The UAE s Rising Military Role in Africa Defending Interests Advancing Influence ISPI

The UAE’s Rising Military Role in Africa: Defending Interests, Advancing Influence

The United Arab Emirates in Africa is mainly for marine control, which has two important strategic routes, the Red Sea heading to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean heading to the Indian Ocean. The military reliance of the United Arab Emirates is in accordance with the three major patterns: the fight against Jihadopism, the cooperation of African countries, and the involvement in conflicts such as Libya and Sudan.

This analysis is the second part: eleonora Ardemagni, "One Port, One Node: The Geopolitical Road to Africa", ISPI, June 13, 2023

Since the 2010s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has strengthened military relations with many African countries, especially the square Sahel region. This has accelerated since the 2020s. On the other hand, this trend is due to the growing economic presence of the principal in Africa (infrastructure, commercial port, fossil energy and renewable energy, mining). On the other hand, it also shows the principal's willingness to strengthen political influence in the African continent.

The activity of the Emirates in Africa indicates important marine elements. In fact, it is a combination of commercial intentions (eg, port and coastal infrastructure) and geopolitical intentions (eg, the control of sea lane, military projection), often overlapping. In Africa, the involvement of UAE can be mainly traced in two oceans. One is Red Med Med (the direction from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean), and the other is Red India (the direction from the Red Sea to the West Indian Ocean). Thus, the Red Sea is located in the center of the crossing regional geopolitics of the principal, which includes Yemen. The United Arab Emirates's activities in Africa are mainly ocean control with two important strategic routes, the Red Sea heading to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean heading to the Indian Ocean. The military reliance of the United Arab Emirates is in accordance with the three major patterns: the fight against Jihadopism, the cooperation of African countries, and the involvement in conflicts such as Libya and Sudan.

This analysis is the second part: eleonora Ardemagni, "One Port, One Node: The Geopolitical Road to Africa", ISPI, June 13, 2023

Main Findings:

The activity of the Emirates in Africa indicates important marine elements. In fact, it is a combination of commercial intentions (eg, port and coastal infrastructure) and geopolitical intentions (eg, the control of sea lane, military projection), often overlapping. In Africa, the involvement of UAE can be mainly traced in two oceans. One is Red Med Med (the direction from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean), and the other is Red India (the direction from the Red Sea to the West Indian Ocean). Thus, the Red Sea is located in the center of the crossing regional geopolitics of the principal, which includes Yemen. The United Arab Emirates in Africa is mainly for marine control, which has two important strategic routes, the Red Sea heading to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean heading to the Indian Ocean. The military reliance of the United Arab Emirates is in accordance with the three major patterns: the fight against Jihadopism, the cooperation of African countries, and the involvement in conflicts such as Libya and Sudan.
This analysis is the second part: eleonora Ardemagni, "One Port, One Node: The Geopolitical Road to Africa", ISPI, June 13, 2023
Since the 2010s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has strengthened military relations with many African countries, especially the square Sahel region. This has accelerated since the 2020s. On the other hand, this trend is due to the growing economic presence of the principal in Africa (infrastructure, commercial port, fossil energy and renewable energy, mining). On the other hand, it also shows the principal's willingness to strengthen political influence in the African continent.
The activity of the Emirates in Africa indicates important marine elements. In fact, it is a combination of commercial intentions (eg, port and coastal infrastructure) and geopolitical intentions (eg, the control of sea lane, military projection), often overlapping. In Africa, the involvement of UAE can be mainly traced in two oceans. One is Red Med Med (the direction from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean), and the other is Red India (the direction from the Red Sea to the West Indian Ocean). Thus, the Red Sea is located in the center of the crossing regional geopolitics of the principal, which includes Yemen.
UAE's military role in Africa is following three patterns. The first is a rebellion group and pirates related to Jihad Terrorism (Al Qaeda, is), the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization that UAE is listed as terrorists). The goal is to support African countries develop / improve the defense capabilities through military training and education. The second pattern is related to military provision and cooperation in the defense industry, aiming to strengthen the stabilit y-oriented partnership with the government invested by UAE. The third pattern is about the activity of the Emirates in conflict areas (Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia), and the principal authorities are usually denied, but they have an influence through military support for no n-state armed forces. The purpose is to enhance it. In any cooperative case, one pattern tends to overwhelm, but two patterns may be connected on the same stage.
The military presence strategy of Africa also includes the flexible scheme of the military outpost base, which is installed, expanded, or temporarily used by the principal to support the goal. This expansion of this role in the African continent may expose the UAE to security risks in the medium to long term.
UAE has developed defense and military relations with African countries to protect the economic interests of their country from unstable situations and terrorism and to enhance geopolitical influence;

The main means of growing military roles in Africa are training and education, cooperation in the defense industry, providing weapons, and informal support for local armed forces;

Since the 2010s, UAE has established defense and military relations, especially in the eastern African countries and the Sahel region;

For the past eight years (after 2016), UAE signing into eight memorandums (agreements) focusing on the struggle with terrorism in Africa (Somalia, Puntrandia, Ethiopia, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Kenya, Mozambique );

Since the 2010s, UAE has provided or provided military training and education to eight countries in Africa (Somalia, Puntrand, Somalyland, Ethiopia, Chad, Mauritania, Morocco) and invested in local defense capabilities. UAE's military role in Africa follows three patterns. The first is a rebellion group and pirates related to Jihad Terrorism (Al Qaeda, is), the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization that UAE is listed as terrorists). The goal is to support African countries develop / improve the defense capabilities through military training and education. The second pattern is related to military provision and cooperation in the defense industry, aiming to strengthen the stabilit y-oriented partnership with the government invested by UAE. The third pattern is about the activity of the Emirates in conflict areas (Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia), and the principal authorities are usually denied, but they have an influence through military support for no n-state armed forces. The purpose is to enhance it. In any cooperative case, one pattern tends to overwhelm, but two patterns may be connected on the same stage.

The military presence strategy of Africa also includes the flexible scheme of the military outpost base, which is installed, expanded, or temporarily used by the principal to support the goal. This expansion of this role in the African continent may expose the UAE to security risks in the medium to long term.

The Emirati Military Ties in Africa. Patterns, Goals and Tools

UAE has developed defense and military relations with African countries to protect the economic interests of their country from unstable situations and terrorism and to enhance geopolitical influence;

The main means of growing military roles in Africa are training and education, cooperation in the defense industry, providing weapons, and informal support for local armed forces;

Since the 2010s, UAE has established defense and military relations, especially in the eastern African countries and the Sahel region;

Since the 2010s, UAE has provided or provided military training and education to eight countries in Africa (Somalia, Puntrand, Somalyland, Ethiopia, Chad, Mauritania, Morocco) and invested in local defense capabilities. The military role of UAE in Africa is following three patterns. The first is a rebellion group and pirates related to Jihad Terrorism (Al Qaeda, is), the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization that UAE is listed as terrorists). The goal is to support African countries develop / improve the defense capabilities through military training and education. The second pattern is related to military provision and cooperation in the defense industry, aiming to strengthen the stabilit y-oriented partnership with the government invested by UAE. The third pattern is about the activity of the Emirates in conflict areas (Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia), and the principal authorities are usually denied, but they have an influence through military support for no n-state armed forces. The purpose is to enhance it. In any cooperative case, one pattern tends to overwhelm, but two patterns may be connected on the same stage.

The main means of growing military roles in Africa are training and education, cooperation in the defense industry, providing weapons, and informal support for local armed forces;

Since the 2010s, UAE has established defense and military relations, especially in the eastern African countries and the Sahel region;

Since the 2010s, seven African countries that signed commercial port concessions with Emirati DP World and AD Ports Group have subsequently established defense industrial and/or military ties with the UAE (DRC, Angola, Tanzania, Somaliland, Egypt, Senegal, Mozambique, see previous analysis).

Since the mid-2010s, the UAE has developed a flexible scheme of military bases in African countries (Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Somaliland, Puntland, Somalia, Chad) built/expanded/temporarily used by the Emirates to support protean military deployments and objectives far removed from the traditional “base” pattern. Yemen fits into this picture as part of the broader Red Sea region;

On counterterrorism, recent events have revealed Emirati engagement with African jihadi groups, particularly in Somalia and in the fight against Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab. In June 2023, the UAE conducted its first manned military operation in Somalia. The first publicly reported airstrike by the Emirates was with a Turkish-made Bayraktar drone targeting a jihadist-held village in the Galgud region.

In February 2024, 18 soldiers, including three from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and one from Bahrain, were killed and 20, including two Emiratis, were injured in an attack by men in military uniforms who had infiltrated the General Gordon Training Center, a military facility in Mogadishu run by Emirati soldiers. The attack was claimed by Al-Shabaab, and the perpetrator was a defected former terrorist who had since enlisted in the military.

Al-Shabaab, which had already targeted Emirati forces within Somalia's borders in 2015[1] and 2019[2], defined the UAE as an "enemy" for its support of the Somali government in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist attacks and the recent Somali Navy contract with Turkiye have reportedly led the UAE to scale back its financial support for the Somali military and limit its funding to the defense of Mogadishu and key facilities.

In Africa, as elsewhere, military training and education are key to Emirati foreign policy.[3] This has been experimented with in many African countries, both with states and non-state armed actors, for bilateral cooperation and patron-client relationships. The UAE's focus on providing military training and education support in third countries is based on the Emirati experience in peacekeeping operations and, more recently, its emphasis on stabilization policy.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the UAE participated in Western-led peace support operations (PSOs), including in Somalia (US-led UNITAF in 1993-1994). In 2011, the UAE (along with Qatar) participated in Operation Unified Protection in Libya, where Emirati fighter jets implemented a no-fly zone against Muammar Gaddafi's forces. In April 2021, the UAE supported the French military's Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, announcing "logistical support flights to support the international community's efforts to combat terrorism, with France at the center." From the Emirati perspective, involvement in stabilization operations is aimed primarily at enhancing its geopolitical status in third countries. Promoting broader institution-building with partners is rather a complementary goal, "emphasizing the political nature of stabilization operations."[4] The UAE develops military ties with African countries primarily to counter terrorism, insurgency, and piracy, and to strengthen government control over the territories of countries where the Emirates have economic interests.

Pattern 1 Countering terrorism and piracy: Emirati defense capacity improvement goal through military training and education.

Somalia In January 2023, the UAE and Somalia signed an agreement to strengthen military-security relations along with counterterrorism cooperation to enhance "institutional capacity building of Somali security forces and support for ongoing efforts to eradicate Al-Shabaab from Somalia." The UAE primarily supports the Stabilization Force for Capital Security, which is currently training in Eritrea as of 2023. Somali military recruits undergo part of an Emirati-led training program in Uganda and Ethiopia. The UAE also provides funding and training to the Somali Military Police. In March 2023, the UAE deployed military vehicles to the Jubaland region of southern Somalia. The contract also includes training of local forces.[5] In 2018, the UAE ended a military training program with Mogadishu's army that began in 2014, due to strained relations with the government in the framework of the GCC crisis with Qatar. According to Abu Dhabi, the UAE also paid the soldiers' salaries as of 2018 and built a training center and a hospital.

Puntando: Since 2012, UAE has been in the headquarters in Bossaso, and has been training, equipped with the Puntanda Marine Police Unit (PMPF), which also has bases on coastal towns and Mt. 。 PMPF was established in 2011 to deter pirate acts in Aden Bay, but gradually began to focus on terrorism. Since its establishment, UAE has paid monthly salaries to 2, 000 members.

Somaliland: In 2018, UAE launched a training program for local police and military as part of a larg e-scale transaction in 2017 to build a military airport in Velbera.

Ethiopia: UAE is an elite military unit established in 2018 and supports the training of the Republic of Defense Corps, which is the protection of the Prime Minister, senior officials, and major domestic facilities. In 2023, Ethiopia and UAE signed a memorandum to fight terrorism. In November 2023, the Ethiopian UAE Embassy held a lecture called "Fight Terrorism and Extremeism" in cooperation with the Walkorage of the Ethiopian Defense Ministry.

Chad: In June 2023, UAE and Chad signed a military cooperation agreement. In August 2023, the UAE was dispatched military vehicles and security equipment in response to the aftermath of a coup in Niger and supported government efforts in the battle with terrorism and border security. In early 2024, UAE dispatched a unit to Chad to train Army soldiers.

Mauritannia: In 2016, UAE established a military academy in Mauritania, Mohamed Bin Sayed Defense University, and founded in 2014, supported by France, G5 Sahel, G5 Sahel (Burkina Fasa, Chad, Mari, Mari. Training a senior officer of Mauritania, Niger). In 2018, training for senior officers began. In 2019, UAE discussed cooperation with Mauritania in the defense field. The UAE promised $ 35 million to the G5 Sahel integrated army in 2017 and $ 20 million in 2020. After a series of coups in member states, the G5 Sahel is on the way to dissolution.

2016-2021. Focus on Libya and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait:

Mari: In 2019, UAE and Mari signed a military cooperation agreement. It is reported that the agreement complemented the training of the Mali army in Mauritania as part of the G5 Sahel. In 2020, the UAE provided 30 Typhoon armored vehicles and 30 Made in UAE Cougar light armored vehicles.

Nigeria: In 2023, a delegation from the UAE National Defense University visited its counterpart in Abuja, paving the way for cooperation, including exchange programs and knowledge sharing.Pattern 2: Securing governments of countries where the UAE invests: Stability-oriented partnerships through defense industrial cooperation and procurement.

Egypt: In 2023, at the IDEX defense expo in Abu Dhabi, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense and the UAE's Tawazun Council, the Emirates' main defense industry government entity, signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation. The memorandum focuses on defense, industrial, and technological cooperation.Morocco: In 2006, the UAE and Morocco signed a military cooperation agreement consisting of training and technical and logistical assistance. In 2021, the two countries agreed to strengthen military and intelligence cooperation and cooperate in military industries.

Senegal: In 2020, the UAE and Senegal signed a memorandum of understanding on counterterrorism and an agreement on military cooperation between the defense ministries in Abu Dhabi. In 2023, Senegal will acquire UAE-made light armored vehicles.Angola: In 2023, Emirati Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding, a subsidiary of EDGE (an Abu Dhabi-based defense conglomerate), signed a $1 billion contract with the country to provide the Angolan Navy with a new fleet of 71-meter corvettes.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): As part of a $202. 1 billion investment package in the DRC, the Emirates invested in the DRC's security sector, delivering 30 tactical armored vehicles. In 2024, the Congolese army will reportedly use Emirati-made armored vehicles to strengthen the defense of the city of Goma against rebel groups.Kenya: In 2018, Kenya acquired helicopters from the UAE to fight Al-Shabaab. In 2019, GAL (UAE's Global Aerospace Logistics, part of EDGE) signed a contract with the Kenya Air Force to provide aircraft maintenance and overhaul services.

Uganda: In 2021, Emirati armored vehicle manufacturer Strait Group signed a partnership with National Enterprise Corporation (NEC) to produce armored vehicles in Uganda. NEC is the commercial arm of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF).Tanzania: In 2023, Emirati EDGE signed a defence industry cooperation agreement with the People's Defence Forces (air, land and sea defence domains).

2021-2024. Focus on Sudan, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean:

Mozambique: In 2022, UAE and Mozambique signed a memorandum on terrorism. The two countries have agreed to share information and expertise in terrorism countermeasures.

Pattern 3 In Africa's military base: Flexible missio n-oriented strategy including YemenAs UAE has been increasingly involved in African military issues, UAE has been in the African continent (Libya, Egypt, Egyptia, Somaliland, Somaliland, Puntrand, Somalia, Chad), especially in the African horns and Libya Sahel Subgression. It is developing a flexible plan for a military outpost. These outposts are temporarily used by the principal to support UAE's changing military interests and goals. As pointed out by Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah, "UAE has pursued a security strategy under the partnership with major areas and international allies [...] foreign military facilities. We have created a strategic depth through deployment. "

As of 2024, some military bases have been withdrawn by the principal, or have reduced their presence in such facilities, and are currently mainly supported by host countries, in some cases, local allies. Is in response to it. This plan reflects both the UAE economic investment trajectory in Africa and the priority of evolving security, and the UAE provides unofficial military assistance to various players in Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia. Abu Dhabi has denied that he is there.In the Geopolitics of the Eirthium in the Red Sea-West Indian Ocean region, Yemen, which has been torn in a dispute, plays an important role (Pelim / Mei Yun, Socotra Islands). In fact, the causal relationship is emerged between the military and rea r-forth support of the principal who was dispatched in the Yemen War (2015-2019) and the UAE choice for African military facilities. The principal military presence (2018-), which is close to the coast of the Somalia but part of Yemen, is "Phase 1" (force projection), a military facility strategy in the West Indian Ocean, including Africa. It means a gradual transition to phase 2 (force protection). This means that the "outpost strategy" has almost r e-adjusted the "outpost strategy" to protecting the routes and influence that have already been acquired in the African continent and the area from the Power Project. 。

In doing so, the UAE is demonstrating a flexible, mission-oriented strategy for military installations that distinguishes it from the traditional permanent “base” model designed primarily to counter state threats. In fact, the outposts serve the Emirati sphere to tap into select local groups and networks to counter non-state armed groups (terrorist organizations, insurgents, pirates, etc.) or to strengthen Emirati influence in the region. This flexible approach not only allows the UAE to retain some discretion over its overseas outposts and secrecy over its unofficial military activities, but also allows it to rapidly adjust its presence in African countries, minimizing security risks, financial costs, and political exposure at the local and media levels.The “first phase” of the Emirati outpost strategy spans 2016-2021. The UAE’s military-oriented foreign policy reached its zenith, especially evident in the Libya and Yemen wars. On both the Yemeni and African sides, the focus was on the Bab el-Mandeb bottleneck.[9]

Asab (Eritrea) 2015-2021: The base primarily supported Emirati deployments in Yemen. In 2015, the UAE obtained a 30-year lease on a deep-water port from Eritrea as part of a broader deal that allowed the Gulf coalition to use Eritrean land, airspace and waters for military operations in Yemen. From mid-2015 to 2019, Assab hosted Emirati military vehicles and drones, and also served as an Emirati-run training center for UAE-backed Yemeni and Sudanese fighters deployed to the country. The base, key to amphibious operations against Houthi islands in the Red Sea and the recapture of Aden, was partially dismantled by the UAE in 2021 when Emirati forces completed their withdrawal from Yemen. Assab also played a role in Emirati-backed Ethiopian Federal Army military operations in the Tigray region.[10]Al-Kadim

(Libya) From 2016-2020, from 2019 to 2020, UAE exploded in Libya to support the Halifa Hufftar army. In 2017, UAE expanded Al Cadim Air Force Base (65 miles east of Bengadi) and was stationed in the middle of 2016. At that time, the United States was supplying and operating the unmanned aircraft installed at the Air Force base. During the Libyan civil war, UAE depended not only on Al Cadim (Al Majur), but also on Al Juffula (2016-2019, Central Libya) and Egyptian base in Sidi Barani near Libya.Sidi Barani

Conclusion and Prospects. The Growing Emirati Role Against Terrorism and Maritime Insecurity in and around Africa.

(Egypt) 2016 The Egyptian Air Force Base at the border with Libya accepted a regular aircraft from the UAE during the Libya War [11], and headed to the eastern part of Libya / Egypt. In late 2019, satellite images show Sidi Barani's "rapid enhancement of cargo abilities", and it is highly likely that Al Cadim was replaced as a major base preliminary base of the principal in North Africa. In 2020, the Mirage fighter in the Emira country was deployed at the base.

Velvera

(Somaliland) 2017 to 2019: The contract for the construction of a military airport in 2017 was made in the framework of the UN forces of the UN forces. In 2019, when UAE announced his withdrawal from Yemen, the project was changed to private, and the modernized Velvera Airport opened in late 2021. The UAE has invested $ 55 million in rebuilding Velvera International Airport for passengers and freight services.

Sokotra

(Yemen) For the 2019 UAE, installing a military base on Sokotra is more related to maritime security and projections in the West Indian Ocean, rather than Yemen's battlefield. For this reason, the project is ideally connected to the first and second stages of the prince's outpost strategy, and the focus has shifted from projection to protection. According to media reports, UAE built a military base on Sokotra in 2019 and trained Yemen's recruiters near the Haulaf Port, which was modernized and rebuilt by the emperor in 2018. In 2020, the separation of the Southern Provisional Council (STC), which was supported by the emperor, seized the power of the Socotra Islands. (Libyan) From 2016-2020, from 2019 to 2020, the UAE exploded in Libya to support the Halifa Hufftar army. In 2017, UAE expanded Al Cadim Air Force Base (65 miles east of Bengadi) and was stationed in the middle of 2016. At that time, the United States was supplying and operating the unmanned aircraft installed at the Air Force base. During the Libyan civil war, UAE depended not only on Al Cadim (Al Majur), but also on Al Juffula (2016-2019, Central Libya) and Egyptian base in Sidi Barani near Libya.

Sidi Barani

Velvera

Sokotra

(Yemen) For the 2019 UAE, installing a military base on Sokotra is more related to maritime security and projections in the West Indian Ocean, rather than Yemen's battlefield. For this reason, the project is ideally connected to the first and second stages of the prince's outpost strategy, and the focus has shifted from projection to protection. According to media reports, UAE built a military base on Sokotra in 2019 and trained Yemen's recruiters near the Haulaf Port, which was modernized and rebuilt by the emperor in 2018. In 2020, the separation of the Southern Provisional Council (STC), which was supported by the Emperor, seized the power of the Socotra Islands. (Libya) From 2016-2020, from 2019 to 2020, UAE exploded in Libya to support the Halifa Hufftar army. In 2017, UAE expanded Al Cadim Air Force Base (65 miles east of Bengadi) and was stationed in the middle of 2016. At that time, the United States was supplying and operating the unmanned aircraft installed at the Air Force base. During the Libyan civil war, UAE depended not only on Al Cadim (Al Majur), but also on Al Juffula (2016-2019, Central Libya) and Egyptian base in Sidi Barani near Libya.

Sidi Barani

Velvera

Sokotra

The "Phase 2", a military prelimic base strategy of the principal, can be confirmed after 2021. UAE has chosen a gradual r e-adjustment of foreign policy since 2019, as the risk of conflict between the Middle East has increased. Therefore, the principal has adopted economi c-oriented approaches mainly to protect power to maintain geopolitical interests acquired in this area. At this stage, it is symbolized by the Emperor's army withdrew from Yemen, taking a very positive posture in Libya, and showing the opposite trend in Sudan. R e-adjustment also affected the rationality of military bases. In consideration of the rise of multiple threats to marine security (Iran, Yemen's Hushi, pirates), the focus has shifted to the east side of Aden Bay and the West Indian Ocean.

Perim / My Yun

(Yemen) In 2021, the UAE, which reduced the scale from the angle of Africa, strengthened military presence in the southwestern part of Yemen. In early 2021, according to satellite images, the United States of the Welcome was a runway and aircraft base in a small island perim in the Bab El Mandb Strait, and a large military transport aircraft was accommodated. In 2021, Yemen's national resistance army leader Talek Saleha acknowledged that some of the supported units were stationed on strategic islands.

Abd Al Chestnut

(Yemen) In early 2022, in the northern part of the second island Abd A l-chestnut in the Sokotra Islands, the runway was started and was canceled a few months later. Abd Al Chestnut is 130 km away from the main island of Sokotra and is closest to Somalia in the islands. In early 2024, satellite images recorded a "increase in activity", including the construction of a runway near the waterside and the movement of large vehicles. According to the AP communication, the runway can be used for attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, transport aircraft, and even heaviest bombers. "

Bossaso

(Punrand) 2022 This outpost must be focused on UAE commitment (eg, pirate acts, fucus) for the maritime security in Aden Bay. The UAE set up a military base and airport in Bossaso, and in the latter half of 2022, a soldier of the principal landed in Bossaso with at least 12 military flights loaded with military vehicles.

Kiss Mayo Phase 2, a military outpost base strategy of the principal, can be confirmed after 2021. UAE has chosen a gradual r e-adjustment of foreign policy since 2019, as the risk of conflict between the Middle East has increased. Therefore, the principal has adopted economi c-oriented approaches mainly to protect power to maintain geopolitical interests acquired in this area. At this stage, it is symbolized by the Emperor's army withdrew from Yemen, taking a very positive posture in Libya, and showing the opposite trend in Sudan. R e-adjustment also affected the rationality of military bases. In consideration of the rise of multiple threats to marine security (Iran, Yemen's Hushi, pirates), the focus has shifted to the east side of Aden Bay and the West Indian Ocean.

Perim / My Yun

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Abd Al Chestnut

Bossaso

The Phase 2, a military outpost strategy of Kismao Director, can be confirmed after 2021. UAE has chosen a gradual r e-adjustment of foreign policy since 2019, as the risk of conflict between the Middle East has increased. Therefore, the principal has adopted economi c-oriented approaches mainly to protect power to maintain geopolitical interests acquired in this area. At this stage, it is symbolized by the Emperor's army withdrew from Yemen, taking a very positive posture in Libya, and showing the opposite trend in Sudan. R e-adjustment also affected the rationality of military bases. In consideration of the rise of multiple threats to marine security (Iran, Yemen's Hushi, pirates), the focus has shifted to the east side of Aden Bay and the West Indian Ocean.

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Perim / My Yun

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Abd Al Chestnut

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Bossaso

Kiss Mayo

(Jubbaland, Somalia) 2023~: In the fight against Al-Shabaab and in the midst of threats to freedom of navigation in the Western Indian Ocean, the UAE began building a military base in Kismayo in the Indian Ocean.[13]

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Amjaras

(Chad) 2023 In the framework of the Sudanese war, the UAE established an airbase in Chad. This allows the Emirates to provide military support to the RSF, led by Sudanese Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as "Hemmetti"), a situation that Abu Dhabi denies, while the UN describes as "credible".[14] In 2023, the UAE opened a field hospital in Amjaras, close to the Sudanese border, to treat Sudanese refugees and, according to media reports, also treated wounded RSF fighters from Sudan. Satellite images show that the city's airport has been turned into a military airfield, with makeshift aircraft shelters and hangars. According to one media analysis, the pattern of airfield construction in Amjaras is similar to the base that Emirati forces previously expanded to Al-Khadim in eastern Libya to support Haftar's forces, and many cargo planes are now landing in Amjaras.[15]

Since the mid-2010s, the UAE has rapidly strengthened its military ties with African countries, along with a surge in economic investments in commercial ports and infrastructure. Especially in countries affected by terrorism, insurgency, and piracy, Emirati defense cooperation tends to focus on military training and education (Somalia and Puntland, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, etc.). In terms of military training, the UAE is active both at the bilateral level and in multilateral forums such as the G5 Sahel, the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition, and the UN Training Initiative for Female Peacekeepers.[16]

In countries where the UAE has relevant economic investments, the focus of military cooperation is on defense industry and the provision of weapons. This allows the Emirates to support national security and government stability, ultimately securing their interests abroad (e. g. Morocco, Egypt, Senegal, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique).

Since the mi d-2010s, the UAE has developed a flexible military base plan in the African continent, especially in African horns and Libya Sahel small areas (Libya, Egyptia, Egyptia, Somaliland, Puntand, Somalia, Chad). This reflects the trajectory of UAE's economic investment in Africa, and in some cases it is necessary to secure sea routes. It has also been revealed that the UAE is said to have been provided by the UAE at the conflict site to various no n-nation and national players in Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia.

In the military development in Yemen (2015-2019), the United States has faced most of the issues currently being engaged in Africa. From the construction of local unit defense capabilities to ground strategies on terrorism, from the safety of the coast to the establishment of flexible military prelude. For this reason, the involvement of Yemen has been indirectly continuing with the support of the Emirates in the southern and western groups, but has been a landmark experience for UAE projections in unstable situations, including African countries. There is.

The battle against armed threats, from armed groups related to A l-Qaeda and Islamic countries to pirates, means an increase in the military role of UAE in Africa, especially in the square areas of Sahel and Africa. This will expose the army and trainees of the principal to further security, as happened in Yemen and recently in Somalia.

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After a series of coups that dismantled security cooperation with European countries and the United States, UAE is currently cooperating with ant i-European military governments. In this situation, the UAE has proved a real player to prioritize economic goals and national influence and protect economic investment from terrorist attacks by Jihad, regardless of who holds the government. 。 In this framework, the United States is interested in preventing the Sahel terrorist groups from spreading to West Africa (Ghana, Benan, Togo, Court Jiboir) and its economic network. Since the mi d-2010s, the UAE has developed a flexible military base plan in the African continent, especially in the African horns and the Libya Sahel small area (Libya, Egypt, Egyptia, Somaliland, Puntand, Somalia, Chad). Ta. This reflects the trajectory of UAE's economic investment in Africa, and in some cases it is necessary to secure sea routes. It has also been revealed that the UAE is said to have been provided by the UAE at the conflict site to various no n-nation and national players in Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia.

After a series of coups that dismantled security cooperation with European countries and the United States, UAE is currently cooperating with ant i-European military governments. In this situation, the UAE has proved a real player to prioritize economic goals and national influence and protect economic investment from terrorist attacks by Jihad, regardless of who holds the government. 。 In this framework, the United States is interested in preventing the Sahel terrorist groups from spreading to West Africa (Ghana, Benan, Togo, Cote Voir) and its economic network. Since the mi d-2010s, the UAE has developed a flexible military base plan in the African continent, especially in African horns and Libya Sahel small areas (Libya, Egyptia, Egyptia, Somaliland, Puntand, Somalia, Chad). This reflects the trajectory of UAE's economic investment in Africa, and in some cases it is necessary to secure sea routes. It has also been revealed that the UAE is said to have been provided by the UAE at the conflict site to various no n-nation and national players in Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia.

The Short-Lived ‘Horse Nation’

Amjaras

In Africa's horns, marine security will be the focus of UAE's military efforts. Behind this is the extensive unstable of the Red Sea region, such as the Fushitan attack from Yemen for international navigation in the southern Beni Sea, the Bab El Mandb Strait, and the Aden Bay. Furthermore, among local no n-national armed forces (A l-Shabab and Somalia pirates), which share ant i-Emilati emotions, there are signs of interest or economic cooperation [17], causing new marine risks. Not only can it also cause further resentment of the presence of the emperor.

This spures the smuggling network. In 2023, an expert panel related to Yemen said, "I think there is a clos e-collided smuggling network between Yemen and Somalia, and between Yemen and Sudan, which are active and acted on weapons from common information sources." [18]

In the African continent, UAE is more and more ambitious as a middle power that can protect and move forward, along with local partners, as well as local partners. It will be.

HISTORY Vault: Native American History

[1] In 2015, Al Shabab claimed a car bomb on a vehicle carrying government officials in the emperor in Mogadish. Https://www. reuters. com/Iduskbn0p414y/ that the government officials in this attack died in this attack, but did not die.

Elim Poon - Journalist, Creative Writer

Last modified: 27.08.2024

The Role of the Military in Polifics. London: Pall Mall Press,. counter the growing military and economic influence of China and Russia. Increased presence of Russian and Chinese military capabilities in North Africa and the Sahel could impact freedom of movement/freedom of navigation. The expansion of Russia's political role in Africa is not limited to achieving its interests advanced level of military industries (Defence.

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