EGM has also led to an increase in consumption. In order to reduce the burden of EGM for public health, it has recently introduced a policy of reducing the number of EGMs in Italy and Finland. In this study, we compare the purpose and legitimacy of these laws and the overall impact on total consumption.
The purpose and legitimacy of the policy to reduce the number of EGM are based on a qualitative media analysis. The impact on total consumption was measured using the financial values provided by Gambling providers of Italy and Finnish.
As a result, the reduction of the EGM number in both countries was justified by public health concerns, but the amplitude of the policy varied. In Italy, more ambitious reductions than Finland, and the number of gambling facilities was reduced. Nevertheless, the financial data has pointed out that the reduction range was not sufficient.
Initially, public health concerns were emphasized in the media discussion, but in the end, both countries were not so ambitious due to the lobby activities of the industry and the national revenue stake. As a result, it did not seem to reduce the total consumption and reduce the burden on public health.
Gambling is being understood as a public health problem (for example, [1, 2]). Therefore, the initiative of Har m-reduction should be targeted at the population level. Some of these initiatives aim to spread more harmful products, and to make harmful products less harmful. The latter approach has recently been held in Italy and Finland, which reduces the possibility of using electronic gambling machines (EGM). Reduction of usable possibilities is an important policy to restrict gambling exposure and consumption, in addition to the mandatory identity verification and restrictions on product characteristics [4]. In particular, EGM and casino gambling have a very low price elasticity in demand, so the price setting and tax (widely used in cigarettes and alcohol regulations, see [4, 5]) are not very relevant [6]. An electronic gambling machine (EGM) is one of the most harmful gambling. The high possibility of obtaining EGM has also led to an increase in consumption. In order to reduce the burden of EGM for public health, it has recently introduced a policy of reducing the number of EGMs in Italy and Finland. In this study, we compare the purpose and legitimacy of these laws and the overall impact on total consumption.
The purpose and legitimacy of the policy to reduce the number of EGM are based on a qualitative media analysis. The impact on total consumption was measured using the financial values provided by Gambling providers of Italy and Finnish.
As a result, the reduction of the EGM number in both countries was justified by public health concerns, but the amplitude of the policy varied. In Italy, more ambitious reductions than Finland, and the number of gambling facilities was reduced. Nevertheless, the financial data has pointed out that the reduction range was not sufficient.
EGM reductions in previous research
Initially, public health concerns were emphasized in the media discussion, but in the end, both countries were not so ambitious due to the lobby activities of the industry and the national revenue stake. As a result, it did not seem to reduce the total consumption and reduce the burden on public health.
Gambling is being understood as a public health problem (for example, [1, 2]). Therefore, the initiative of Har m-reduction should be targeted at the population level. Some of these initiatives aim to spread more harmful products, and to make harmful products less harmful. The latter approach has recently been held in Italy and Finland, which reduces the possibility of using electronic gambling machines (EGM). Reduction of usable possibilities is an important policy to restrict gambling exposure and consumption, in addition to the mandatory identity verification and restrictions on product characteristics [4]. In particular, EGM and casino gambling have a very low price elasticity in demand, so the price setting and tax (widely used in cigarettes and alcohol regulations, see [4, 5]) are not very relevant [6].
EGM is one of the most harmful forms of gambling, and EGM gambling is the mainstream treatment service related to gambling [3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9]. EGM has a lot of structural features that enhance gambling and prolong, such as speed, sensory effects, interactive functions, bonuses, near misses, losing (LDW), and payout variability. 4, 7, 10]. [11, 12] that traditional slot machines are replaced by electronic terminals that provide a variety of games [11, 12]. In addition to the structural features, the situation characteristics, including the possibility of EGM, are also related to consumption and increased harm. High visibility of EGM in an environment other than casinos can further increase the possibility of the harm. One systemic review [9] found that the high possibility of EGM is related to increased gambling and gambling. In Australia, the number of EGM facilities in geographical regions is also related to individual bankruptcy cases.
In this study, we compare the policy purpose and legitimacy of Italy and Finnish EGM reduction policies, and the impact on public health measured by total consumption. As in the case of alcohol, gambling harm seems to increase according to the consumption. At the same time, the obtained theory [15, 16] suggests that the possibility of obtaining reduces the total consumption. This theory is also supported by evidence obtained from the EGM closure during the COVID-19 period [17, 18]. There are other perspectives, including gambling suppression erosion theory (GRET) and population adaptation, but there are few empirical backing (see [19, 20], respectively).
Methods
Focusing on Italy and Finland is justified by the high gambling spending in these two situations and the extensive use of hig h-strength no n-casino EGM. Comparative statistics on the EGM number in the two countries [21] counts both countries as one of the most EGMs per capita in Europe. In 2019, there were about 21, 100 EGMs on the mainland of Finland, of which 18, 500 were no n-casinos and 2600 were gambling arcades. The EGM market on the mainland of Finland is operated by exclusive owners, Veikkaus. (PAF is operated in the Orlando Islands). According to the latest population survey, 31 % of Finnish's last year's gamblers have gambling with EGM within the past 12 months. This is a relatively high number.
Media analysis
In Italy, 5. 9 % of Italian gamblers have gambling in EGM in the last 12 months, according to the latest population survey [23] from 2017 to 2018. This is more noticeable than Finland, but is the same as the numbers in other European countries. There are about 320, 000 EGMs in Italy in 2019 (after the reduction has already started), of which 263, 000 units are mainly no n-casinos (AWP), and the rest are arcades. It was a lottery terminal (VLT) installed. The Italian EGM market is operated by 11 contesting, one of which Lottomatica, SISAL, and Snaitech accounted for the largest share.
The two countries have recently been dealing with the EGM gambling harm by recently reducing the number of EGMs. Finnish EGM reduction began by Veikkaus, which has monopoly, and began in January 2020. Initially, the target was to remove 3500 no n-casino EGMs (18 % of no n-casino gaming machines), but later set to 8, 000 units (43 %). The EGM reduction process in Italy had already begun in the early 2000s by local governments with concerns about the spread of gambling. After discussions at permanent conferences on the relationship between the central government and the region, the number of gambling fields was halved (from 98, 600 to 48, 000) by September 2017 and the end of 2019, and the number of EGMs was reduced by 35 % (from 400, 000 to 265, 000). I reached the agreement by doing. However, some existing regional laws are more restrictive.
In the following, we will introduce documents for the impact of EGM reduction and analyze the policy changes between Italy and Finnish. The legitimacy and purpose of the EGM reduction policy was analyzed using a qualitative media analysis. The impact of the reduction in total consumption was measured using the financial values provided by the EGM operator.
The impact of the previous EGM reductions and removal policies suggested that reducing the possibility of use can lead to total consumption and problem gambling. [4, 9] Nevertheless, results and impacts vary depending on the degree of policy. < SPAN> In Italy, 5. 9 % of Italian gamblers have gambling in EGM in the last 12 months, according to the latest population survey [23] from 2017 to 2018. This is more noticeable than Finland, but is the same as the numbers in other European countries. There are about 320, 000 EGMs in Italy in 2019 (after the reduction has already started), of which 263, 000 units are mainly no n-casinos (AWP), and the rest are arcades. It was a lottery terminal (VLT) installed. The Italian EGM market is operated by 11 contesting, one of which Lottomatica, SISAL, and Snaitech accounted for the largest share.
Financial data
The two countries have recently been dealing with the EGM gambling harm by recently reducing the number of EGMs. Finnish EGM reduction began by Veikkaus, which has monopoly, and began in January 2020. Initially, the target was to remove 3500 no n-casino EGMs (18 % of no n-casino gaming machines), but later set to 8, 000 units (43 %). The EGM reduction process in Italy had already begun in the early 2000s by local governments with concerns about the spread of gambling. After discussions at permanent conferences on the relationship between the central government and the region, the number of gambling fields was halved (from 98, 600 to 48, 000) by September 2017 and the end of 2019, and the number of EGMs was reduced by 35 % (from 400, 000 to 265, 000). I reached the agreement by doing. However, some existing regional laws are more restrictive.
In the following, we will introduce documents for the impact of EGM reduction and analyze the policy changes between Italy and Finnish. The legitimacy and purpose of the EGM reduction policy was analyzed using a qualitative media analysis. The impact of the reduction in total consumption was measured using the financial values provided by the EGM operator.
The impact of the previous EGM reductions and removal policies suggested that reducing the possibility of use can lead to total consumption and problem gambling. [4, 9] Nevertheless, results and impacts vary depending on the degree of policy. In Italy, 5. 9 % of Italian gamblers have gambling in EGM in the last 12 months, according to the latest population survey [23] from 2017 to 2018. This is more noticeable than Finland, but is the same as the numbers in other European countries. There are about 320, 000 EGMs in Italy in 2019 (after the reduction has already started), of which 263, 000 units are mainly no n-casinos (AWP), and the rest are arcades. It was a lottery terminal (VLT) installed. The Italian EGM market is operated by 11 contesting, one of which Lottomatica, SISAL, and Snaitech accounted for the largest share.
Results
The two countries have recently been dealing with the EGM gambling harm by recently reducing the number of EGMs. Finnish EGM reduction began by Veikkaus, which has monopoly, and began in January 2020. Initially, the target was to remove 3500 no n-casino EGMs (18 % of no n-casino gaming machines), but later set to 8, 000 units (43 %). The EGM reduction process in Italy had already begun in the early 2000s by local governments with concerns about the spread of gambling. After discussions at permanent conferences on the relationship between the central government and the region, the number of gambling fields was halved (from 98, 600 to 48, 000) by September 2017 and the end of 2019, and the number of EGMs was reduced by 35 % (from 400, 000 to 265, 000). I reached the agreement by doing. However, some existing regional laws are more restrictive.
Justifications and expected outcomes of EGM reduction policies
Italy
In the following, we will introduce documents for the impact of EGM reduction and analyze the policy changes between Italy and Finnish. The legitimacy and purpose of the EGM reduction policy was analyzed using a qualitative media analysis. The impact of the reduction in total consumption was measured using the financial values provided by the EGM operator.
The impact of the previous EGM reductions and removal policies suggested that reducing the possibility of use can lead to total consumption and problem gambling. [4, 9] However, results and impacts vary depending on the degree of policy.
First, the magnitude of the reduction is important. More important reductions have better results [4], but the full removal and stop of EGM leads to the rapid reduction in total consumption. In Norway, EGM was removed from public spaces in 2007, and from 2008 to 2009, it was installed more sparsely and replaced with less harmful play machines, so that gambling consumption and treatment and support services were needed. Gender has decreased [26, 27, 28]. Recent research on the effects of COVID-19 on gambling supports this observation. Preventive measures taken to suppress the spread of colonavirus include EGM shutdowns in many areas, including Finland and Italy. These closures have reduced the burden of harm caused by EGM gambling, such as a decrease in total consumption and gambling harm [17, 18, 29, 30]. Also, the decrease in lan d-based gambling consumption is not linked to the increase in online gambling in many areas [15, 30, 31].
Second, reducing the number of playgrounds and the number of gaming machines will reduce consumption. The frequency of visiting the playground and the gambling in the relationship between the dwelling distance from the playground and the inversely proportional relationship [32] suggests that if the network becomes sparse, the total consumption may be reduced. 。 In Piedmont, Italy, in addition to the removal of 50 % of EGM, reducing the location of EGM and restricting business hours, seeking a sharp decrease in gambling consumption, reduced gambling, and helping to help. [27, 33] led to the decrease.
Third, by moving the EGM from a no n-casino location, such as a supermarket, a tobacco restaurant, a gas station, can be reduced by restricting exposure to gambling and reducing consumption. For example, in Poland, the no n-casino EGM market was monopolized between 2009 and 2015. As of 2018, the machine has been r e-introduced to the exclusive owner arcade. According to the Ministry of Health [34], the total consumption was reduced by limiting the EGM to arcade. Nevertheless, other studies argue that arcades have other harm. Gambling and alcohol c o-consumption and other venue effects can particularly increase the risk of harm in this environment.
The study was carried out using a mixed-methods approach combining a qualitative media analysis with a quantitative analysis of financial data. The objectives of this approach were, first, to identify the aims and justifications of the EGM reductions in Italy and Finland and, second, to measure the impact of the EGM reductions on total consumption. The financial data reflect the total consumption of EGMs at the population level and are therefore considered a good proxy for population-level harmfulness.
The media analysis was based on press reports published in Italy and Finland before and during the EGM reductions. The objectives of the media analysis were to analyse and identify (a) justifications and oppositions for the reductions and (b) aims expressed in public.
Finland
In Italy, the study consisted of 17 articles collected from the online database of Italy's best-selling newspaper, Corriere della Sera (CS, circulation approx. 300, 000–400, 000 copies). In Finland, articles were collected mainly from two sources: Of the 45 articles analysed, 13 were found in the online database of Finland's largest daily newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat (HS, circulation approx. 300, 000). A further 32 articles were found using an online database that aggregated news from RSS feeds of other newspapers and media outlets available to the public in Finland (comprising articles from uutispuro. fi, Iltalehti (IL), Iltasanomat (IS), MTV3 uutiset (MTV3), YLE uutiset (YLE) and Keskisuomalainen (KSML). In both countries, the articles consisted mainly of news articles, but also included opinion pieces and interviews with stakeholders. Most articles contained characteristics of several types of reporting. Data were collected using the keyword “gambling machines” in the Italian and Finnish versions (Italian: apparecchi da gioco/da intrattenimento, macchinette, slot machine; Finnish: rahapelikone, rahapeliautomaatti, pelikone, peliautomaatti). Data were collected from one year before the announced cuts (September 2018 in Finland and September 2016 in Italy) until the end of February 2020, as subsequent news stories focused exclusively on the impact of COVID-19 on gambling. Articles that did not directly mention EGM policies were excluded.
The data were thematically analyzed by two researchers. Based on a first reading, the researchers discussed relevant themes: (1) the declared objectives of the policy proposing the removal/reduction of EGMs, (2) the arguments made by opponents against the reduction/removal, (3) the expected impact of the policy change, and (4) the final decision taken.
The second part considers the financial impact of EGMs in Italy and Finland in terms of total consumption. This was achieved by examining (1) the number of EGMs in Italy and Finland before and after (or during) the reduction, and (2) the amount of gross gambling revenue (GGR, i. e., bets minus winnings) generated by EGMs before and after (or during) the reduction.
In Italy, figures were extracted from the ADM Libro Blu for the years 2016 to 2019. Libro Blu is the official annual report published by the Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli (ADM, the public department of the Ministry of Economy and Finance responsible for regulating the gambling market). The financial figures considered are total gambling revenues and expenditures. In Italy, VLTs were not subject to the reductions, so the data only concern AWPs. As gambling in Italy is operated by private multinational groups under concessions, we also investigated how the reductions affected the public and private sector revenue shares.
In Finland, financial figures and EGM numbers were requested from the monopoly holder Veikkaus using the official data request protocol. The EGM reductions were due to start in January 2020, but COVID-related closures prevented us from analysing the impact from March onwards, so we could only compare EGM numbers and the GGR they generate from January 2018 to February 2020. COVID-19-related EGM closures and possible relocation to online gambling therefore did not affect the analysis in this study. The data on EGMs in Finland covers EGMs located outside casinos. The data received from Veikkaus were indexed by the sole proprietor against a baseline of January 2018.
Impacts on total consumption
The results are in two parts. First, the justification and expected outcomes of EGM reduction policies in Italy and Finland are examined using press materials. In the second part, the impact of EGM reductions on total consumption is examined using financial figures.
The debate preceding the EGM reduction policy in Italy started with state and local disagreements on whether to adopt a state-level EGM reduction policy. Since the reductions had already been initiated by the municipalities, this debate reflects a conflict of interests between the Italian central and local administrations. Thus, the main stakeholders involved in the Italian debate were not gamblers or gambling providers, but political actors at different administrative levels and journalists acting as watchdogs of political decision-making.
Italy
The first article in the debate (CS 2016. 4. 6a) reported that Prime Minister Matteo Renzi had announced a 30% reduction in EGMs, including all EGMs other than casinos. The justifications presented by the government concerned the social and health impacts of gambling expansion, as well as the requests of local authorities. To reduce the risk of illegal machines, the new AWPs would also work with remote connections. However, on the same day, another article (CS 6. 4. 2016b) reported a suspicious change in which the number of EGMs would be reduced. According to the Italian Stabilization Law, the calculated 30% reduction should have been based on the number of machines registered in July 2015 (378, 109 machines), not on the number registered in December 2015 (418, 210 machines). This difference is attributed to lobbying by the gambling industry. The article also points out that the widespread availability of legal gambling does not necessarily prevent illegal gambling, which is one of the justifications most used by the state to expand gambling, but it does increase state revenues.
Strengthening channeling policy: the Finnish approach to protecting domestic online gambling market
A few days later (CS 2016. 05. 12) was featured in an article in which the industry lobby claimed that it was "powerful enough to change the flow of the law." In a reply (CS 12. 05. 2016), the ADM (Italian Exclusive Management Bureau) mentions the ban on issuing a newly licensed certificate of slot machines, which is not an alternative to the slot machine in December 2015. I revealed that there was. In response to this claim, the two journalists argued that this gap could bring out more than 40, 000 old EGMs out of the warehouse and increase the number of EGMs by 10. 6 % in four months. did. According to the article, this is also an example of gambling policy corruption. The same was argued in the later reports that the stable law was not protected by the Ministry of Finance Ordinance, and the actual number of EGM had increased (CS 2016. 11. 16; CS 2017. 04. 08).
1 Introduction
In May 2017, not only reduced the number of gambling field and EGM, but also received a new agreement as a result of the permanent conference that imposes a minimum distance between EGM and sensitive places (schools, hospitals, etc.). The discussion about EGM was revived (CS 05. 05. 2017a; b). The chairman of the National Municipal Association thought it was a "good compromise" (CS 2017. 05. 05a). However, a more critical commentary by a journalist states that this agreement is "impossible to present" because the proposed regulations were slower than the local regulations that have already been implemented. 。 The article also points out that the ant i-gambling movement is not satisfied with the agreement. Again, this dissatisfaction result is due to the industry lobby activity. The shortest distance problem caused further discussions from the viewpoint of local national teams mainly demanding regulations during the survey period (CS 09. 11. 2016; CS 07. 07. 2017).
Overall, items from 2016 have more openly supported the significant reduction of EGM, and is critical of the lobby activities of the national and industry. The need to reduce the number of EGM has been justified from the viewpoint of poverty and social inequality (CS 2016. 05. 12; CS 2017. 3. 29) has also been pointed out (CS 2016. 11. 16 CS 2017. 04. 08). < SPAN> A few days later (CS 2016. 05. 12) was featured in an article in which the industry lobby claimed that it was "powerful enough to change the law." In a reply (CS 12. 05. 2016), the ADM (Italian Exclusive Management Bureau) mentions the ban on issuing a newly licensed certificate of slot machines, which is not an alternative to the slot machine in December 2015. I revealed that there was. In response to this claim, the two journalists argued that this gap could bring out more than 40, 000 old EGMs out of the warehouse and increase the number of EGMs by 10. 6 % in four months. did. According to the article, this is also an example of gambling policy corruption. The same was argued in the later reports that the stable law was not protected by the Ministry of Finance Ordinance, and the actual number of EGM had increased (CS 2016. 11. 16; CS 2017. 04. 08).
In May 2017, not only reduced the number of gambling field and EGM, but also received a new agreement as a result of the permanent conference that imposes a minimum distance between EGM and sensitive places (schools, hospitals, etc.). The discussion about EGM was revived (CS 05. 05. 2017a; b). The chairman of the National Municipal Association thought it was a "good compromise" (CS 2017. 05. 05a). However, a more critical commentary by a journalist states that this agreement is "impossible to present" because the proposed regulations were slower than the local regulations that have already been implemented. 。 The article also points out that the ant i-gambling movement is not satisfied with the agreement. Again, this dissatisfaction result is due to the industry lobby activity. The shortest distance problem caused further discussions from the viewpoint of local national teams mainly demanding regulations during the survey period (CS 09. 11. 2016; CS 07. 07. 2017).
Overall, items from 2016 have more openly supported the significant reduction of EGM, and is critical of the lobby activities of the national and industry. The need to reduce the number of EGM has been justified from the viewpoint of poverty and social inequality (CS 2016. 05. 12; CS 2017. 3. 29) has also been pointed out (CS 2016. 11. 16 CS 2017. 04. 08). A few days later (CS 2016. 05. 12) was featured in an article in which the industry lobby claimed that it was "powerful enough to change the flow of the law." In a reply (CS 12. 05. 2016), the ADM (Italian Exclusive Management Bureau) mentions the ban on issuing a newly licensed certificate of slot machines, which is not an alternative to the slot machine in December 2015. I revealed that there was. In response to this claim, the two journalists argued that this gap could bring out more than 40, 000 old EGMs out of the warehouse and increase the number of EGMs by 10. 6 % in four months. did. According to the article, this is also an example of gambling policy corruption. The same was argued in the later reports that the stable law was not protected by the Ministry of Finance Ordinance, and the actual number of EGM had increased (CS 2016. 11. 16; CS 2017. 04. 08).
In May 2017, not only reduced the number of gambling field and EGM, but also received a new agreement as a result of the permanent conference that imposes a minimum distance between EGM and sensitive places (schools, hospitals, etc.). The discussion about EGM was revived (CS 05. 05. 2017a; b). The chairman of the National Municipal Association thought it was a "good compromise" (CS 2017. 05. 05a). However, a more critical commentary by a journalist states that this agreement is "impossible to present" because the proposed regulations were slower than the local regulations that have already been implemented. 。 The article also points out that the ant i-gambling movement is not satisfied with the agreement. Again, this dissatisfaction result is due to the industry lobby activity. The shortest distance problem caused further discussions from the viewpoint of local national teams mainly demanding regulations during the survey period (CS 09. 11. 2016; CS 07. 07. 2017).
2 Online gambling regulation within the European single market
Overall, items from 2016 have more openly supported the significant reduction of EGM, and is critical of the lobby activities of the national and industry. The need to reduce the number of EGM has been justified from the viewpoint of poverty and social inequality (CS 2016. 05. 12; CS 2017. 3. 29) has also been pointed out (CS 2016. 11. 16 CS 2017. 04. 08).
In 2017, the press changed. The person's responsibility for gambling harm was emphasized in an interview with gambling treatment services (CS 2017. 05. 28), and researchers at Istituto Superiore Di Sanità (Italian National Institute) said, "The problem is not gambling, not gambling. It is a relationship. " Previously critical media seems to have accepted a compromise on shrinking EGM. In the public and critical items (CS 2017. 11. 15) at the end of the analysis period, he pointed out that there is no government that is positive for journalists, both right, left, and even in the media. This may be some of the reasons why Coriele Della Sarah did not discuss the EGM anymore from 2018 to 2019. Another reason may be a policy decision on the countr y-level reduction, but it is unlikely that this problem had previously been given an important space. There was only once a year searched between 2018 and 2019, and neither was directly focused on EGM.
In Italian newspaper data, the negative financial results due to the reduction seemed to be naturally regarded and did not be clearly discussed. At the same time, other measures were later introduced, including tax reforms for EGMS prize money to increase national gambling income (CS 25. 10. 2018).
Like the Italian case, the movement that led to the reduction of EGM in Finland continues not only from long discussions on EGM harm, but also from justification of Finnish gambling policies. One of the legal justifying the Finnish gambling monopoly is to prevent and reduce gambling (law 2112. 2016/1286, section 1). However, the positive advertising campaigns of the monopoly owners and the establishment of EGM increased critical public opinion from 2018 to 2019 (IL 14. 8. 2019). In March 2019 (MTV3 20. 3. 2019), a citizen initiative was launched by experts from gambling damage, with the aim of removing EGM from public spaces. In Finland, citizens can start the law amendment procedures by petition. In August 2019, Minister of Interior Maria Ohisaro suggested that the EGM would be removed from public spaces (HS 12. 8., 2019; MTV3, 12. 8. 2019).
Like Italy, Finnish media was initially critical of EGM. However, unlike the case of Italy, the discussion in the Finnish media seemed to be a small stakeholder network in the EGM policy, while the journalist's role was only small. The main supporters of the removal were citizen activists (MTV3, 2019. 3. 20), researchers (HS 2019. 8. 14; HS 2019. 8. 16), and a small number of politicians (HS 2018. 11. 25). Their main claims were to reduce gamblin g-related harm in lo w-income groups (MTV3, 2019. 8. 12; Hs 16. 8. 2019). The public opinion poll on August 31, 2019 was widely reported in the media (IL; ksml; yle; MTV3; HS 31. 8. 2019), and 60 % of Finnish became independent of EGM from a casino. It was shown that he wanted to move it to gambling arcades. Some parliamentarians (MP) also supported the removal of EGM from public spaces. According to a poll on parliamentarians, members involved with Gambling monopoly companies, Veccaus, were more opposed to EGM removal than members of the Diet (IS, 2019. 8. 17). A quarter of Finnish parliamentarians has revealed his relationship with Veccaus through the position of a group that is a member of the Veckaus Board or as a member of a group that has gained from the revenue generated by Vecas (is, 2019. 8. 17. ...)
3 Materials and methods
3.1 Qualitative data
The most loud voice holder against the elimination of EGM was the representatives of the redistributed network (IL 2019. 8. 15; MTV3, 16. 8. 2019; HS 26. 8. 2019). In Finland, supermarkets, kiosks, and restaurants are receiving fees by providing gambling products containing EGM (Yle 15. 2. 2020; IL 15. 2. 2020). The main reasons for EGM are the profits of gaming machines, especially for small stores and restaurants, and the associated employment (IL 2019. 8. 15; HS 2019. 8. 26). < SPAN>, like Italy, Finnish media was initially critical of EGM. However, unlike the case of Italy, the discussion in the Finnish media seemed to be a small stakeholder network in the EGM policy, while the journalist's role was only small. The main supporters of the removal were citizen activists (MTV3, 2019. 3. 20), researchers (HS 2019. 8. 14; HS 2019. 8. 16), and a small number of politicians (HS 2018. 11. 25). Their main claims were to reduce gamblin g-related harm in lo w-income groups (MTV3, 2019. 8. 12; Hs 16. 8. 2019). The public opinion poll on August 31, 2019 was widely reported in the media (IL; ksml; yle; MTV3; HS 31. 8. 2019), and 60 % of Finnish became independent of EGM from a casino. It was shown that he wanted to move it to gambling arcades. Some parliamentarians (MP) also supported the removal of EGM from public spaces. According to a poll on parliamentarians, members involved with Gambling monopoly companies, Veccaus, were more opposed to EGM removal than members of the Diet (IS, 2019. 8. 17). A quarter of Finnish parliamentarians has revealed his relationship with Veccaus through the position of a group that is a member of the Veckaus Board or as a member of a group that has gained from the revenue generated by Vecas (is, 2019. 8. 17. ...)
The most loud voice holder against the elimination of EGM was the representatives of the redistributed network (IL 2019. 8. 15; MTV3, 16. 8. 2019; HS 26. 8. 2019). In Finland, supermarkets, kiosks, and restaurants are receiving fees by providing gambling products containing EGM (Yle 15. 2. 2020; IL 15. 2. 2020). The main reasons for EGM are the profits of gaming machines, especially for small stores and restaurants, and the associated employment (IL 2019. 8. 15; HS 2019. 8. 26). Like Italy, Finnish media was initially critical of EGM. However, unlike the case of Italy, the discussion in the Finnish media seemed to be a small stakeholder network in the EGM policy, while the journalist's role was only small. The main supporters of the removal were citizen activists (MTV3, 2019. 3. 20), researchers (HS 2019. 8. 14; HS 2019. 8. 16), and a small number of politicians (HS 2018. 11. 25). Their main claims were to reduce gamblin g-related harm in lo w-income groups (MTV3, 2019. 8. 12; Hs 16. 8. 2019). The public opinion poll on August 31, 2019 was widely reported in the media (IL; ksml; yle; MTV3; HS 31. 8. 2019), and 60 % of Finnish became independent of EGM from a casino. It was shown that he wanted to move it to gambling arcades. Some parliamentarians (MP) also supported the removal of EGM from public spaces. According to a poll on parliamentarians, members involved with Gambling monopoly companies, Veccaus, were more opposed to EGM removal than members of the Diet (IS, 2019. 8. 17). A quarter of Finnish parliamentarians has revealed his relationship with Veccaus through the position of a group that is a member of the Veckaus Board or as a member of a group that has gained from the revenue generated by Vecas (is, 2019. 8. 17. ...)
The most loud voice holder against the elimination of EGM was the representatives of the redistributed network (IL 2019. 8. 15; MTV3, 16. 8. 2019; HS 26. 8. 2019). In Finland, supermarkets, kiosks, and restaurants are receiving fees by providing gambling products containing EGM (Yle 15. 2. 2020; IL 15. 2. 2020). The main reasons for EGM are the profits of gaming machines, especially for small stores and restaurants, and the associated employment (IL 2019. 8. 15; HS 2019. 8. 26).
In response to this discussion, Veikkaus announced in September 2019 that it would reduce the number of EGMs in 2020 with other changes to improve the approach to "responsible gambling" (HS 2019. 9. 5 ksml 2019. 9. . 5). In October, VEIKKAUS stated that 3, 500 EGMs would be removed in 2020 and a total of up to 8, 000 machines would be removed (is 31. 10. 2019; KSML, 31. 10. 2019). The reduction is mainly implemented by removing some of the gaming machines from places with a large number of EGMs (YLE 2019. 12. 3). Veccaus's proposal was much inferior to the original proposal. Furthermore, in contrast to the Italian case, the reduction was not the number of resale points. This is probably due to the opposition of the reseller. One resale company representative, "We now have five machines. Remove two of the less profit and replace them with one more profitable one. The impact is minor (IS, 2020. 2. 24). Researchers criticized that the scope of the reduction plan was limited (KSML, 2019. 10. 31), but reports on this were limited. The monopoly's proposal seems to have been accepted by the media without any further discussions.
3.2 Qualitative method
The remaining articles focus on the financial results expected by the reduction. VEIKKAUS has about 150 million to 200 million in 2021, as of 2021, as of 2021, as of 2021, as of 2021, as of 2021, as of 2021, as of 2021, due to planned EGM reductions and other changes (marketing reductions in 2021). It is estimated to decrease the euro (Yle, 31. 10. 2019; KSML, 31. 10. 2019). The decrease in the total consumption will also affect the income of the beneficiary and the redistribution network. According to previous surveys, 60 % of Veckaus GGRs are pointed out to beneficiaries and almost 10 % are directed to the resale network. [37] It is estimated that the reduction will affect almost 2, 200 resellers (of the 6300) (Yle 2019. 12. 3), and some of them are concerned about the decline in income even in the media report (MTV3 2019. 11. 7). It has been expressed. Interestingly, gamblin g-related issues and the impact on the level of harm have been discussed anymore, and all discussions on the expected results are focused only on profits and beneficiaries.
As mentioned above, in Italy and Finland, EGM reductions were justified due to public health concerns, but the policy range varied. In Italy, a 35% reduction in gaming machines was the target. In Finland, the initial plan was to reduce 18% of non-casino gaming machines, which was later increased to 43%. In contrast to the 31% reduction in gambling venues in Italy, the Finnish reduction did not reduce resale points.Below, we present available data on the impact of reduction policies on total consumption.
4 Results
The Italian data on total EGM consumption focuses on reductions targeted at non-casino AWP machines from 2016 to 2019. Figure 1 shows the total reduction in the number of machines over the period, while Figure 2 shows the reduction in the number of venues.
4.1 Looking for an adequate channeling strategy
Many jurisdictions are struggling to curb offshore gambling, as well as the established approach to gambling regulation no longer applies to online gambling. The aim of this study is to examine the arguments used by Finnish actors who discussed channelling as a means to curb offshore gambling and a monopoly gambling regime as a sustainable framework to address the offshore gambling problem. For this study, a total of 18 Finnish civil servants working in the ministry responsible for gambling problems and representatives of the state-owned gambling company Veikkaus were interviewed. Channelling is an important policy tool, but in the absence of a regulatory framework to prevent offshore operations, it will remain a kind of idealised political strategy, according to the interviewees. Besides a monopoly gambling regime, the pros and cons of a potential licensing regime were discussed. The declining market share of online gambling marked the beginning of a new era in Finnish gambling policy. As mentioned above, in Italy and Finland, EGM reductions were justified by public health concerns, but the scope of the policies varied. In Italy, a 35% reduction in gaming machines was the goal. Finland initially planned to cut 18% of non-casino gaming machines, but later increased it to 43%. In contrast to Italy's 31% cut in gambling venues, the Finnish cut did not reduce resale points.
Below, we present available data on the impact of the cut policy on total consumption.
The Italian data on total EGM consumption focuses on the cut targeted at non-casino AWP machines from 2016 to 2019. Figure 1 shows the total reduction in the number of machines during the period, while Figure 2 shows the reduction in the number of venues.
Many jurisdictions are struggling to curb offshore gambling, as well as the established approach of gambling regulation no longer applies to online gambling. The aim of this study is to examine the arguments used by Finnish actors who discussed channelling as a means to curb offshore gambling and the monopoly gambling regime as a sustainable framework to address the offshore gambling problem. For this study, a total of 18 Finnish civil servants working in the ministry responsible for gambling issues and representatives of the state-owned gambling company Veikkaus were interviewed. Channelling is an important policy tool, but without a regulatory framework to prevent offshore operations, it will remain a kind of idealistic political strategy, the interviewees said. Besides a monopoly gambling regime, the pros and cons of a potential licensing regime were discussed. The declining market share of online gambling marked the beginning of a new era in Finnish gambling policy. As mentioned above, in Italy and Finland, the reduction of EGMs was justified by public health concerns, but the breadth of the policy varied. In Italy, a reduction of 35% gaming machines was the goal. In Finland, the initial plan was to reduce 18% of non-casino gaming machines, which was later increased to 43%. In contrast to the 31% reduction in gambling installations in Italy, the Finnish reduction did not reduce resale points.
Below, we present the available data on the impact of the reduction policies on total consumption.
Italian data on total EGM consumption focuses on cuts targeted at non-casino AWP machines from 2016 to 2019. Figure 1 shows the total reduction in the number of machines during the period, while Figure 2 shows the reduction in the number of venues.
Many jurisdictions are struggling to curb offshore gambling as well, as well as the established approach to gambling regulation no longer applies to online gambling. The aim of this study is to examine the arguments used by Finnish actors who discussed channeling as a means to curb offshore gambling and a monopoly gambling regime as a sustainable framework to address the offshore gambling problem. For this study, a total of 18 Finnish civil servants working in the ministry responsible for gambling problems and a representative of Veikkaus, the state-owned gambling company, were interviewed. Channeling is an important policy tool, but in the absence of a regulatory framework to prevent offshore operations, it will remain a kind of idealized political strategy, the interviewees stated. Besides a monopoly gambling regime, the pros and cons of a potential licensing regime were discussed. The decline in online gambling market share has marked the beginning of a new era in Finland's gambling policy.
Many jurisdictions have struggled to curb offshore gambling. Because offshore gambling originates across national and jurisdictional borders, it is difficult to regulate the online gambling sector with jurisdiction-specific structures (Gainsbury et al.). Because the online market is highly competitive, regulatory policies in different jurisdictions struggle to keep up with technological developments in the online gambling industry (Banks, 2014; also Järvinen-Tassopoulos, 2022). In more restrictive jurisdictions, including countries that operate gambling monopoly systems (e. g., Norway, Finland, and most Canadian provinces), a strategic measure called channeling has become increasingly important. Channeling refers to national authorities' attempts to steer online gambling into regulated markets by various means. Channeling can be achieved by making regulated offers more attractive to consumers (e. g., offering attractive gambling products, higher payout percentages, more intensive marketing). Conversely, channeling can also be achieved by making unregulated offers less attractive to consumers. Measures to achieve this range from criminalizing playing on offshore gambling sites to softer measures (e. g., limiting or banning advertising) (Lycka, 2014; Hörnle et al., 2018; Egerer and Marionneau, 2023). State-owned and state-controlled gambling companies are more likely to rely on jurisdictions' channeling policies since they cannot compete with private gambling sites.
This study scrutinizes channeling as a means to curb the offshore provision of gambling under monopoly regimes. Until now, only a few studies have explored the operational and political consequences of the tool of channelling (e. g. Nadeau et al., 2014; Littler and Järvinen-Tassopoulos, 2018; Borch, 2022; Selkee et al. However, to our knowledge, no previous studies have explored the experiences, views and challenges of channelling from the perspective of regulators and gambling provider representatives. This study focuses on Finland, a Nordic EU member state.
In June 2023, the recently elected Finnish righ t-wing administration has decided to reconnect the domestic online gambling market by introducing licenses to external providers since 2026. This movement leads to the movement of most European countries where the monopoly of gambling has already been resolved and the online market has been open to competition. Behind this decision, especially, despite attempts to strengthen monopoly, it may be difficult to control the offshore market and flush consumption to monopoly (Rydman and Tukia, 2019). In 2021, only 65%of the estimated 65%of the Finnish online gambling market was controlled by monopoly (H2 Gambling Capital, 2021), increasing from 14%in 2019 (Veikkaus, 2018). According to various estimates, Finns have lost 300 to 470 million euros per year on offshore websites (Sailas et al.)
4.2 Retaining players on a website without prohibiting online gambling
From the winter of 2018 to the spring of 2019, a total of 18 public servants in charge of gambling related matters in various ministries in Finnish and 18 representatives of Finnish stat e-owned gambling companies (VEIKKAUS) were interviewed for the purpose of this research. At the time of the interview, channeling was one of the foundation of Finnish gambling policy, along with the prevention of gambling damage. However, Prime Minister Sanna Marine's former administration has undergone the VEIKKAUS an outnitated that it can evolve in a changing online environment and improve operations in a responsible way, but to suppress offshore gambling. Was found to be difficult (Rydman and Tukia, 2019).
In this study, we focus on the social and economic impacts of Finnish stakeholders regarding the implementation of channeling measures to reduce offshore gambling, and the loss of the online market share. The research topic is as follows: (1) Is it considered an effective means to suppress offshore gambling? (2) Is it thought that maintaining an exclusive system is a sustainable solution for offshore gambling issues? < SPAN> In June 2023, the recently elected Finnish righ t-wing administration has decided to reconnect the domestic online gambling market by introducing licenses to external providers since 2026. This movement leads to the movement of most European countries where the monopoly of gambling has already been resolved and the online market has been open to competition. Behind this decision, especially, despite attempts to strengthen monopoly, it may be difficult to control the offshore market and flush consumption to monopoly (Rydman and Tukia, 2019). In 2021, only 65%of the estimated 65%of the Finnish online gambling market was controlled by monopoly (H2 Gambling Capital, 2021), increasing from 14%in 2019 (Veikkaus, 2018). According to various estimates, Finns have lost 300 to 470 million euros per year on offshore websites (Sailas et al.)
From the winter of 2018 to the spring of 2019, a total of 18 public servants in charge of gambling related matters in various ministries in Finnish and 18 representatives of Finnish stat e-owned gambling companies (VEIKKAUS) were interviewed for the purpose of this research. At the time of the interview, channeling was one of the foundation of Finnish gambling policy, along with the prevention of gambling damage. However, Prime Minister Sanna Marine's former administration has undergone the VEIKKAUS an outnitated that it can evolve in a changing online environment and improve operations in a responsible way, but to suppress offshore gambling. Was found to be difficult (Rydman and Tukia, 2019).
In this study, we focus on the social and economic impacts of Finnish stakeholders regarding the implementation of channeling measures to reduce offshore gambling, and the loss of the online market share. The research topic is as follows: (1) Is it considered an effective means to suppress offshore gambling? (2) Is it thought that maintaining an exclusive system is a sustainable solution for offshore gambling issues? In June 2023, the recently elected Finnish righ t-wing administration has decided to reconnect the domestic online gambling market by introducing licenses to external providers since 2026. This movement leads to the movement of most European countries where the monopoly of gambling has already been resolved and the online market has been open to competition. Behind this decision, especially, despite attempts to strengthen monopoly, it may be difficult to control the offshore market and flush consumption to monopoly (Rydman and Tukia, 2019). In 2021, only 65%of the estimated 65%of the Finnish online gambling market was controlled by monopoly (H2 Gambling Capital, 2021), increasing from 14%in 2019 (Veikkaus, 2018). According to various estimates, Finns have lost 300 to 470 million euros per year on offshore websites (Sailas et al.)
From the winter of 2018 to the spring of 2019, a total of 18 public servants in charge of gambling related matters in various ministries in Finnish and 18 representatives of Finnish stat e-owned gambling companies (VEIKKAUS) were interviewed for the purpose of this research. At the time of the interview, channeling was one of the foundation of Finnish gambling policy, along with the prevention of gambling damage. However, Prime Minister Sanna Marine's former administration has undergone the VEIKKAUS an outnitated that it can evolve in a changing online environment and improve operations in a responsible way, but to suppress offshore gambling. Was found to be difficult (Rydman and Tukia, 2019).
In this study, we focus on the social and economic impacts of Finnish stakeholders regarding the implementation of channeling measures to reduce offshore gambling, and the loss of the online market share. The research topic is as follows: (1) Is it considered an effective means to suppress offshore gambling? (2) Is it thought that maintaining an exclusive system is a sustainable solution for offshore gambling issues?
In the context of Europe, the regulations of online gambling are particularly difficult, and some of the jurisdictions (Malta, Gibraltar, the UK, etc.) function as "online gambling hubs" and gamble online operators. The fact that it is issued (Zborowska et al.) If many online gamblers provide gambling products and services in their native language, online gamblers have a license with license and license. It may be difficult to distinguish businesses that are not (Gainsbury et al.) Therefore, the existing approach to gambling regulations is no longer applicable to online gambling, and new measures beyond the borders to prevent gambling damage. Necessary (Zbolowska et al.) In addition, many offshore gambling companies are operating in the most harmful gambling products, such as online casinos and online sports betting (Gainsbury et al.)
The offshore gambling market is global, but regulations differ from country to country. Even in the European Union (EU), the gambling law is not in harmony between member countries. On the contrary, the European Commission (EC) is interested in protecting the EU Treaty and ensuring conformity between member countries (for example, Littler, 2011). Gambling is within the scope of Article 49 of the EU Function Treaty (TFEU) on the freedom of service. For this reason, the possibility of member states that restrict basic freedom to provide services in the domestic market is limited. Any restrictions must be legitimate and proportional (see Miettinen, 2022). Therefore, the regulation range of member countries regarding offshore gambling is limited. Most member countries have difficulty justifying restrictions in the domestic market, so they dismantle monopoly structures and often have subsidiaries in other members. Replaced with a license system that allows you to apply for online gambling approval (Costes et al, 2016; SCHMIDT-Kessen et al, 2019, etc.). Malta is a major EU member country that promotes the establishment of a private offshore company by permission to operate online gambling from its jurisdiction (Zbolowska et al., 2012; MyLymaa, 2017).
In addition to regulated issues, offshore gambling is usually reduced gambling income between the laws (GainSbury et al., 2018b; Borch, 2022; Järvinen; Järvinen; Järvinen; -Tassopoulos, 2022). The world's online market has grown more than 100 % since 2016 (H2 Gambling Capital, 2021). In 2022, the world's online gambling market is estimated to be $ 75. 2 billion, and is expected to reach $ 217 billion at the end of 2031 (Growth Marketing Report, 2023).
There are also measures that can be used by regulatory authorities to suppress offshore provision. These measures include, for example, blacklisting offshore website, IP addresses, monetary trading blocks, information to consumers, fines and claims for offshore providers. (Hörnle et al., 2018; Gainsbury et al., 2018a, b; Eger and Marionneau, 2023). In most of the context, these measures are only a few effects, but are widely adopted to achieve the purpose of channeling. Therefore, channeling is a kind of place holder (PLANZER, 2014) whose content changes according to the interests of various stakeholders (see Selkee et al.) < Span> The provision of offshore gambling is usually reduced in gambling income between the laws (Gainsbury et al., 2018b; BORCH, 2022; Järvinen-tassopoulos, 2022). The world's online market has grown more than 100 % since 2016 (H2 Gambling Capital, 2021). In 2022, the world's online gambling market is estimated to be $ 75. 2 billion, and is expected to reach $ 217 billion at the end of 2031 (Growth Marketing Report, 2023).
There are also measures that can be used by regulatory authorities to suppress offshore provision. These measures include, for example, blacklisting offshore website, IP addresses, monetary trading blocks, information to consumers, fines and claims for offshore providers. (Hörnle et al., 2018; Gainsbury et al., 2018a, b; Eger and Marionneau, 2023). In most of the context, these measures are only a few effects, but are widely adopted to achieve the purpose of channeling. Therefore, channeling has a kind of place holder (PLANZER, 2014) (see SELKEE et al.) In addition to regulating issues (see Selkee et al.), In addition to the content of changing the content according to the interests of various stakeholders. The provision is usually provided by offshore companies, so that tax is not paid in the laws targeted by offshore companies, so the gambling income between the laws is reduced (Gainsbury et al., 2018b; Borch, 2022; Järvinen-tassopouros, 2022). The world's online market has grown more than 100 % since 2016 (H2 Gambling Capital, 2021). In 2022, the world's online gambling market is estimated to be $ 75. 2 billion, and is expected to reach $ 217 billion at the end of 2031 (Growth Marketing Report, 2023).
There are also measures that can be used by regulatory authorities to suppress offshore provision. These measures include, for example, blacklisting offshore website, IP addresses, monetary trading blocks, information to consumers, fines and claims for offshore providers. (Hörnle et al., 2018; Gainsbury et al., 2018a, b; Eger and Marionneau, 2023). In most of the context, these measures are only a few effects, but are widely adopted to achieve the purpose of channeling. Therefore, channeling is a kind of place holder (PLANZER, 2014) whose content changes according to the interests of various stakeholders (see Selkee et al.).
4.3 Toward a licensing system?
Previous studies have shown that channeling policies are justified on at least three different grounds (Van Den Bogaert and Cuyvers, 2011; Borch, 2022; Selkee et al.:). First, channeling is an instrument for preventing gambling harm, since regulated markets are expected to have a higher level of consumer protection. This of course assumes that regulated gambling offers are really safe. If this is not the case, a larger size of the regulated market may lead to greater overall harm (Nadeau et al.). Second, it is expected that there will be less criminal activity (e. g. money laundering and fraud) in regulated markets, allowing channeling to also serve as a law enforcement tool. This objective is independent of the size of the regulated market. And again, channeling is only justified in this respect if the regulated offers are indeed well monitored. After all, even legalized and licensed online gambling markets are not free from illegal activities and illegal competition (e. g., Spapens et al., 2008; Banks, 2017; Rolando and Scavarda, 2018). Third, gambling generates surplus profits, which have traditionally been directed to supplement the state budget and other beneficiaries (Sulkunen et al.). Offshore gambling challenges the premise of gambling as a means of revenue collection. Channeling therefore also serves as a tool to protect public revenues. This objective may be behind many attempts to curb offshore gambling, even though it does not fit into EU law (e. g., Selin, 2019).
Eighteen thematic interviews were conducted with civil servants working in Finnish ministries responsible for gambling regulation, ownership control and gambling harm prevention, as well as with representatives of Veikkaus working in the executive, board and management committees. The interviews were conducted between winter 2018 and spring 2019. Candidates for interviews were contacted by email or phone. Those who agreed to be interviewed could choose to receive thematic questions in advance and had the right to refuse to participate in the study at any time. Previous studies have shown that channeling policies are justified on at least three different grounds (Van Den Bogaert and Cuyvers, 2011; Borch, 2022; Selkee et al:) First, channeling is a measure of gambling harm prevention, since regulated markets are expected to have a higher level of consumer protection. This of course assumes that regulated gambling offers are really safe. If this is not the case, the overall harm may be greater with a larger regulated market size (Nadeau et al.) Second, it is expected that there will be less criminal activity (e. g. money laundering and fraud) in regulated markets, allowing channeling to also serve as a law enforcement tool. This objective is independent of the size of the regulated market. And again, channeling is only justified in this respect if the regulated offer is indeed well monitored. After all, even legalized and licensed online gambling markets are not free from illegal activities and illegal competition (e. g., Spapens et al., 2008; Banks, 2017; Rolando and Scavarda, 2018). Third, gambling generates surplus profits, which have traditionally been directed to supplement the state budget and other beneficiaries (Sulkunen et al.). Offshore gambling challenges the premise of gambling as a means of revenue collection. Channeling therefore also serves as a tool to protect public revenues. This objective may be behind many attempts to curb offshore gambling, even though it does not fit into EU law (e. g., Selin, 2019).
Eighteen thematic interviews were conducted with civil servants working in Finnish ministries responsible for gambling regulation, ownership control and gambling harm prevention, as well as with representatives of Veikkaus working in the executive, board and management committees. The interviews were conducted between winter 2018 and spring 2019. Candidates for interviews were contacted by email or phone. Those who agreed to be interviewed could choose to receive thematic questions in advance and had the right to refuse to participate in the study at any time. Previous studies have shown that channeling policies are justified on at least three different grounds (Van Den Bogaert and Cuyvers, 2011; Borch, 2022; Selkee et al:) First, channeling is a measure of gambling harm prevention, since regulated markets are expected to have a higher level of consumer protection. This of course assumes that regulated gambling offers are really safe. If this is not the case, the overall harm may be greater if the size of the regulated market is larger (Nadeau et al.) Second, it is expected that there will be less criminal activity (e. g. money laundering and fraud) in regulated markets, allowing channeling to also serve as a law enforcement tool. This objective is independent of the size of the regulated market. And again, channeling is only justified in this respect if the regulated offer is indeed well monitored. After all, even legalized and licensed online gambling markets are not free from illegal activities and illegal competition (e. g., Spapens et al., 2008; Banks, 2017; Rolando and Scavarda, 2018). Third, gambling generates surplus profits, which have traditionally been directed to supplement the state budget and other beneficiaries (Sulkunen et al.). Offshore gambling challenges the premise of gambling as a means of revenue collection. Channeling therefore also serves as a tool to protect public revenues. This objective may be behind many attempts to curb offshore gambling, even though it does not fit into EU law (e. g., Selin, 2019).
Eighteen thematic interviews were conducted with civil servants working in Finnish ministries responsible for gambling regulation, ownership control and gambling harm prevention, as well as with representatives of Veikkaus working in the executive, board and management committees. The interviews were conducted between winter 2018 and spring 2019. Potential interviewees were contacted by email or telephone. Those who agreed to be interviewed could choose to receive thematic questions in advance and had the right to refuse to take part in the study at any time.
The interviewees are key stakeholders in the Finnish gambling scene (some of them political elites) and therefore can be defined as “experts” and “have special knowledge about the social phenomenon that interests the interviewer” (Gläser and Laudel, 2009, p. 117). In all interviews, relationships of interest, trust, power, control and hierarchy may influence this form of social interaction (Abels and Behrens, 2009). Most interviewees were friendly and provided the interviewers with important information about the current state of the Finnish online gambling market. In a few cases, the conversational exchange was hindered by the “profile effect” (Abels and Behrens, 2009, p. 144), which means that the interviewees were “showy” in front of the interviewer. On the other hand, the lead researcher felt pressured to gather information about the key stakeholders who influence the ownership of Veikkaus (JJT). In summary, the topic of ownership and online gambling governance was a hot political issue in Finland when the interviews were conducted and remains so today.
Two types of questions were used in the interviews. The civil servants were interviewed on topics focusing on ownership steering, gambling harm prevention, responsible gambling, and cooperation between the ministries and the Prime Minister's Office (home of the Ownership Steering Office). The representatives of Veikkaus were interviewed on topics related to business strategy, ownership steering, online competition between licensed and unlicensed operators, responsible gambling, and gambling harm prevention.
The interviews were conducted face-to-face (except for one phone call) and lasted between 40 minutes and 2 hours. The interviews were transcribed verbatim. In addition, the interviewees were guaranteed anonymity to protect their identity and could ask to see the transcript if they wished to make changes to the interview. The interview excerpts conducted with the representatives of Veikkaus are marked with "VE" and the interview excerpts conducted with the civil servants are marked with "PS". The identification number following “VE” or “PS” indicates the numerical order of the interview as it was stored in the Atlas. ti software.
The analysis of the interview data was performed using an inductive content analysis (elo and kyngäs, 2008) as a qualitative method. First, I read all text materials and identified the parts related to "channeling", "blocking", and "gambling regime" (open coding). Next, a variety of code created based on the interview was grouped, and a specific title was given (group and category). Finally, the information collected in different categories was abstracted as a result (see Table 1). ATLAS. ti 9 was used to support the cord classification of the open coding process and the theme group.
Table 1
Table 1. Three steps of inductive content analysis
Despite the various efforts to protect Finnish gambling due to competition with overseas online gambling (Selin, 2019), Veikkaus's online market share has declined. During the interview, the business strategy of the state-owned VEIKKAUS depended on the principle of "competitive monopoly" (see Järvinen-tassopouros, 2022). The fact that market share was declining and gambling profits continued to be deprived of overseas providers was an urgent issue. It seemed useless to match the demand for gambling without taking appropriate measures to prevent offshore gambling. At the same time, the interviewers were interested in and recognized the strengths and weaknesses of channeling. Some of them know how other Scandinavian countries (such as Sweden and Norway) are running gambling and channeling.
VEIKKAUS representatives and civil servants discussed the idea of changing to provide legal gambling and suppressing online gambling on unreliable offshore websites. VEIKKAUS representatives believed that channeling was a way to promote and develop gambling companies and detain Finnish gambling customers on the Veikkaus website. The biggest problem for them was that gambling profits were taken off by offshore providers and Finnish gamblers played on offshore website.
"We (VEIKKAUS) should have a channeling strategy (in Finnish) so that online gambling can be guided from offshore websites to Veikkaus websites. Approximately 260 million euros per year (offshore operator) The gambling provided by VEIKKAUS must not be played by other customers. " (VE9, Board of Directors).
According to previous research, gamblers have recognized (famous websites, wel l-reputed websites), referral information, offers, payout rates, customer protection, fairness of games, financial safety, etc. It is shown to select a website accordingly (Zbolowska et al., 2012; GAINSBURY, 2018b). In the EU, the stat e-owned gambling company has a different regulation from a private gambling company. Gambling revenue must not be the main focus of gambling in order to justify the monopoly market restrictions in the European single market. At the same time, to make the channeling strategy successful, the provider of the stat e-owned gambling must be very interesting for the player (Pallesen et al.
European gambling regulation authorities use various means to prevent offshore gambling providers from providing products and services to gamblers (hörnle et al, 2018; Schmidt-Kessen et al.), Especially, The use of website blocking is active as a forced measure: This measure is used by more than half of the EU/EEA member countries (Schmidt-Kessen et al.) Interviews. Since the blocking measures have not yet been implemented in Finland, the interviewers mean "blocking" is either a website or monetary trading blocking. VEIKKAUS representatives believe that blocking is a matter of consideration in searching for efficient means to limit the provision of unrelated gambling in Finland.
5 Discussion
It is understandable that many people think that there is no appropriate means to "regulate online gambling). Of course, blocking is one of the measures that could be considered (in Finland). Like other European countries. The license system protects the gambling system so that there is no free rider, and one way to deal with free rider is to block (Finnish) online markets. (Gambling) I was not talking about gambling restrictions instead of gambling. In other words, if the Gambler of Finnish does not play (on the VEIKKAUS website), this gambler is not very meaningful. I think that calling should be our common interest. " (VE17, executive level).
In this excerpt, the interviewee speaks to the interviewer in a dialogue for the common cause of channeling Finnish gambling demand to the domestic online market. Before channeling measures like payment blocking were implemented, most of the Veikkaus representatives criticized the regulation of gambling companies, saying that implementing restrictions on online gambling is a costly task and that the development of online products and services seems impossible under the current regulatory framework.
When gambling regulators want to block illegal gambling sites, they basically have two options: They can block the website by targeting the server hosting the website, effectively removing the website from the Internet. This can be achieved by sending a takedown request to the web hosting provider that runs the server. Regulators can also block websites by preventing clients from accessing them (Internet access blocking) (Schmidt-Kessen et al.).
The next representative of Veikkaus, while acknowledging the problem of offshore providers, understands that regulating unlicensed offerings requires a highly political decision:
"But then we have to discuss whether we can restrict their activity, since they (unlicensed offshore companies) are legal operators in their own jurisdiction. We talk about blocking them because they don't have a gambling license in Finland. Whether to block transfers or block IP addresses, that's something that the new government (of Prime Minister Sana Marin) and the owners, and maybe the parliamentarians, should discuss" (VE16, Executive Committee).As previous studies show, different jurisdictions have addressed the issue of offshore gambling with different measures depending on how their laws regulate online gambling (Gainsbury et al., 2018b; Egerer and Marionneau, 2023). According to Veikkaus representatives, the ability of state-owned gambling companies to compete with offshore gambling companies was undermined by regulators who did not fully understand the consequences of a decline in online market share. In addition to the failure of the channelling policy, the Finnish government was likely to lose interest in Veikkaus (Järvinen-Tassopoulos, 2022).
In comparison with the discourse of Veikkaus representatives, the public officials' views on channeling were more heterogeneous. The majority of these interviewees expressed concern with the prevention of gambling harm. Here, one of the public officials describes channeling from a prevention perspective:
"If we want the Finnish gambling operator Veikkaus to offer games and want Finns to play these games, we need to think about consumer protection, crime prevention and prevention of gambling harm. If we agree on these things and are politically described as such in this (monopoly gambling) regime, we need to find suitable gambling offers to direct online gamblers to the Veikkaus website. Our legal answer is that according to EU law, (gambling operations) are aimed at preventing gambling harm and therefore channeling is allowed" (PS3, Regulation). (PS3, Regulation).
Offshore gambling offers have been portrayed as more attractive and exciting for consumers than the gambling products offered by legal gambling providers (Gainsbury et al.). Channeling is not only about the right kind of gambling products and services, but also about keeping customers on licensed and regulated gambling sites:
"If consumers behave in a simple way, channeling means moving their gambling from one website to another. Then there is no problem because consumers will choose the less harmful games. But in reality, consumer behavior can be changed by marketing and product development. What happens if Veikkaus creates a new consumption? What will consumers do when they discover online slot machines, for example? Will they stay on Veikkaus websites? These are complex issues that have not yet been fully studied." (PS13, Prevention of gambling harm).
While the above interviewee (PS3) spoke about “offering proper gambling”, the latter interviewee (PS13) questioned the plans of Finnish gambling providers to develop gambling products and services. If the main objective of Finnish gambling policy is to prevent and limit gambling harm, directing online gambling to Veikkaus websites cannot encourage consumers through advertising campaigns and reminding gamblers about the “good purposes” for which gambling revenues are distributed in Finnish welfare society (Van Den Bogaert and Cuyvers, 2011; Littler and Järvinen-Tassopoulos, 2018; Marionneau and Kankainen, 2018).
Some civil servants saw channeling as a way to maintain the current monopoly in Finland. While most other Nordic and European countries chose to open up their online gambling markets to licensed gambling providers (e. g., Cisneros Örnberg and Hettne, 2018; Forsström and Cisneros Örnberg, 2019), Finnish regulators were still exploring ways to restrict offshore gambling offers within their monopoly regime:
"We are currently looking at ways to prevent offshore gambling with technical means. Prevention is a technical issue, but also a legal issue. Online gambling is not prohibited by the (Finland) Criminal Code. We (the regulators) have pondered the legal issues, and have done so sometimes with Veikkaus. The problem is not the gambler. If we think about offshore offers that are not regulated by the (Finland) Lottery Act, this is the problem we want to address. Even the National Police Agency is ready to consider options to prevent (offshore operations). But this online environment with no visible borders poses a challenge for regulators." (PS3, Regulation).
May 2018 In May, the Finnish Ministry of the Interior prepared amendments to the Lotteries Act (1047/2001). One of the aims of this preparation phase was to strengthen the channeling capabilities of Veikkaus. In addition, appropriate technical measures to block the offering of offshore gambling were investigated (Rydman and Tukia, 2019). The report (Rydman and Tukia, 2019) addressed blocking of access to websites and financial transactions between online gambling operators and gamblers.
6 Conclusion
One public official predicted how difficult it would be for Finnish gamblers to accept blocking measures that would prevent access to offshore sites:
"Finns are used to online gambling, so it is not suitable for their way of thinking that the Internet is blocked like North Korea or offshore gambling is prohibited by law. Finland's gambling method and offshore operations are not online gambling in the same (online) environment. It did not exist (PS12).
Data availability statement
The Dutch case was particularly interesting for Finnish regulatory authorities in 2018 and 2019. Interviews (PS12) seem to have stated that the Dutch gambling system is protected from offshore gambling rather than the Finnish gambling system. However, in the Netherlands, online sports betting and horse racing betting were available through exceptions for e-commerce (Littler and Järvinen-Tassopouros, 2018). Also, despite the fact that payment transactions cannot be blocked under the Dutch gambling gambling law, the payment blocks were based on "voluntary cooperation" by service providers (hörnle et al., 2018, p. 59; rydman). And Tukia, 2019).
Ethics statement
At the time of the interview, offshore gambling was opposed to Finnish gambling policies. The Finnish gambling administration has no longer able to turn online gambling demand to Veikkaus's gambling. VEIKKAUS representatives were interested in being able to develop new products and services, but Finnish public servants were interested in gambling damage and consumer protection. 。 The interview explained that channeling is an important policy means to suppress offshore provision, but if there is no solid political will and regulations to prevent offshore management and marketing, channeling is strong. It would be just a kind of ideal political strategy, rather than a realistic thing. < SPAN> "Finns are used to online gambling, so it is not suitable for their way of thinking that the Internet is cut off like North Korea or offshore gambling is prohibited by law. Remarks, Gambling (Finnish), and the same (online) protected system are prohibited in the Netherlands. There was no Dutch operator (PS12).
Author contributions
The Dutch case was particularly interesting for Finnish regulatory authorities in 2018 and 2019. Interviews (PS12) seem to have stated that the Dutch gambling system is protected from offshore gambling rather than the Finnish gambling system. However, in the Netherlands, online sports betting and horse racing betting were available through exceptions for e-commerce (Littler and Järvinen-Tassopouros, 2018). Also, despite the fact that payment transactions cannot be blocked under the Dutch gambling gambling law, the payment blocks were based on "voluntary cooperation" by service providers (hörnle et al., 2018, p. 59; rydman). And Tukia, 2019).
Funding
At the time of the interview, offshore gambling was opposed to Finnish gambling policies. The Finnish gambling administration has no longer able to turn online gambling demand to Veikkaus's gambling. VEIKKAUS representatives were interested in being able to develop new products and services, but Finnish public servants were interested in gambling damage and consumer protection. 。 The interview explained that channeling is an important policy means to suppress offshore provision, but if there is no solid political will and regulations to prevent offshore management and marketing, channeling is strong. It would be just a kind of ideal political strategy, rather than a realistic thing. "Finns are used to online gambling, so it is not suitable for their way of thinking that the Internet is cut off like North Korea or offshore gambling is prohibited by law. Finland's gambling method and offshore operations are not online gambling in the same (online) environment. It did not exist (PS12).
Acknowledgments
The Dutch case was particularly interesting for Finnish regulatory authorities in 2018 and 2019. Interviews (PS12) seem to have stated that the Dutch gambling system is protected from offshore gambling rather than the Finnish gambling system. However, online sports betting and horse racing betting were available in the Netherlands (Littler and Järvinen-Tassopouros, 2018). Also, despite the fact that payment transactions cannot be blocked under the Dutch gambling gambling law, the payment blocks were based on "voluntary cooperation" by service providers (hörnle et al., 2018, p. 59; rydman). And Tukia, 2019).
Conflict of interest
At the time of the interview, offshore gambling was opposed to Finnish gambling policies. The Finnish gambling administration has no longer able to turn online gambling demand to Veikkaus's gambling. VEIKKAUS representatives were interested in being able to develop new products and services, but Finnish public servants were interested in gambling damage and consumer protection. 。 The interview explained that channeling is an important policy means to suppress offshore provision, but the channeling is strong without a solid political will and regulations that prevent offshore management and marketing. It would be just a kind of ideal political strategy, rather than a realistic thing.
Publisher’s note
In 2018, the total value of the Gambling market in Finnish was about 250 million euros (a combination of the VEIKKAUS game (GGR) and the estimated H2 gambling capital provided by offshore gambling), and this market share in this market. Was 89 % (VEIKKAUS, 2018). VEIKKAUS has updated its business strategy from the end of 2019 to early 2020 following the public opinion against the marketing and the number of electronic gambling aircraft outside the casino. Instead of maintaining competitiveness among the core values of strategy, responsibilities, channeling skills, and new businesses (B2B businesses, etc.) have become new core themes (VEIKKAUS, 2019).
References
We asked all the interviewees how to define the purpose of the exclusive gambling system in Finland. Most civil servants mentioned the Finnish lottery in the answer:
"The purpose is described in the gambling law) is considered to be a better way to prevent gambling harm than any other system. (Veccacus) is considered to be a better way to prevent gambling. From my point of view, steering is a procedure and the job of the harmful evaluation group. " (PS13, prevention of gambling harm).
According to the lottery method, the prevention of gambling damage is the legal legal legal legal formation of the Finnish monopoly system, along with consumer protection and crime prevention. In the abov e-mentioned excerpts, public servants (PS13) talk about the steering, but it does not simply take the form of ownership steering. The harmful evaluation group has been appointed by the Ministry of Social Health in Finnish and issues gambling policies and management evaluations and reports. Therefore, the activities are steering on gambling policies and operations from a preventive perspective.
Since 2013, the EC stated that the Finnish gambling legislation has complied with the EU Law, Finnish regulatory authorities have become increasingly responsible for restricting and preventing gambling harm. In December 2017, a new loss limit for remittance to online games and online game accounts at a fas t-paced online game and online game accounts was set, and gambling dependents could be excluded from all online gambling, spending online gambling. It is now possible to set a time counter to record the time (Järvinen-tassopouros, 2018). At the time of the large epidemic of COVID-19, the loss limit for online gambling was reduced (Järvinen-tassopoulos et al.)
Another civil servant also stated the purpose of the exclusive gambling system, explaining the reasons why Finland has hindered the release of the online gambling market to a new provider.
"I don't think there is a courage to challenge the monopoly gambling system. This system is like a sacred truth, the benefits are enormous, and the system will (with gambling revenue). If the beneficiary is very influential, the beneficiary must be weakened. You will know how difficult it is. " (PS1, prevention of gambling damage).
This excerpt is a remarkable stakeholder who tries to maintain funding, "beneficiary" (such as a no n-governmental organization) of gambling revenue. It also suggests that Finnish civil society depends on gambling profits and eventually the monopoly system. At the same time, studies have shown that receiving funds from the gambling industry can be ethically suspicious and have problems with the receiving side (Marioneau and Kankainen, 2018). In other words, maintaining such a business relationship with various beneficiaries transforms the role of the Finnish state from a policy device to a revenue collector (Adams, 2008; orFord, 2011).
While most interviews agree to the purpose of the monopoly system, some commented on the possibility of establishing a license system in Finland. This is generally discussed due to the declining online market share of Veckaus. According to these interviews, payout rates, license fees, gambling revenue, and customer experiences are different in licensing. In addition, the opening of the online gambling market may prove that there is a risk not only for gamblers but also for the state: < Span>, and other civil servants talk about the purpose of the exclusive gambling system. He stated his views on the reasons that hindered the online gambling market to a new provider:
"I don't think there is a courage to challenge the monopoly gambling system. This system is like a sacred truth, the benefits are enormous, and the system will (with gambling revenue). If the beneficiary is very influential, the beneficiary must be weakened. You will know how difficult it is. " (PS1, prevention of gambling damage).
This excerpt is a remarkable stakeholder who tries to maintain funding, "beneficiary" (such as a no n-governmental organization) of gambling revenue. It also suggests that Finnish civil society depends on gambling profits and eventually the monopoly system. At the same time, studies have shown that receiving funds from the gambling industry can be ethically suspicious and have problems with the receiving side (Marioneau and Kankainen, 2018). In other words, maintaining such a business relationship with various beneficiaries transforms the role of the Finnish state from a policy device to a revenue collector (Adams, 2008; orFord, 2011).
While most interviews agree to the purpose of the monopoly system, some commented on the possibility of establishing a license system in Finland. This is generally discussed due to the declining online market share of Veckaus. According to these interviews, payout rates, license fees, gambling revenue, and customer experiences are different in licensing. In addition, the opening of the online gambling market can prove that there is a risk not only for gamblers but also for the nation: Another civil servant is online, while talking about the purpose of the exclusive gambling system. Explaining the reasons for hindering the gambling market to a new provider:
"I don't think there is a courage to challenge the monopoly gambling system. This system is like a sacred truth, the benefits are enormous, and the system will (with gambling revenue). If the beneficiary is very influential, the beneficiary must be weakened. You will know how difficult it is. " (PS1, prevention of gambling damage).
This excerpt is a remarkable stakeholder who tries to maintain funding, "beneficiary" (such as a no n-governmental organization) of gambling revenue. It also suggests that Finnish civil society depends on gambling profits and eventually the monopoly system. At the same time, studies have shown that receiving funds from the gambling industry can be ethically suspicious and have problems with the receiving side (Marioneau and Kankainen, 2018). In other words, maintaining such a business relationship with various beneficiaries transforms the role of the Finnish state from a policy device to a revenue collector (Adams, 2008; orFord, 2011).
While most interviews agree to the purpose of the monopoly system, some commented on the possibility of establishing a license system in Finland. This is generally discussed due to the declining online market share of Veckaus. According to these interviews, payout rates, license fees, gambling revenue, and customer experiences are different in licensing. The opening of the online gambling market can prove that there is a risk not only for gamblers but also for the nation:
"I hope the Finnish gambling system will not change as other things. Dozens of gambling operators will compete (in the license system). Competition will be stricter and competition is appropriate. In other words, it becomes more efficient, which has a competitive means that is not in Veccaus, and at the same time. (Omitted) The gambling market is likely to decrease (omitted). In the case of a system), it is necessary for Finnish people to collect the same amount of gambling (in the case of monopoly). If you do twice as much as you do, you will not want to see that in Finland, regardless of the gambling system. "Dou". (VE14, executive class).
Interviews are drawn almost chaos as a competition with offshore providers who cannot regulate or tax (see the metaphor of the Western Pioneering Age, 2018). This extraction recognizes that the need to maintain the same level of gambling profits in another gambling system, but that the increase in online gambling may increase the spread of gambling damage. When Sweden decided to reconnect online gambling under the license system, he imposed 18 % tax on GGR (Cisneros örnberg and Hettne, 2018) to a newly licensed provider. In France, the taxation level for gambling is 33. 7%for GGR in online sports betting and 1. 8%for online table games (Vila, 2020).
Many interviews were interested in Sweden cases, as Sweden opened the online market to former offshore providers during the interview. Here, a civil servant is disagreeing in the license process of Swedish online gambling products:
"It is pointless to compare Finland with Sweden. Sweden maintains a monopoly on things like lotteries, which is very strange. That is, the least harmful products are excluded (among the licensed games). How does the EU accept this? The Swedish monopoly should include the products with the most harmful features. In any case, Sweden moved to a licensing system in which various gambling companies operate legally. (PS2, regulation).
Licensing systems can use various measures to prevent gambling harm. Identity verification, financial and time limits, and self-exclusion are measures also used in monopoly gambling systems. One of the more specific measures is called the "duty of care", which requires gambling companies to warn or contact problem gamblers when their gambling behavior becomes dangerous, and to provide problem gamblers with information about help and where they can find help (Forsström and Cisneros Örnberg, 2019). Additionally, maintaining blacklists of unauthorized offshore websites, restricting transactions to offshore websites, restricting advertising, and using landing pages to provide information to gamblers are channeling measures in the licensing regime (Gainsbury et al., 2018a; Schmidt-Kessen et al.). Online gambling harm prevention begins with gambling products and services, but to be successful it requires appropriate gambling policies and strong regulation of online gambling operations.
At the time of the interview, the Finnish online market was opaque. Nevertheless, the purpose of the monopoly system was clear for the interviewees. Some interviewers were prepared to talk about another gambling system, but their vision was based on the knowledge of Sweden and the Netherlands. Although channeling does not depend on a specific gambling system, it is a strategic means used to convert the government to an offshore offer that has not been approved for gambling demand (Borch, 2022). In Finland, the revised lottery law (1284/2021) was enforced in January 2023, and it is prohibited from not approved gambling providers to operate or advertise in Finland, and the fines and fines are subject. Until it was done, channeling was rather a policy basis. This study only means that channeling is an effective strategic means only when offshore providers have restricted access to the domestic online gambling market and take appropriate measures to prevent gambling damage. Was shown.
The results of this study indicate that the growing importance of offshore gambling operation may have a significant impact on gambling regulations at the jurisdiction level. Since 2018, offshore operators have lost their market share, and Finnish officials have emphasized channeling policy. The purpose of channeling was used to justify a variety of policy approaches, such as revision of Finnish lottery methods and appropriate measures to prevent offshore provision (see Rydman and Tukia, 2019). In addition, there were interviews that anticipate the possibility of shifting from the monopoly gambling system to the license system. However, at the time of the interview, no one was ready for this change. In particular, in Sweden, many interviews have learned about the recent movement of the license system in 2019 in 2019. Prior to this change, the monopoly share in the Sweden online gambling market dropped to 47 % (Selkee et al.) As a result, as the market share of online gambling increased, channeling could be a guideline for domestic gambling regulations. Is shown.
Previous studies suggest that channeling policies are justified in terms of higher levels of consumer protection, reduced criminal activity, and profit surplus (see Van Den Bogaert and Cuyvers, 2011; Borch, 2022; Selkee et al.). Our results partially support these findings. In our study, channeling was specifically considered as a means to prevent gambling harms (socio-economic hypothesis by Nadeau et al., 2014). Veikkaus representatives considered online gambling offered by state-owned gambling companies to be less harmful (and therefore more responsible) than online gambling offered by offshore competitors. For example, Veikkaus did not offer consumers welcome bonuses or free spins (Gainsbury et al.). Profit surplus was also cited as a feature of the Finnish monopoly gambling regime. Finally, none of the interviewees mentioned criminal activity. Some Veikkaus representatives criticized offshore operators as untrustworthy, but more organized criminal activities such as money laundering and match fixing were not mentioned.
Gambling regulation approaches vary by era and policy goals. To understand the regulatory and political context related to the channeling approach, in which the new Finnish government decided to change its approach to the licensing of online gambling providers, Kingma's (2008) theory on gambling regulation was applied in this study. Kingma (2008) shows how the liberalization and virtualization of gambling operations changed gambling regulation in the Netherlands by creating different prototypes of regulatory models. In Kingma's theory, the "alibi model" refers to legalizing gambling to avoid illegal markets and restricting the provision of gambling by suppressing the pursuit of private profits. In this model, gambling revenues are allocated to "goodwill" (Kingma, 2008; Chambers, 2011). Previous studies suggest that channeling policies are justified in terms of higher levels of consumer protection, reduced criminal activity, and profit surplus (see Van Den Bogaert and Cuyvers, 2011; Borch, 2022; Selkee et al.). Our results partially support these findings. In our study, channeling was specifically considered as a means to prevent gambling harms (socio-economic hypothesis by Nadeau et al., 2014). Veikkaus representatives considered online gambling offered by state-owned gambling companies to be less harmful (and therefore more responsible) than online gambling offered by offshore competitors. For example, Veikkaus did not offer consumers welcome bonuses or free spins (Gainsbury et al.). Profit surplus was also cited as a feature of the Finnish monopoly gambling regime. Finally, none of the interviewees mentioned criminal activity. Some Veikkaus representatives criticized offshore operators as untrustworthy, but more organized criminal activities such as money laundering and match fixing were not mentioned.
Gambling regulation approaches vary by era and policy goals. To understand the regulatory and political context related to the channeling approach, in which the new Finnish government decided to change its approach to the licensing of online gambling providers, Kingma's (2008) theory on gambling regulation was applied in this study. Kingma (2008) shows how the liberalization and virtualization of gambling operations changed gambling regulation in the Netherlands by creating different prototypes of regulatory models. In Kingma's theory, the "alibi model" refers to legalizing gambling to avoid illegal markets and restricting the provision of gambling by suppressing the pursuit of private profits. In this model, gambling revenues are allocated to "goodwill" (Kingma, 2008; Chambers, 2011). Previous studies suggest that channeling policies are justified in terms of higher levels of consumer protection, reduced criminal activity, and profit surplus (see Van Den Bogaert and Cuyvers, 2011; Borch, 2022; Selkee et al.). Our results partially support these findings. In our study, channeling was specifically considered as a means to prevent gambling harms (socio-economic hypothesis by Nadeau et al., 2014). Veikkaus representatives considered online gambling offered by state-owned gambling companies to be less harmful (and therefore more responsible) than online gambling offered by offshore competitors. For example, Veikkaus did not offer consumers welcome bonuses or free spins (Gainsbury et al.). Profit surplus was also cited as a feature of the Finnish monopoly gambling regime. Finally, none of the interviewees mentioned criminal activity. Some Veikkaus representatives criticized offshore operators as untrustworthy, but more organized criminal activities such as money laundering and match fixing were not mentioned.
Gambling regulation approaches vary by era and policy goals. To understand the regulatory and political context related to the channeling approach, in which the new Finnish government decided to change its approach to the licensing of online gambling providers, Kingma's (2008) theory on gambling regulation was applied in this study. Kingma (2008) shows how the liberalization and virtualization of gambling operations changed gambling regulation in the Netherlands by creating different prototypes of regulatory models. In Kingma's theory, the "alibi model" refers to legalizing gambling to avoid illegal markets and restricting the provision of gambling by suppressing the pursuit of private profits. In this model, gambling revenues are allocated to "goodwill" (Kingma, 2008; Chambers, 2011).
Instead of using the "risk model" to represent the regulatory change from the "alibi model" in the Dutch case, we propose a new model to represent Finland's online gambling policy from 2018 (see Table 2). Kingma's (2008) "risk model" proposes a "liberal political approach" (Chambers, 2011) to gambling, which is considered a commercial entertainment. In the "risk model", the economic importance of the gambling sector is acknowledged and a controlled gambling market prevents risks such as addiction and crime. Our "dam model" captures a gambling policy that aims to steer online gambling towards regulated offers and actively prevent offers from elsewhere. Although the "alibi model" well represents the Finnish online gambling regime (Littler and Järvinen-Tassopoulos, 2018), a policy shift took place around 2018, led by channeling objectives. Table 2
Table 2. Model of online gambling regulation in Finland [based on Kingma (2008) and Littler and Järvinen-Tassopoulos (2018)].
Table 2 shows how the channeling approach, or “dam model”, differs from the alibi model in the context of online gambling regulation in Finland. In the 2000s, online gambling was considered a potentially harmful activity that was best regulated in a monopoly regime. Although there was some competition from unlicensed online gambling operators, policymakers were more concerned with justifying the monopoly gambling regime to the European Commission, which emphasized the importance of preventing gambling harm (Littler and Järvinen-Tassopoulos, 2018). The “alibi model” presents a “social democratic view” of gambling (Myllymaa, 2017, p. 233), i. e. gambling was seen as an exceptional activity that does not generate any added value necessary for economic growth and value enhancement. The ideal state is the Finnish welfare state, where welfare is provided by the public sector (the state and municipalities), the private sector (the market), civil society (third sector organisations, non-governmental organisations) and the family (Pessi and Grönlund, 2011).
Despite multiple attempts to reform the Finnish Lotteries Act in the 2000s and 2010s (Selkee et al. This strategy also has an impact on the moral meaning of online gambling and the basis of gambling law in Finland. Moreover, this monopoly regime and strong regulatory model seem to fit the ideal of a welfare state in which gambling revenues are a "just cause". However, Hellman and Alanko (2021) point out that funding the third sector with gambling revenues is problematic. The public and third sectors can have opposing roles (e. g., non-governmental organizations fill in the gaps in services or provide similar services), and third sector activities are offset by gambling activities that fund services (e. g., a large part of gambling revenues come from individuals with gambling problems) (see Table 1, Hellman and Alanko, 2021, p. 96).
The reform of the Finnish Lotteries Act began in May 2018 and its objectives include Veikkaus These included strengthening the channeling capacity of Finnish gambling companies and preventing offshore offerings (Rydman and Tukia, 2019). Therefore, online gambling regulation moved to a new model (the “dam model”) aimed at improving channeling measures and protecting the Finnish online market from unlicensed gambling providers. Since 2018, the moral meaning of online gambling has changed: offshore gambling was considered more harmful for Finnish gamblers than gambling on domestically regulated websites, as also highlighted in the interviews in our study. To ensure Veikkaus’ competitiveness in the face of offshore competition, as also highlighted in the company’s business strategy in 2018, Finnish society (represented by civil servants in this study) needs to create new solutions to defend the monopoly regime and strengthen channeling policies. The latter issue would be better addressed if state-owned gambling companies were deregulated and allowed the same means (e. g. welcome bonuses) as offshore companies to attract customers (see Järvinen-Tassopoulos, 2022).
See HEISKALA and LUHTAKALLIO, 2006; see Rainio-Niemi, 2015) and the effects of globalization in Finnish society Power), technology (Development and spread of information technology), institutional (pressure on regulations), organizational (spreading networks), productive (emphasis on product virtualization, competition and demand), public policy (public policy) It refers to a sudden change at the level of competitiveness and growth (Heiskala and Luhtakallio, 2006; Rainio-niemi, 2015). Table 2 shows the virtualization of gambling, requiring a new political position for the online competition and the evolution of the online gambling market. The Internet is a globalized metaphor, and the "Corporate Political Approach" (Chambers, 2011), such as "Alibi Model", is no longer able to respond to continuous competition that controls the world online gambling market. Maybe.
From 2024, it is expected that gambling revenue will be transferred to a national budget without budgeting, and this change will guarantee the consistency between the gambling system and the values of the Nordic welfare national model (). Hellman and Alanko, 2021). Nevertheless, competitiveness is a keyword for neoliberal governance, which means that this is a guarantee of the accumulation of capital and the optimal conditions for maximizing labor. (Saarinen et al.) With this in mind, "Dam model" is a temporary model, and if the current gambling system ends, it is presumed that it will be replaced by a more appropriate regulatory model. Can do. The ideal type of the < SPAN> competitive society "(see HEISKALA and LUHTAKALLIO, 2006; Rainio-Niemi, 2015) is the effect of globalization in Finnish society Talent (competitiveness ), Technical (development and spread of information technology), institutional (pressure on regulation renewal), organizational (spreading network), productive (emphasis on product virtualization, competition and demand), public It refers to a sudden change at the policy (competitiveness and growth) level (Heiskala and Luhtakallio, 2006; Rainio-Niemi, 2015). Table 2 shows the virtualization of gambling, requiring a new political position for the online competition and the evolution of the online gambling market. The Internet is a globalized metaphor, and the "Corporate Political Approach" (Chambers, 2011), such as "Alibi Model", is no longer able to respond to continuous competition that controls the world online gambling market. Maybe.
From 2024, it is expected that gambling revenue will be transferred to a national budget without budgeting, and this change will guarantee the consistency between the gambling system and the values of the Nordic welfare national model (). Hellman and Alanko, 2021). Nevertheless, competitiveness is a keyword for neoliberal governance, which means that this is a guarantee of the accumulation of capital and the optimal conditions for maximizing labor. (Saarinen et al.) With this in mind, "Dam model" is a temporary model, and if the current gambling system ends, it is presumed that it will be replaced by a more appropriate regulatory model. Can do. See HEISKALA and LUHTAKALLIO, 2006; see Rainio-Niemi, 2015) and the effects of globalization in Finnish society Power), technology (Development and spread of information technology), institutional (pressure on regulations), organizational (spreading networks), productive (emphasis on product virtualization, competition and demand), public policy (public policy) It refers to a sudden change at the level of competitiveness and growth (Heiskala and Luhtakallio, 2006; Rainio-niemi, 2015). Table 2 shows the virtualization of gambling, requiring a new political position for the online competition and the evolution of the online gambling market. The Internet is a globalized metaphor, and the "Corporate Political Approach" (Chambers, 2011), such as "Alibi Model", is no longer able to respond to continuous competition that controls the world online gambling market. Maybe.
From 2024, it is expected that gambling revenue will be transferred to a national budget without budgeting, and this change will guarantee the consistency between the gambling system and the values of the Nordic welfare national model (). Hellman and Alanko, 2021). Nevertheless, competitiveness is a keyword for neoliberal governance, which means that this is a guarantee of the accumulation of capital and the optimal conditions for maximizing labor. (Saarinen et al.) With this in mind, "Dam model" is a temporary model, and if the current gambling system ends, it is presumed that it will be replaced by a more appropriate regulatory model. Can do.
This result is important for policy. If channeling becomes a guideline for gambling regulations, concerns about other regulations may be shadowed. Channeling suggests that the regulated gambling and the gambling provided in the country are "more safe" or "better" options, but are regulated, of f-shore gambling. Gambling may cause serious harm. By 2026, the Finnish gambling market will be partially opened to approved online gambling providers. Nevertheless, the purpose of channeling will continue to be a leading principle. In other European countries, which have recently adopted license systems, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, the channeling rate to regulatory controls is still a central interest in policy and is an index of institutional success. In the future, the purpose of Chanring in Finland is that if the range of gambling companies will increase, total consumption and harm may increase (Nadeau et al., But the result suggests. The monopoly is not unrelated to competition in the future, rather than turning off gamblers consumption, or at least the most harmful products. It may be focused.
This study has several limits. Our data is consisting of an interview with ke y-i n-tonants involved in regulations and provisions of gambling. Their gambling can be affected by their position and "profile effect". In addition, it is limited to Finnish cases to explain the shift of regulatory models from Alibi Model to the new "Dam model". It is unlikely that Finnish cases are completely represented by other regulatory models in Europe and other regions. It is worth noting that in the context of Finnish, there is almost no "risk model". Channeling has a different meaning in context, which is reflected in various embodiment (Van Den Bogaert and Cuyvers, 2011; Borch, 2022; Järvinen-tassopoulos, 2022; Selkee et al.) The system has historically associated with the funding of "good intentions" by gambling profits (see "Public Relations" and "Public Interest"). Järvinen-tassopoulos and Eräsaari, 2018; SULKUNEN, 2018).
To confirm whether the transition to the "dam model" will be applied in other areas, and whether the fundamental principle and grounds are different in other areas, further investigations from other contexts are required. Probably. Furthermore, the regulatory model is an ideal type, rather than a clearly defined or mutual exclusive application. As Kingma (2008) has pointed out, various regulatory principles may coexist and compete. Depending on the context, especially when the gambling market is open to a generous license system, the "dam model" will strongly attract the characteristics of "neoliberal views" (MyLLYMAA, 2017, P. 233). It may be.
Channeling is a specific regulatory means, its purpose is to prevent the harm of online gambling and protect the national or stat e-owned gambling online market share to the online gambling market in the domestic online gambling market. It is to guide gambling. As a regulatory means, channeling does not depend on a specific legal system or gambling system. In addition, channeling is composed of various policy means, including the fact that the stat e-owned gambling is more attractive and gambling other than the stat e-owned gambling is not attractive. In accordance with the principles of channeling, which is included in the "Dam Model, Finland was implemented in early 2023 in 2023. However, as we have revealed in our survey, the channeling principle alone cannot completely solve the problem of offshore gambling provision unless additional measures are taken. Furthermore, excessive emphasis on channeling may be covered by domestic market problems.
Domestic officials have important information on the development of the online gambling market, legal development in jurisdiction, and online gambling. This study indicates that the change in legislation and regulations is a long political process defined by agenda settings, decisio n-making, and implementation (Zahariadis, 2014). Further to record a complete policy process related to the transition from a gambling system to another gambling system in Finland and other countries, the transition to the "dam model" and the "dam model" Research is required.
Raw data that supports the conclusion of this paper can be obtained by the authors without hesitation.
Veccaus's management has allowed employees to interview employees for research purposes, so human research did not require ethical approval. Public servants have accepted them individually to be interviewed for research. Research was conducted in accordance with the requirements of local laws and research institutions. Participants provided a written informed outlet for participation in this research.
JJ-T JJ-T: Conceptualization, formal analysis, funding, investigation, methodology, software, writing-original draft, writing and editing. VM: Conceptualization, fund acquisition, survey, writing-original draft, writing-review / editing. ME: Conceptualization, fund acquisition, writing-Review and edit.
The author states that he received financial support for research, writing, or publishing in this paper. JJ-T research at the Finnish Health and Welfare Research Institute has been funded by the Finnish Ministry of Social Health within the purpose of the lottery law §52. VM was funded by the Ministry of Social Health and Finnish Academy based on Article 52 of the Finnish lottery law (project 349589). ME received funding from the Ministry of Social Health based on Article 52 of the Finnish lottery law.
JJ-T is grateful to the interviewers of the interviews and the researcher of Vuokko Härmä for cooperating with the 2018 interview collection.
The authors declare that the investigation was conducted without a commercial or financial relationship that could be interpreted as potential conflicts of interest.
All claims stated in this paper are the authors, and does not necessarily represent the assertions of their organizations, publishers, editors, and reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or a claim that the manufacturer may claim is not guaranteed or supported by the publisher.
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