Yale Law Journal The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights Separation of Ownership and

The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption

In the 19th century, modern companies were standardized and rapidly spread around the world. However, the early stocks were different from modern stocks in terms of important terms. The most obvious thing is that it has deviated from the general rules of one share today and adopted the resolution of the voting rights that prefer small shareholders rather than large shareholders. In recent years, both law scholars and economists have been trying to explain these schemes as a rough investor protection to protect small shareholders from exploitation by ruling shareholders.

In contrast, we argue that voting restrictions are generally functioning not to protect shareholders as investors, but to protect shareholders as consumers. Companies that adopted these rules were often monopoly to provide important infrastructure services such as transportation, banks, and insurance. Local merchants, farmers, and landowners who used these services were major shareholders of the company. They usually did not buy shares in the hope of profits, but purchased shares to raise collective property. With the exercise of shareholder voting rights, the control of corporate services did not reach the hands of monopoly and competitors. In fact, companies strongly had a consumer cooperative character. This perspective also shows that the ultr a-laws were unusually emphasized in the 19th century.

Current legal and economics has continued to focus on separation of ownership and control, but the separation of ownership and consumption achieved by the late 19th century is also a basic change in the history of stocks. It was a point, but it is generally overlooked. Understanding this shift is not only historical practices, but also in modern discussions over the deviation from the rules of each share. In the 19th century, modern companies were standardized and quickly spread around the world. However, the early stocks were different from modern stocks in terms of importance. The most obvious thing is that it has deviated from the general rules of one share today and adopted the resolution of the voting rights that prefer small shareholders rather than large shareholders. In recent years, both law scholars and economists have been trying to explain these schemes as a rough investor protection to protect small shareholders from exploitation by ruling shareholders.

Introduction

Current legal and economics has continued to focus on separation of ownership and control, but the separation of ownership and consumption achieved by the late 19th century is also a basic change in the history of stocks. It was a point, but it is generally overlooked. Understanding this shift is not only historical practices, but also in modern discussions over the deviation from the rules of each share. In the 19th century, modern companies were standardized and rapidly spread around the world. However, the early stocks were different from modern stocks in terms of importance. The most obvious thing is that it has deviated from the general rules of one share today and adopted the resolution of the voting rights that prefer small shareholders rather than large shareholders. In recent years, both law scholars and economists have been trying to explain these schemes as a rough investor protection to protect small shareholders from exploitation by ruling shareholders.

The author Henry Hansman is Yale University Law School, Professor Oscar M. Lue Housen. Mariana Pagendar is Professor of Sao Paulo Geturio Versas Law (Direito GV). Ian Ayres, Howard Bodenhorn, Ronald Gilson, Timothy Guinne, Leslie Hannah, Eric Hilt, Naomi Lamoreaux, John Lan. GBEIN, David Le Bris, ALDO MUSACCHIO, CLAIRE PRIEST, RICHARD SYLLA, Andrew Verstein, Charles WhiteHead, Robert Wright, and American Law and Economics Association 2011 Thanks to the UAL Meeting participants, and the University of Colombia, Sao Paulo Geturio He also participated in meetings and workshops at Versas Law School, University of Tel Aviv, Toulouse Economic University, Vanderville Law School, and Jale University Law School. Thanks to Alison Gauche, Ian Massias, Nicholas Walter, Julie One, especially Joan Williams, as a valuable investigation cooperation. David Louk and Yale Law Journal colleagues did wonderful editing. The author Henry Hansman is Yale University Law School, Professor Oscar M. Lue Housen. Mariana Pagendar is Professor of Sao Paulo Geturio Versas Law (Direito GV). Ian Ayres, Howard Bodenhorn, Ronald Gilson, Timothy Guinne, Leslie Hannah, Eric Hilt, Naomi Lamoreaux, John Lan. GBEIN, David Le Bris, ALDO MUSACCHIO, CLAIRE PRIEST, RICHARD SYLLA, Andrew Verstein, Charles WhiteHead, Robert Wright, and American Law and Economics Association 2011 Thanks to the UAL Meeting participants, and the University of Colombia, Sao Paulo Geturio He also participated in meetings and workshops at Versas Law School, University of Tel Aviv, Toulouse Economic University, Vanderville Law School, and Jale University Law School. Thanks to Alison Gauche, Ian Massias, Nicholas Walter, Julie One, especially Joan Williams, as a valuable investigation cooperation. David Louk and Yale Law Journal colleagues did wonderful editing. The author Henry Hansman is Yale University Law School, Professor Oscar M. Lue Housen. Mariana Pagendar is Professor of Sao Paulo Geturio Versas Law (Direito GV). Ian Ayres, Howard Bodenhorn, Ronald Gilson, Timothy Guinne, Leslie Hannah, Eric Hilt, Naomi Lamoreaux, John Lan. GBEIN, David Le Bris, ALDO MUSACCHIO, CLAIRE PRIEST, RICHARD SYLLA, Andrew Verstein, Charles WhiteHead, Robert Wright, and American Law and Economics Association 2011 Thanks to the UAL Meeting participants, and the University of Colombia, Sao Paulo Geturio He also participated in meetings and workshops at Versas Law School, University of Tel Aviv, Toulouse Economic University, Vanderville Law School, and Jale University Law School. Thanks to Alison Gauche, Ian Massias, Nicholas Walter, Julie One, especially Joan Williams, as a valuable investigation cooperation. David Louk and Yale Law Journal colleagues did wonderful editing.

Adam Smith has criticized the business company early and pointed out two shortcomings of its organizational form. The first is that companies are generally monopoly and have disadvantages to consumers. 1 The other is the agency cost now. 2. Today, the Corporate Governance is the latter problem, that is, the cost of a business owner, that is, by a da y-se e-b y-day act, or by a dominant shareholder on a da y-seeing shareholder. It dominates the discourse. 3 Recently, researchers in both economics and law have begun to regard agency costs as a major factor in forming the historical changes in corporate forms, and the unique characteristics of the company law and practical in the past era. Is interpreted as a means to protect small shareholders from exploitation by managers and dominant shareholders 4. 4 This is especially true in the 19th century. The 19th century was a time when a major corporate organizational form of modern costumes was established, especially a corporation. 5 Corporate governance in the early 19th century, as in the developed countries of the 19th century, may be beneficial to be beneficial today in developing countries without a powerful legal system for shareholder protection. Some scholars suggest. 6

But this approach is anachronistic. From the late 18th century to the early 19th century, the main economic adverse effects related to the company's form were not the da y-t o-day for business owners and ruling shareholders, but rather the monopoly that Adam Smith's first concerned. Prior to 1860, most companies were established by the State Congress' special law, resulting in exclusive power. 7 More importantly, many companies were more naturally monopolized by the economy. Initial corporate law and practical specialty were often designed to minimize the abuse of market power. The purpose was to protect shareholders as consumers, rather than protecting shareholders as investors, as expected in today's customs. Adam Smith early criticized the business company and pointed out two shortcomings of its organizational form. The first is that companies are generally monopoly and have disadvantages to consumers. 1 The other is the agency cost now. 2. Today, the Corporate Governance is the latter problem, that is, the cost of a business owner, that is, by a da y-se e-b y-day act, or by a dominant shareholder on a da y-seeing shareholder. It dominates the discourse. 3 Recently, researchers in both economics and law have begun to regard agency costs as a major factor in forming the historical changes in corporate forms, and the unique characteristics of the company law and practical in the past era. Is interpreted as a means to protect small shareholders from exploitation by managers and dominant shareholders 4. 4 This is especially true in the 19th century. The 19th century was a time when a major corporate organizational form of modern costumes was established, especially a corporation. 5 Corporate governance in the early 19th century, as in the developed countries of the 19th century, may be beneficial to be beneficial today in developing countries without a powerful legal system for shareholder protection. Some scholars suggest. 6

But this approach is anachronistic. From the late 18th century to the early 19th century, the main economic adverse effects related to the company's form were not the da y-t o-day for business owners and ruling shareholders, but rather the monopoly that Adam Smith's first concerned. Prior to 1860, most companies were established by the State Congress' special law, resulting in exclusive power. 7 More importantly, many companies were more naturally monopolized by the economy. Initial corporate law and practical specialty were often designed to minimize the abuse of market power. The purpose was to protect shareholders as consumers, rather than protecting shareholders as investors, as expected in today's customs. Adam Smith has criticized the business company early and pointed out two shortcomings of its organizational form. The first is that companies are generally monopoly and have disadvantages to consumers. 1 The other is the agency cost now. 2. Today, the Corporate Governance is the latter problem, that is, the cost of a business owner, that is, by a da y-se e-b y-day act, or by a dominant shareholder on a da y-seeing shareholder. It dominates the discourse. 3 Recently, researchers in both economics and law have begun to regard agency costs as a major factor in forming the historical changes in corporate forms, and the unique characteristics of the company law and practical in the past era. Is interpreted as a means to protect small shareholders from exploitation by managers and dominant shareholders 4. 4 This is especially true in the 19th century. The 19th century was a time when a major corporate organizational form of modern costumes was established, especially a corporation. 5 Corporate governance in the early 19th century, as in the developed countries of the 19th century, may be beneficial to be beneficial today in developing countries without a powerful legal system for shareholder protection. Some scholars suggest. 6

To understand this, it is important to recognize an important but underappreciated feature of corporate activity in the early republic: the lack of separation between ownership and consumption. In many corporations of the time, the major shareholders were also the corporations' major customers. These customers were business owners, such as farmers, merchants, and manufacturers, and the corporations typically provided infrastructure goods and services that were essential to the success of those local businesses.

This ownership pattern existed for two reasons. First, for many corporations, local merchants and farmers were clearly the most effective source of capital at a time when capital markets were not well developed and government financing was not common. Second, control over service providers allowed consumers to protect themselves from monopoly exploitation. Early American business corporations were often, in effect, consumer cooperatives, and, as cooperatives generally do, they served to protect consumer-owners from the exercise of monopoly power.

Understanding this form of ownership reveals an important feature of the early business corporation that has recently attracted the attention of scholars in both economics and law. Most notable in this regard are the unusual shareholder voting rules of this period. In the late 18th century and through much of the 19th century, American corporations frequently employed shareholder voting schemes that deviated from the one-share, one-vote rule that later became common. 9 In particular, many 19th-century corporations restricted voting power in ways that made it difficult for any one shareholder to gain control of the corporation. These voting systems included three types: graduated voting, in which the number of votes a shareholder could exercise increased in proportion to the number of shares he owned; capped voting, which placed a limit on the total number of votes a shareholder could exercise, regardless of the number of shares he held; and per capita voting, which was a one-shareholder, one-vote rule.

Such votin g-restricted rules have only gained the attention of law scholars through the research of David Ratner 10 and Colen Dan Lavy 11. Its interpretation does not focus on economic factors such as agency costs and monopoly, but that Dunlavy says that "social selection for specific types of governance" is limited to corporate voting rights. 12. 12, especially, reflecting a "democratic" "corporate social concept" rather than the "Purt Clate s-like" governance approach, represented by the voting rights. 13 This is called "democracy theory".

Since then, the reasons for the voting rights limit rules have been featured by many other researchers, but in contrast to Ratner and Dunlavy, the theory is rooted in economic consideration. I value it. Specifically, reflecting a modern tide that emphasizes agency costs, the rules of voting rights are "designed to invite small shareholders to protect small shareholders from the rule of major shareholders. It is almost uniformly interpreted as "you are." 14 According to this view, the restrictions on exercising voting rights are usually imposed by the individual articles of incorporation of the company, and was "the most important protection provided to small investors in the early 19th century". The company law compensated for the weaknesses that the minority of shareholders did not fully gave the right of shareholders. 15 This is called "Investor Protection theory".

However, both democracy and investor protection theory are difficult to explain two important factors regarding the exercise of corporate voting rights in the 19th century. First, why did the restrictions on exercising voting rights appear in specific industries, such as turnpike, canals, railways, banks, and insurance companies, while other industries such as manufacturing industries? Second, why did all kinds of companies have almost disappeared by all kinds of companies by the end of the 19th century? The 16 voting limit rules have gained the attention of lawyers for the first time through the study of David Ratner 10 and Colen Dan Lavie 11. Its interpretation does not focus on economic factors such as agency costs and monopoly, but that Dunlavy says that "social selection for specific types of governance" is limited to corporate voting rights. 12. 12, especially, reflecting a "democratic" "corporate social concept" rather than the "Purt Clate s-like" governance approach, represented by the voting rights. 13 This is called "democracy theory".

However, both democracy and investor protection theory are difficult to explain two important factors regarding the exercise of corporate voting rights in the 19th century. First, why did the restrictions on exercising voting rights appear in specific industries, such as turnpike, canals, railways, banks, and insurance companies, while other industries such as manufacturing industries? Second, why did all kinds of companies have almost disappeared by all kinds of companies by the end of the 19th century? 16. These voting restrictions have gained the attention of lawyers for the first time through the research of David Ratner 10 and Colin Dan Lavy 11. Its interpretation does not focus on economic factors such as agency costs and monopoly, but that Dunlavy says that "social selection for specific types of governance" is limited to corporate voting rights. 12. 12, especially, reflecting a "democratic" "corporate social concept" rather than the "Purt Clate s-like" governance approach, represented by the voting rights. 13 This is called "democracy theory".

I. corporate ownership and voting rights in early u.s. history

A. Physical Infrastructure

We try to shed light to these questions by providing another explanation of the patterns of exercising exercise in the 19th century. Our interpretation is basically economical, and the change in the scheme of the shareholder resolution of the shareholder resolution has different economic purposes and problems between the early 19th century and modern corporations. It is caused. In other words, the resolution of voting rights is generally functioned as a consumer protection device in a company that was a consumer cooperative in a rough sense.

This "consumer protection theory" helps to explain the relative rate of relatives in various industries and companies. The 19t h-century transportation company (turn pike, canal, railway), like banks and insurance companies, generally had a large market power, but not in contrast. In addition, companies that adopted the exercise of voting rights were usually monopoly companies that provide essential supplementary services to local merchants. Surprisingly, these merchants were the main customers of the early business companies and the main shareholders for two important reasons. First, local merchants were interested in the formation of economic infrastructure and funding, which are important for the success of their business. 17th, this form of ownership is the control of such infrastructure elements, to investors pursuing profits to claim exclusive usage fees to merchants, and competition for merchants. It played a role in preventing the opponent's hand. We try to shed light to these questions by providing another explanation about the patterns of exercise of voting rights observed in the 19th century. Our interpretation is basically economical, and the change in the scheme of the shareholder resolution of the shareholder resolution has different economic purposes and problems between the early 19th century and modern corporations. It is caused. In other words, the resolution of voting rights is generally functioned as a consumer protection device in a company that was a consumer cooperative in a rough sense.

This "consumer protection theory" helps to explain the relative rate of relatives in various industries and companies. The 19t h-century transportation company (turn pike, canal, railway), like banks and insurance companies, generally had a large market power, but not in contrast. In addition, companies that adopted the exercise of voting rights were usually monopoly companies that provide essential supplementary services to local merchants. Surprisingly, these merchants were the main customers of the early business companies and the main shareholders for two important reasons. First, local merchants were interested in the formation of economic infrastructure and funding, which are important for the success of their business. 17th, this form of ownership is the control of such infrastructure elements, to investors pursuing profits to claim exclusive usage fees to merchants, and competition for merchants. It played a role in preventing the opponent's hand. We try to shed light to these questions by providing another explanation of the patterns of exercising exercise in the 19th century. Our interpretation is basically economical, and the change in the scheme of the shareholder resolution of the shareholder resolution has different economic purposes and problems between the early 19th century and modern corporations. It is caused. In other words, the resolution of voting rights is generally functioned as a consumer protection device in a company that was a consumer cooperative in a rough sense.

1. Turnpikes

The theory of consumer protection is also useful for explaining the reason why voting rights have virtually disappeared from the business company in the late 19th century. At that time, the construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, was mainly liable for local governments and state governments. Meanwhile, the capital market has developed and the necessary funds for private companies have been supplied. With the improvement of transportation and communication, the competition between banks and insurance has intensified, while government regulations have become more and more likely to survive investors. The exploitation of market dominance has been managed by a separate body of ant i-trading law and the Fare Regulation Law, not the corporate law. In order to adopt an independent law for cooperatives, and for decades, a cooperative adopted for decades to deal with untruffled monopoly, such as agriculture, in a more executable form. Was used. In addition, the rules of voting rights can be easily avoided over time, only a rough and temporary form of consumer protection.

The consumer protection theory we presented to explain the restrictions on voting rights in the 19th century is strongly confronted with the theory of investor protection. If a company is an exclusive company, there is a clear conflict between corporate investors and customers. Investors can make the most benefits by setting exclusive prices, but customers can make the most benefits by setting competitive prices. As a result, if the company is dominated by shareholders who are the main customers of the company, shareholders may prefer to maintain the price of the company and get a return to investment in a lower price than a high dividend. do not have. However, this policy is not attractive for shareholders who are neither company customers. From an investor in a company, shareholders, a corporate customer, have tunnized corporate (potential) profits through other transactions with companies. Consumer Protection theory is also useful for explaining the reason why voting rights restricted in the late 19th century. At that time, the construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, was mainly liable for local governments and state governments. Meanwhile, the capital market has developed and the necessary funds for private companies have been supplied. With the improvement of transportation and communication, the competition between banks and insurance has intensified, while government regulations have become more and more likely to survive investors. The exploitation of market dominance has been managed by a separate body of ant i-trading law and the Fare Regulation Law, not the corporate law. In order to adopt an independent law for cooperatives, and for decades, a cooperative adopted for decades to deal with untruffled monopoly, such as agriculture, in a more executable form. Was used. In addition, voting rights restrictions can be easily avoided over time, only a rough and temporary form of consumer protection.

The consumer protection theory we presented to explain the restrictions on voting rights in the 19th century is strongly confronted with the theory of investor protection. If a company is an exclusive company, there is a clear conflict between corporate investors and customers. Investors can make the most benefits by setting exclusive prices, but customers can make the most benefits by setting competitive prices. As a result, if the company is dominated by shareholders who are the main customers of the company, shareholders may prefer to maintain the price of the company and get a return to investment in a lower price than a high dividend. do not have. However, this policy is not attractive for shareholders who are neither company customers. From an investor in a company, shareholders, a corporate customer, have tunnized corporate (potential) profits through other transactions with companies. The theory of consumer protection is also useful for explaining the reason why voting rights have virtually disappeared from the business company in the late 19th century. At that time, the construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, was mainly liable for local governments and state governments. Meanwhile, the capital market has developed and the necessary funds for private companies have been supplied. With the improvement of transportation and communication, the competition between banks and insurance has intensified, while government regulations have become more and more likely to survive investors. The exploitation of market dominance has been managed by a separate body of ant i-trading law and the Fare Regulation Law, not the corporate law. In order to adopt an independent law for cooperatives, and for decades, a cooperative adopted for decades to deal with untruffled monopoly, such as agriculture, in a more executable form. Was used. In addition, voting rights restrictions can be easily avoided over time, only a rough and temporary form of consumer protection.

In contrast to many documents that provide investor protection theory in the rules of voting rights, there are two authors who suggest something similar to consumer protection theory. One is Donald Smythe, and in a short but insigh t-very insightful comment on Dunlavy, the rules of voting rights in companies that provide amenities such as bridges and paved roads are local public. 18, which is presenting a hypothesis that it may be explained by the personality of the goods without any further investigation, is the other is Joseph Somer. In a thoughtful paper on banks' historical developments in the first few decades in the United States, banks often have merchants "utility", "clubs", "credit unions", and "cooperatives". He states that he had a personality. 19

It is well known that large US companies in the 20th century have separated their own and control. Although not very familiar, the separation of ownership and consumption, which characterized the evolution of companies in the 19th century, was certainly basic. Understanding this separation and the cause is different types of corporate forms in the process of the 19th century, and for most of the 20th century, a variety of different types that control corporate organizations, that is, cooperative corporation, and corporate corporation. It helps to understand that it has changed to a no n-profit corporation or a local government corporation. The initial stocks with resolution restricted here are formal owners of investments found in corporations, de facto ownership owned by cooperatives, and charity that can be seen in no n-profit corporations. It was effectively combined with the latter elements, such as providing funds and providing local groups and services as seen in local government corporations. There are two authors who suggest something similar to consumer protection theory, in contrast to many documents that provide investor protection theory on voting restrictions. One is Donald Smythe, and in a short but insigh t-very insightful comment on Dunlavy, the rules of voting rights in companies that provide amenities such as bridges and paved roads are local public. 18, which is presenting a hypothesis that it may be explained by the personality of the goods without any further investigation, is the other is Joseph Somer. In a thoughtful paper on banks' historical developments in the first few decades in the United States, banks often have merchants "utility", "clubs", "credit unions", and "cooperatives". He states that he had a personality. 19

It is well known that large US companies in the 20th century have separated their own and control. Although not very familiar, the separation of ownership and consumption, which characterized the evolution of companies in the 19th century, was certainly basic. Understanding this separation and the cause is different types of corporate forms in the process of the 19th century, and for most of the 20th century, a variety of different types that control corporate organizations, that is, cooperative corporation, and corporate corporation. It helps to understand that it has changed to a no n-profit corporation or a local government corporation. The initial stocks with resolution restricted here are formal owners of investments found in corporations, de facto ownership owned by cooperatives, and charity that can be seen in no n-profit corporations. It was effectively combined with the latter elements, such as providing funds and providing local groups and services as seen in local government corporations. In contrast to many documents that provide investor protection theory in the rules of voting rights, there are two authors who suggest something similar to consumer protection theory. One is Donald Smythe, and in a short but insigh t-very insightful comment on Dunlavy, the rules of voting rights in companies that provide amenities such as bridges and paved roads are local public. 18, which is presenting a hypothesis that it may be explained by the personality of the goods without any further investigation, is the other is Joseph Somer. In a thoughtful paper on banks' historical developments in the first few decades in the United States, banks often have merchants "utility", "clubs", "credit unions", and "cooperatives". He states that he had a personality. 19

After the exercise of restricted voting rights was replaced by one share, the latter ruled the US listed company for the first century, and in fact it was listed on the New York Stock Exchange from 1926 to 1985. It was a condition for. However, in recent years, consensus supporting the rules has been fluctuating in the United States. Famous companies, such as Google and Facebook, have adopted voting rights in the opposite voting rights in the dual class. If this trend continues, the rules of exercising voting for the US listed companies have changed continuously for more than two centuries, exercising restrictions, exercising proportional voting rights, and exercising voting rights. However, there is no consensus for recent reasons for expanding the exercise of voting rights, whether it will last a long time, or whether it is useful for society in general. 20 In addition, recently, a prominent proposal for returning to the exercise of restricted voting rights has been proposed, especially a public company's "exercise of square voting rights". In this system, voting rights will increase according to the square root of the shareholder owned by shareholders (for example, one voting right for one share, 100 voting rights for 100 shares). 21 And investor protection is the main purpose of this proposal.

Here, we do not pursue such modern developments. However, if you want to understand the pattern of corporate rule that is suitable for the 21st century, it is useful to understand how other patterns and why in the 19th and 20th centuries developed. After the exercise of restricted voting rights has been replaced by each share, the latter rules the US listed companies for the first century, and in fact, from 1926 to 1985, the New York Securities Exchange. It was a condition for listing in. However, in recent years, consensus supporting the rules has been fluctuating in the United States. Famous companies, such as Google and Facebook, have adopted voting rights in the opposite voting rights in the dual class. If this trend continues, the rules of exercising voting for the US listed companies have changed continuously for more than two centuries, exercising restrictions, exercising proportional voting rights, and exercising voting rights. However, there is no consensus for recent reasons for expanding the exercise of voting rights, whether it will last a long time, or whether it is useful for society in general. 20 In addition, recently, a prominent proposal for returning to the exercise of restricted voting rights has been proposed, especially a public company's "exercise of square voting rights". In this system, voting rights will increase according to the square root of the shareholder owned by shareholders (for example, one voting right for one share, 100 voting rights for 100 shares). 21 And investor protection is the main purpose of this proposal.

Here, we do not pursue such modern developments. However, if you want to understand the pattern of corporate rule that is suitable for the 21st century, it is useful to understand how other patterns and why in the 19th and 20th centuries developed. After the exercise of restricted voting rights was replaced by one share, the latter ruled the US listed company for the first century, and in fact it was listed on the New York Stock Exchange from 1926 to 1985. It was a condition for. However, in recent years, consensus supporting the rules has been fluctuating in the United States. Famous companies, such as Google and Facebook, have adopted voting rights in the opposite voting rights in the dual class. If this trend continues, the rules of exercising voting for the US listed companies have changed continuously for more than two centuries, exercising restrictions, exercising proportional voting rights, and exercising voting rights. However, there is no consensus for recent reasons for expanding the exercise of voting rights, whether it will last a long time, or whether it is useful for society in general. 20 In addition, recently, a prominent proposal for returning to the exercise of restricted voting rights has been proposed, especially a public company's "exercise of square voting rights". In this system, voting rights will increase according to the square root of the shareholder owned by shareholders (for example, one voting right for one share, 100 voting rights for 100 shares). 21 And investor protection is the main purpose of this proposal.

2. Bridges

In the remaining part of this paper, the consumer protection theory of voting rights restrictions is possible by examining the economic characteristics of various voting rights exercise schemes and available data on shareholder resolution in 19t h-century companies. Explore sex. Part II describes shareholder resolution schemes adopted by US companies from late 18th century to early 19th century. Analyzing by industry, the resolution of voting rights indicates that it has appeared much higher in companies that have market dominance and are owned by major customers. Part II suggests that the explanation of consumer protection sheds another feature of the early corporate law, that is, the doctrine of ultr a-legalism, which is not convinced in the conventional explanation. The III section explores the reasons why the resolution restrictions are gradually abandoned in the late 19th century. The IV section explains the possibility of explanation of consumer protection to explain overseas experiences of resolution of voting rights at early business companies.

First, we will verify the ownership structure of US companies and exercise exercise of voting rights from the late 18th century to the early 19th century. To make it easier to explain, we will first focus on companies that promote physical infrastructure businesses, then financial companies, and finally manufacturers, and analyze by industry.

Today, many basic physical infrastructure of society, especially the main elements of transportation networks such as roads and bridges, are loaned by any level and are generally owned and operated. However, the situation was completely different in the early US Republic. The U. S. colonial municipalities, like the British municipalities in the 17th and 18th centuries, are generally dominated by local companies, and mainly establish and protect the exclusive guilds of various vendors. It was for the purpose. 22 Municipalities sometimes built and operated facilities such as market halls and wharfs, but most of them are to strengthen the market strength of various companies and municipalities, and the facilities are income through the usage fee. It became a source. 23 The rest of this paper is a consumer with voting rights restrictions by examining the economic characteristics of various voting rights exercise schemes and available data on shareholder resolution in 19t h-century companies. Explore the possibility of protection theory. Part II describes shareholder resolution schemes adopted by US companies from late 18th century to early 19th century. Analyzing by industry, the resolution of voting rights indicates that it has appeared much higher in companies that have market dominance and are owned by major customers. Part II suggests that the explanation of consumer protection sheds another feature of the early corporate law, that is, the doctrine of ultr a-legalism, which is not convinced in the conventional explanation. The III section explores the reasons why the resolution restrictions are gradually abandoned in the late 19th century. The IV section explains the possibility of explanation of consumer protection to explain overseas experiences of resolution of voting rights at early business companies.

Today, many basic physical infrastructure of society, especially the main elements of transportation networks such as roads and bridges, are loaned by any level and are generally owned and operated. However, the situation was completely different in the early US Republic. The U. S. colonial municipalities, like the British municipalities in the 17th and 18th centuries, are generally dominated by local companies, and mainly establish and protect the exclusive guilds of various vendors. It was for the purpose. 22 Municipalities sometimes built and operated facilities such as market halls and wharfs, but most of them are to strengthen the market strength of various companies and municipalities, and the facilities are income through the usage fee. It became a source. 23 In the rest of this article, the consumer protection theory of voting rights restricted by examining the economic characteristics of various voting rights exercise schemes and available data on shareholder resolution in 19t h-century companies. Explore the possibilities. Part II describes shareholder resolution schemes adopted by US companies from late 18th century to early 19th century. Analyzing by industry, the resolution of voting rights indicates that it has appeared much higher in companies that have market dominance and are owned by major customers. Part II suggests that the explanation of consumer protection sheds another feature of the early corporate law, that is, the doctrine of ultr a-legalism, which is not convinced in the conventional explanation. The III section explores the reasons why the resolution restrictions are gradually abandoned in the late 19th century. The IV section explains the possibility of explanation of consumer protection to explain overseas experiences of resolution of voting rights at early business companies.

3. Canals

Although the American Revolution brought about a substantial democratization of local government, 24 as we explain below, the result was that the provision of physical infrastructure by local (or state or national) governments did not become widespread. Not only were historical precedents for this type of activity scarce, but so was public opinion. In the Jacksonian era in particular, strong suspicion of government and resistance to taxes, along with intense local conflicts, prevented agreement on government development projects. 25

However, early 19th century state governments were willing to grant legal personality to groups of citizens who wanted to finance and manage their own public improvements. As a result, private organization and financing became widespread, and the internal governance structures given to these enterprises reflected their role as private producers of public goods.

Turnpikes are a classic example of voting restrictions in enterprises that were primarily owned by customers. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, turnpikes were almost always run by commercial corporations. 26 Turnpikes were in fact one of the most common forms of business corporations throughout this period. Over one-fifth of all corporate charters granted in the late 18th century were for turnpike companies, and they remained one of the major forms of business corporations on the East Coast until the early 19th century. 27 Turnpikes accounted for one-third of all corporations created in New York between 1800 and 1830. 28

4. Railroads

Voting restrictions were particularly prevalent among turnpike companies. Joseph Stancliffe Davis has noted that voting caps were "almost universal" among 18th-century turnpike companies. 29 Other studies of voting patterns in 19th-century industrial companies have found that turnpikes had the highest incidence of voting restrictions of any industry. In his study of early New York companies, Eric Hilt finds that 98 percent of turnpike charters contained voting restrictions, and of those, only 1 percent had one-share, one-vote structures. 30 Hilt estimates that turnpikes had significantly lower voting concentration than companies in other industries (Hilt's index of 0. 23, compared with the next lowest, 0. 70, for bridge companies). 31 Similarly, John W. Cadman reports that a significant number of turnpikes adopted voting caps or graduated voting, even though the “vast majority” of early New Jersey corporations granted one vote per share. 32 To confirm and extend these statistics and others reported below, we independently analyzed a large database, created and generously provided by economic historians Richard Schirra and Robert Wright, 33 that contains the voting rules of nearly every (more than 22, 000) business corporation that received legislative charter in any U. S. state between 1790 and 1859. A more detailed description of this database and tables of statistics derived from it appear in the Appendix. For ease of interpretation, we focus here only on companies incorporated in the original 13 states. Additionally, we excluded Massachusetts and South Carolina from our analysis, as it has been suggested that the original data contained systematic attrition and miscoding for these states. As a result, we were left with a sample of 6, 387 companies. We refer to this sample as the "multistate analysis." Voting restrictions were particularly prevalent among turnpikes. Joseph Stancliffe Davis has noted that voting caps were "almost universal" among 18th-century turnpike companies. 29 Other studies of voting patterns in 19th-century industrial corporations have found that turnpikes had the highest incidence of voting restrictions across all industries. In his study of early New York corporations, Eric Hilt finds that 98 percent of turnpike charters contained voting restrictions, and of those, only 1 percent had one-share, one-vote structures. 30 Hilt estimates that turnpikes had significantly lower voting concentration than companies in other industries (Hilt's index of 0. 23, compared with the next lowest, 0. 70, for bridge companies). 31 Similarly, John W. Cadman reports that a significant number of turnpikes adopted voting caps or graduated voting, even though the “vast majority” of early New Jersey corporations granted one vote per share. 32 To confirm and extend these statistics and others reported below, we independently analyzed a large database, created and generously provided by economic historians Richard Schirra and Robert Wright, 33 that contains the voting rules of nearly every (more than 22, 000) business corporation that received legislative charter in any U. S. state between 1790 and 1859. A more detailed description of this database and tables of statistics derived from it appear in the Appendix. For ease of interpretation, we focus here only on companies incorporated in the original 13 states. Additionally, we excluded Massachusetts and South Carolina from our analysis, as it has been suggested that the original data contained systematic attrition and miscoding for these states. As a result, we were left with a sample of 6, 387 companies. We refer to this sample as the "multistate analysis." Voting restrictions were particularly prevalent among turnpikes. Joseph Stancliffe Davis has noted that voting caps were "almost universal" among 18th-century turnpike companies. 29 Other studies of voting patterns in 19th-century industrial companies have found that turnpikes had the highest incidence of voting restrictions across all industries. In his study of early New York companies, Eric Hilt finds that 98 percent of turnpike charters contained voting restrictions, and of those, only 1 percent had one-share, one-vote structures. 30 Hilt estimates that turnpikes had significantly lower voting concentration than companies in other industries (Hilt's index of 0. 23, compared with the next lowest, 0. 70, for bridge companies). 31 Similarly, John W. Cadman reports that a significant number of turnpikes adopted voting caps or graduated voting, even though the “vast majority” of early New Jersey corporations granted one vote per share. 32 To confirm and extend these statistics and others reported below, we independently analyzed a large database, created and generously provided by economic historians Richard Schirra and Robert Wright, 33 that contains the voting rules of nearly every (more than 22, 000) business corporation that received legislative charter in any U. S. state between 1790 and 1859. A more detailed description of this database and tables of statistics derived from it appear in the Appendix. For ease of interpretation, we focus here only on companies incorporated in the original 13 states. Additionally, we excluded Massachusetts and South Carolina from our analysis, as evidence suggests that the original data contained systematic attrition and miscoding for these states. As a result, we were left with a sample of 6, 387 companies. We refer to this sample as the “multiple-state analysis.”

As shown in Appendix Table 1, our multistate analysis reveals that between 1790 and 1859, 65% of turnpike and railroad (grouped together under the heading "roads" in the table) firms had limited voting systems. To confirm that this proportion was significantly higher than in manufacturing, Table 2 presents the results of regression analyses controlling for state and founding year.

Consistent with the consumer protection explanation, turnpikes were an industry in which shareholder interests in the firm's output (roads) rather than in the firm's profits were most visible. Turnpike shareholders were typically merchants and landowners located along the turnpike's route and profiting from its existence. 34 As Ronald Seavoy puts it, "Turnpikes were popular investments not necessarily because they offered the prospect of profit, but because they improved access to markets, raised local land values, and reduced the cost of goods that had to be purchased. Their shares had low par values and were widely held." 35 In fact, turnpikes rarely paid, and were not expected to pay, dividends to their investors. 36 The purchase of stock was akin to a voluntary tax on a public good. 37 This social pressure to contribute to the improvement of the community may have been the driving force behind the investment, and the prospect of a low financial return on the stock may have acted as a kind of "selection motivator." 38 But the most effective marketing tool to attract shareholders was to repeatedly emphasize the economic benefits the road would provide to local merchants and landowners. 39

That the primary interest of turnpike shareholders is in the company's output, not its profits, was clear from the turnpike cases of the early 19th century. Indeed, some courts have allowed shareholders to renege on their promise to join if the route of the turnpike is changed, which results in a less convenient road for the shareholders, the future users. For example, in Middlesex Turnpike Corporation v. Locke, 40 a shareholder successfully defended against an action for payment of levies made after joining. The defendant's counsel argued that his client had not consented to become the owner of the turnpike. He was originally induced to join because the turnpike as originally directed was particularly convenient for him. He would not have found such convenience in any other route. He would not have joined to assist the latter. 41 The courts agreed and dismissed the shareholders' claim. 42 Even those courts that refused to invalidate the obligation to join because of a later change in the route fully understood the nature of the turnpike shareholders' interest in the enterprise. In Irvin v. Susquehanna & Philipsburg Turnpike Co., 43 counsel for disgruntled stockholders argued that "the benefits of the road were never intended to compensate the individuals for their subscriptions, but rather it was the facilities and benefits that would come to their estates, and it was in consideration of this that Irvin made his promise to pay."44 While the indirect benefits to the owners were a "very strong inducement" to join the turnpike, the court refused to equate "the motive for entering into the contract with the consideration for it."45 It was clear from the turnpike cases of the early 19th century that the primary interest of turnpike stockholders was in the company's output, not in the company's profits. In fact, some courts allowed stockholders to renege on their subscription promises if the route of the turnpike was changed so that the road was less convenient for the stockholders, the future users. For example, in Middlesex Turnpike Corporation v. Locke, 40 a stockholder successfully defended against a lawsuit seeking payment of a levy made after the stockholders joined. Counsel for the defendant argued that his client had not consented to become an owner of the turnpike. He was originally induced to join because of the special convenience to him of the turnpike as originally directed. He would not have found such convenience in any other route. He would not have joined to assist the latter. 41 The court agreed and dismissed the stockholders' claim. 42 Even the court that refused to invalidate the obligation to join because of a later change in the route fully understood the nature of the interest of the turnpike stockholders in the enterprise. In Irvin v. Susquehanna & Philipsburg Turnpike Co., 43 counsel for the disgruntled stockholders contended that "it was never envisaged that the interests of the road would compensate the individuals for their subscriptions, but that it was the facilities and benefits which would be brought to their estates, and it was with this in mind that Irvin made his promise to pay." 44 While the indirect benefits to the owners were a "very powerful inducement" to join the turnpike, the court refused to equate "the motive for entering into the contract with the consideration for it." 45 That the primary interest of turnpike shareholders was in the company's output, not its profits, was clear from the turnpike cases of the early 19th century. Indeed, some courts allowed shareholders to renege on their promise to join if the route of the turnpike was changed to make the road less convenient for future users. For example, in Middlesex Turnpike Corporation v. Locke, 40 a shareholder successfully defended against a lawsuit for the payment of levies made after joining. The defendant's counsel argued that his client had not consented to becoming an owner of the turnpike. The defendant was originally induced to join because the turnpike as originally directed was particularly convenient for him. He would not have found any other route so convenient. He would not have joined to assist the latter. 41

The court agreed and dismissed the stockholders' claim. 42

Even courts that refused to invalidate the obligation to join because of later route changes fully understood the nature of the turnpike stockholders' interest in the enterprise. In Irvin v. Susquehanna & Philipsburg Turnpike Co., 43 the disgruntled stockholders' counsel contended that "it was never envisaged that the benefits of the road would compensate the individuals for their subscriptions, but that it was the facilities and benefits which would come to their estates, and it was with this in mind that Irvin made his promise to pay." 44

The court, while the indirect benefits to the owners were a "very powerful inducement" to join the turnpike, refused to equate "the motive for entering into the contract with the consideration for it." 45

In this situation, the voting restrictions served to ensure that no one, especially no one who was not a major user of the turnpike, could accumulate enough stock to give both a concession and the power to set tolls at prices well above marginal cost, much less at a monopoly price level. 46 It was clearly understood that economic development would proceed most quickly and favorably for all adjacent merchants and landowners if turnpike tolls were kept low. Toll prices were kept so low (even to the point of endangering the survival of businesses) that they changed very little during the period. Petitions to the legislature to raise tolls appear to have been very rare, despite the well-known lack of profitability. 47 The idea that voting restrictions favored the interests of consumers at the expense of investors was well understood at the time. This point is clear from the 1846 Virginia Civil Code Reformers' Report, a rare piece of evidence of legislative intent as to why the voting restrictions approach was abandoned. The report noted that one share, one vote was supported by the financial interests of state governments, which are shareholders in many public corporations. 48 The amendment was concerned that overly strict voting restrictions would allow shareholder consumers to exercise disproportionate influence over corporate management and undermine profitability in favor of lower prices. According to the report, "individual shareholders, who have significant investments, are inclined to take the course which they believe best calculated to make their shares productive, taking into consideration the effect of their votes on their investments. 49 In this situation, the voting restrictions served to ensure that no one, especially no one who was not a major user of the turnpike, could accumulate enough stock to give them both a concession and the power to set tolls at prices well above marginal cost, much less at a monopoly price level. 46 It was evidently understood that the fastest and most advantageous economic development would occur for all adjacent merchants and landowners if turnpike tolls were kept low. Toll prices were kept so low (even to the point of endangering the survival of businesses) that they changed very little during the period. Petitions to the legislature to raise tolls appear to have been very rare, despite the well-known lack of profitability. 47 The idea that voting restrictions favored the interests of consumers at the expense of investors was well understood at the time. This is evident from the 1846 Report of the Virginia Civil Code Reformers, a rare piece of evidence of legislative intent as to why the voting restrictions system was abandoned. The report states that the one-share, one-vote system was supported by the financial interests of the state government, which was a shareholder in many public corporations. 48 The amendment was concerned that overly strict voting restrictions would allow shareholder consumers to exercise disproportionate influence over corporate management and undermine profitability in favor of low prices. According to the report, “individual shareholders, who have a large investment, are inclined, in exercising their votes, to consider the effect of their votes on their investments, and to adopt the course which they think best calculated to make their stock productive.”49 In such circumstances, the voting restrictions served to ensure that no one, especially no one who was not a major user of the turnpike, could accumulate enough stock to give himself both a concession and the power to set tolls at prices well above marginal cost, much less at a monopoly price level. 46 It was evidently understood that economic development would proceed most quickly and most favorably for all the adjoining merchants and landowners if turnpike tolls were kept low. Toll prices were kept so low (to the point of endangering the survival of the enterprises) that they changed very little during the period. Petitions to the legislature for toll increases appear to have been very rare, despite the well-known lack of profitability. 47

The idea that voting restrictions favor consumers at the expense of investors was well understood at the time. This is clear from the 1846 Virginia Civil Code Reformers' Report, a rare piece of evidence of legislative intent for why the voting restrictions system was abandoned. The report stated that the one-share, one-vote system was supported by the financial interests of the state government, which was the shareholder of many public corporations. 48

The reformers were concerned that excessively strict voting restrictions would allow shareholder consumers to exercise disproportionate influence over corporate management and undermine profitability in favor of low prices. According to the report, "in exercising his voting power, individual shareholders, having a large investment, are inclined to consider the effect of their voting power on their investment, and to adopt the policy which they believe to be best calculated to make their shares productive. 49

A bridge company established in a state had a resolution limit, but did not exist in other states. According to Hilt, 42 % of bridge companies established in New York by 1825 adopted the resolution limit. In addition, the resolution of the voting rights was also adopted in some of the early bridge companies in Massachusetts and many Bridge companies in New Jersey. On the contrary, the bridge company established in Connecticut rarely adopt voting restrictions. 52 Our analysis of multiple states adopted 38 % of bridge companies established between 1790 and 1859.

In other words, it is a revolutionary Supreme Court ruling of the 53 Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge. This ruling is the most quoted on the proposition that the corporate articles of incorporation do not mean the grant of monopoly privileges, and the Taylor vs. Grease Wold case 54 is a commonerative rule on the contract of shareholders of business companies. It is an incident. 55 Despite such an influential judgment, Bridge Corporation has much lower academic attention than other industries.

B. Financial Infrastructure

Such a small number of historical research has led to the low information on the ownership of the early bridge and the driving force of the bridge transfer. As with turnpike, the bridge generally has important monopoly, and of course it is expected to promote consumer ownership. Regarding the establishment of Charles River Bridge, the first charter in Massachusetts, Joseph Davis said, "In addition to the expectation of traffic revenue, expectations for improving local business and land prices played a major role in promoting the establishment. However, by the time the Charles River Bridge case was ruled (more than 50 years after the company was established), the Supreme Court consistently calls the interests of shareholders as the interests of investors. I was. 57

1. Banks

In the New Jerse Supreme Court in the Taylor vs. Grease Wold, the Bridge Corporation acknowledged the exercise of voting rights by a power of attorney if there was no provision in the articles of incorporation. It was a question of whether the detailed rules that stipulated the voting rules could be adopted. The court concluded that it was not only detailed rules, but only the company's articles of incorporation, which could allow the deviation from the Common Low Rule, one voted one vote. At that time, the court emphasized the "publicity" of companies that operate paved roads, bridges, and railways, in contrast to "strictly private" companies like banks and insurance companies. 58 Colin Dan Lavy pointed out the debate of 59, "a corporation that is all the members of political organizations, has equal rights," as a typical example of a different social concept for corporations. did. 60

Nevertheless, reading the Taylor opinion in detail shows that the adoption of the voting privilege restriction in the 19th century was at least partially economic consideration. In particular, the New Jersey Court's ruling clearly suggests the relationship between consumers' profits and voting restrictions facing monopoly companies. Judge Hornbrowers states:

The obvious trend of the problem (one share and one voting rights rules) is an apparent trend that encourages speculation and monopoly, reduces the rights of small shareholders, reduces the value of stocks, and has a small number of companies and rule of the company. It is to leave it to a capitalist. I do not say that such a thing was intended or that result was brought. However, it only states that the natural or possible tendency of the problem is caused such a result. 61

In the court, the court said that the purpose was "more publicity, and the people have more direct and direct interest in their management", so this purpose (capital provider (capital provider)). He estimated that it will definitely be achieved best by the voting scheme that prioritizes the profits of consumers and the people. 62 In the Taylor vs. Grease Wold case, the New Jersey Supreme Supreme Court was contested by Bridge Corporation, and if the articles of incorporation did not provide this issue, the exercise of voting by a power of attorney was allowed. The question was whether or not the detailed rules for one share and one voting right could be adopted. The court concluded that it was not only detailed rules, but only the company's articles of incorporation, which could allow the deviation from the Common Low Rule, one voted one vote. At that time, the court emphasized the "publicity" of companies that operate paved roads, bridges, and railways, in contrast to "strictly private" companies like banks and insurance companies. 58 Colin Dan Lavy pointed out the debate of 59, "a corporation that is all the members of political organizations, has equal rights," as a typical example of a different social concept for corporations. did. 60

In the court, the court said that the purpose was "more publicity, and the people have more direct and direct interest in their management", so this purpose (capital provider (capital provider)). He estimated that it will definitely be achieved best by the voting scheme that prioritizes the profits of consumers and the people. 62 In the Taylor vs. Grease Wold case, the New Jersey Supreme Court was contested by Bridge Corporation, and if the articles of incorporation did not stipulate this issue, the exercise of voting rights by a power of attorney was allowed and one share at the general meeting of shareholders. (1) It was a question of whether the detailed rules that stipulate the voting rules could be adopted. The court concluded that it was not only detailed rules, but only the company's articles of incorporation, which could allow the deviation from the Common Low Rule, one voted one vote. At that time, the court emphasized the "publicity" of companies that operate paved roads, bridges, and railways, in contrast to "strictly private" companies like banks and insurance companies. 58 Colin Dan Lavy pointed out the debate of 59, "a corporation that is all the members of political organizations, has equal rights," as a typical example of a different social concept for corporations. did. 60

The incidence of voting restrictions in canal companies varied over time and place. Early Massachusetts canal charters frequently contained voting limits. 63 Canals in New Jersey also had voting restrictions, but the charters of four Connecticut canals established by 1856 had no voting restrictions at all. 64 Our multistate analysis shows that 43% of canal companies established between 1790 and 1859 had voting restrictions, with a peak of 66% in the 1790s.

The first canals in the United States were founded for essentially the same reasons as turnpikes: local merchants and landowners hoping to profit from improved transportation pooled their resources to incorporate some of the earliest canals. 65 But other 18th-century canals attracted foreign investment from the start. 66 The Middlesex Canal was one of the few early canals to be built and operated successfully, even if it was not profitable. Its founders were Medford merchants, professionals, and landowners, and as the canal's natural terminus, they were in a position to profit most from the new venture. 67 Christopher Roberts attributes the canal's early shareholder base to a large and stable "partnership united in the cause of establishing a public enterprise." 68 The Middlesex Canal's original articles of incorporation in 1793 contained an elaborate graduated voting system, which was streamlined by an amendment two years later to allow voting by stock, with a limit of 25 votes per shareholder. 69 The Delaware and Raritan Canal appears to have introduced voting restrictions as a defense against foreign (i. e., out-of-state) control of the business, but again, this was presumably to protect shareholders as customers at the expense of their interests as investors. 70 The incidence of voting restrictions in canal companies varied over time and place. Early Massachusetts canal charters frequently contained voting limits. 63 Canals in New Jersey also had voting restrictions, but the charters of the four canals established in Connecticut by 1856 had no voting restrictions at all. 64 Our multistate analysis shows that 43% of canal companies established between 1790 and 1859 had voting restrictions, with a peak of 66% in the 1790s.

The first canals in the United States were founded for essentially the same motivations as turnpikes. Some of the early canals were built by local merchants and landowners hoping to profit from improved transportation, pooling their resources. 65 However, other 18th-century canals attracted foreign investment from the beginning. 66 The Middlesex Canal was one of the few early canals that was successfully built and operated, even if it was not profitable. Its founders were Medford merchants, professionals, and landowners, and as the canal's natural terminus, they stood to gain most from the new venture. 67 Christopher Roberts attributes the canal's early shareholder base to a large and stable extent, "because partners banded together to establish a public enterprise." 68 The Middlesex Canal's original charter of 1793 contained an elaborate tiered voting system, which was streamlined by an amendment two years later to allow stockholders to vote with a limit of 25 votes per shareholder. 69 The Delaware and Raritan Canal appears to have introduced voting restrictions as a defense against foreign (i. e., out-of-state) control of the business, but again, presumably to protect shareholder customers at the expense of investor interests. 70 The incidence of voting restrictions in canal companies varied over time and place. Early Massachusetts canal charters frequently contained voting limits. 63 Canals in New Jersey also had voting restrictions, but by 1856, the charters of the four Connecticut canals had no voting restrictions at all. 64 Our multistate analysis shows that 43% of canal companies established between 1790 and 1859 had voting restrictions, with voting restrictions peaking at 66% in the 1790s.

The first canals in the United States were founded for essentially the same motives as turnpikes: local merchants and landowners hoping to profit from improved transportation pooled their resources to incorporate some of the earliest canals. 65 But other 18th-century canals attracted foreign investment from the start. 66

The Middlesex Canal was one of the few early canals to be built and operated successfully, even if it was not profitable. Its founders were Medford merchants, professionals, and landowners, and as the canal’s natural terminus, they were in a position to profit most from this new venture. 67 Christopher Roberts attributes the canals' early shareholder base to a large and stable extent, "because partners banded together to establish a public enterprise." 68 The Middlesex Canal's original charter in 1793 contained an elaborate graduated voting system, which was streamlined by an amendment two years later to allow stockholders to vote up to 25 votes per share. 69 The Delaware and Raritan Canal appears to have introduced voting restrictions as a safeguard against foreign (i. e., out-of-state) control of the business, but this too was presumably to protect shareholder customers at the expense of investor interests. 70

Eventually, US canals developed as government businesses, not private (ownership or consumer) business. First, US population statistical patterns were disadvantaged by investors' private ownership. 72 The most population in the United States and the most active commercial activities have lost the canal's competitiveness because they are adjacent to the natural waterway or to the center of the east coast, which is accessible on the road. 。 73 Second, it is certain that the customer owned by the customer was hindered by the need for a large amount of capital and the group of merchants supplied by long canals was different. Third, the officials at the time would not have said this, but because the canal's fixed cost and low variable costs are low, the price will be set lower than the average cost to increase efficiency. It seems that it was necessary, and it was recognized that it was necessary to be injected through government rights to do so. Prior to the Ellie Canal, there were only three of the canals that existed in the country, exceeding two miles. The 2 8-mile middle sex canal was the longest, but was forced to struggle. The 74 New York State government has built a new era in which the state is directly involved in the development of canal development by constructing a pioneer in the Ellie Canal and providing funds without the corporate form. 75 Such public works will eventually be threatened by the New York State government.

The railway was the leading role in lon g-distance transportation in the 19th century, but it was later that it appeared as an alternative to turn pikes and canals. The first railway company was established in the late 1820s, while the turnpike and canals were chartered since the 18th century. 76 Like many canals, some railway companies received the government's substantial support, but most of the early New England railways established in the 1830s are completely private companies. Ta. 77

In the early stages of private railway development, voting restrictions were common. At Massachusetts' railway companies established in the 1830s, 78, which commonly set up a large shareholder voting right, 78. The Massachusetts' Railway Law, which was enacted in 1836, was limited to on e-tenth of the number of shares that had been subjected to individual shareholders. 80 Ultimately, US canals developed as government businesses, not private (ownership or consumer) business. First, US population statistical patterns were disadvantaged by investors' private ownership. 72 The most population in the United States and the most active commercial activities have lost the canal's competitiveness because they are adjacent to the natural waterway or to the center of the east coast, which is accessible on the road. 。 73 Second, it is certain that the customer owned by the customer was hindered by the need for a large amount of capital and the group of merchants supplied by long canals was different. Third, the officials at the time would not have said this, but because the canal's fixed cost and low variable costs are low, the price will be set lower than the average cost to increase efficiency. It seems that it was necessary, and it was recognized that it was necessary to be injected through government rights to do so. Prior to the Ellie Canal, there were only three of the canals that existed in the country, exceeding two miles. The 2 8-mile middle sex canal was the longest, but was forced to struggle. The 74 New York State government has built a new era in which the state is directly involved in the development of canal development by constructing a pioneer in the Ellie Canal and providing funds without the corporate form. 75 Such public works will eventually be threatened by the New York State government.

2. Insurance

In the early stages of private railway development, voting restrictions were common. At Massachusetts' railway companies established in the 1830s, 78, which commonly set up a large shareholder voting right, 78. The Massachusetts' Railway Law, which was enacted in 1836, was limited to on e-tenth of the number of shares that had been subjected to individual shareholders. Eventually, US canals developed as government businesses, not private (ownership or consumer) business. First, US population statistical patterns were disadvantaged by investors' private ownership. 72 The most population in the United States and the most active commercial activities have lost the canal's competitiveness because they are adjacent to the natural waterway or to the center of the east coast, which is accessible on the road. 。 73 Second, it is certain that the customer owned by the customer was hindered by the need for a large amount of capital and the group of merchants supplied by long canals was different. Third, the officials at the time would not have said this, but because the canal's fixed cost and low variable costs are low, the price will be set lower than the average cost to increase efficiency. It seems that it was necessary, and it was recognized that it was necessary to be injected through government rights to do so. Prior to the Ellie Canal, there were only three of the canals that existed in the country, exceeding two miles. The 2 8-mile middle sex canal was the longest, but was forced to struggle. The 74 New York State government has built a new era in which the state is directly involved in the development of canal development by constructing a pioneer in the Ellie Canal and providing funds without the corporate form. 75 Such public works will eventually be threatened by the New York State government.

Like turns and canals, the establishment of early railway companies was generally promoted by the outlook of indirect benefits caused by improving communication means. Domestic and overseas financial capital, which became an important source of funding in the next decades, did not play a major role in raising the initial railway construction fund, except for very few exceptions. As emphasized by the 81 Therma Kisler, the first railway promoters generally appealed for shares from the perspective of "associated advantage" rather than profitability. Shareholders agreed to undertake the western railway shares, despite being "certainly not direct profits." 82 Similarly, in the call of donations from the residents along the Amerst Belchaic Town Road, the subscription is not "investment" for "financial rewards", but rather "to ensure the interests of yourself and the local community". It was emphasized. 83

However, restricted voting rights have gradually become no longer used as the industry matures for the first decades. At the Connecticut's railway company established in 1841, one vote per share was recognized. The 84 1850 New York Railway Company Law also provided a single share in the board of directors. In analysis for 85 multiple states, the proportion of railway companies that restricted the exercise of voting rights has dropped sharply from 48 % of companies established in the 1820s to 6 % of companies established in the 1850s. 。 Colleen dunlavy, in line with these numbers, has been rapidly lost in the 1840s, even in railway companies that initially restricted the voting rights of large shareholders. It indicates that it was. 86

C. Manufacturing

It suggests that the change in voting rights exercise rules was in parallel with the financing of the railway company and the major transformation of the owned structure. In the late 19th century, railway companies were considered a modern larg e-scale business company paradigm that requires huge capital, specialized management, and dispersed ownership. Railway securities eventually became a darling of Wall Street, subject to the most notable corporate scandals and control struggle in the 19th century. However, this must not obscure the fact that many of the early US railway companies in the United States were very similar to cooperative companies that characterized other early transport companies. Like the

The geographic distribution of early railroad shareholders confirms the importance of ancillary benefits as an incentive to purchase stock. The first railroad companies established in New England were highly localized enterprises, covering an average distance of 36 miles in 1850. 88 As many as 95% of the Massachusetts shareholders of the Western Railroad (holding 96. 6% of the total stock) lived along its line. 89 Most of the shareholders of the New London Railroad were also nearby residents. 90 Overall, the majority of early railroad promoters and shareholders were local merchants, manufacturers, and landowners who expected to profit from railroad operation. 91

The relationship between shareholders and consumers helps explain the use of voting restrictions in early railroad companies. In particular, a key driving force in the formation of the first railroad companies was the "desire to divert trade away from rival commercial cities." 92 In this light, voting restrictions helped to ensure that the companies did not easily come under the control of capitalists whose interests were antagonistic to the railroad companies and their beneficiaries.

The experience of the Western Railroad, one of the first Massachusetts railroad companies, illustrates this concern. In 1834, when the Western Railroad was facing great difficulties in raising the capital needed for construction, a group of New York capitalists offered to subscribe to the entire capital of the company in exchange for a controlling interest in the business. Despite the urgent need for funds, Western's representatives rejected the offer, citing the risk that the railroad would be "operated in a manner that would prevent the accomplishment of the purposes of its founders."93 The voting restrictions enshrined in Western's original articles of incorporation, limiting the voting power of each shareholder to one-tenth of the total number of shares, 94 no doubt served a similar function. 95 The geographic distribution of early railroad shareholders attests to the importance of ancillary benefits as an inducement to purchase stock. The first railroads established in New England were highly local enterprises, covering an average distance of 36 miles in 1850. 88 As many as 95% of the Massachusetts shareholders of the Western Railroad (holding 96. 6% of the total stock) lived along its line. 89 Most of the shareholders of the New London Railroad were also neighboring residents. 90 Overall, most of the early railroad promoters and shareholders were local merchants, manufacturers, and landowners who expected to profit from railroad operation. 91

II. ultra vires as consumer protection

The interests of shareholders and consumers help explain the use of voting restrictions in early railroad companies. In particular, a key driving force in the formation of the first railroad companies was the desire to divert trade away from rival commercial cities. 92 In this light, voting restrictions helped to ensure that the company would not easily come under the control of capitalists whose interests were antagonistic to the railroad company and its beneficiaries.

The experience of the Western Railroad, one of the first railroad companies in Massachusetts, illustrates this concern. In 1834, when the Western Railroad was facing great difficulties in raising the capital needed for construction, a group of New York capitalists offered to take over the entire capital of the company in exchange for a controlling interest in the business. Although the Western Company urgently needed funds, its representatives rejected the offer, citing the risk that the railroad would be "operated in a manner that would not accomplish the purposes of its founders."93 Voting restrictions in the original articles of incorporation of the Western Company, limiting the voting power of individual shareholders to one-tenth of the total number of shares, 94 no doubt served a similar function. 95 The geographic distribution of early railroad shareholders attests to the importance of ancillary benefits as an incentive to purchase stock. The first railroad companies established in New England were highly localized enterprises, covering an average distance of 36 miles in 1850. 88 As many as 95% of the Massachusetts shareholders of the Western Railway (holding 96. 6% of the total stock) lived along the line. 89 Most of the shareholders of the New London Railroad were also from nearby areas. 90 Overall, most of the early railroad promoters and shareholders were local merchants, manufacturers, and landowners who expected to profit from railroad operation. 91

The relationship between shareholder and consumer interests helps explain the use of voting restrictions in early railroad companies. In particular, a key driving force in the formation of the first railroad companies was the "desire to divert trade from rival commercial cities." 92 In this light, voting restrictions served to ensure that the company would not easily come under the control of capitalists whose interests were antagonistic to those of the railroad company or its beneficiaries.

In contrast, the small Mohawk and Hudson Railway, which was chartered by the New York State Congress in 1826, was one of the few early railways, completely owned by investors. The Mohawk Railway, which connects the 96 Albanny and the Senectadi city, was the first New York railway for passenger transportation. Unlike the 97th railway, this railway was not a local company but a New York capitalist. In 1830, just two months after the start of construction, it became the first railway on the New York Stock Exchange. The 99 Mohawk respects the ownership of investors and has adopted one share and one voting rights from the beginning. 100

III. the decline of voting restrictions

The development of the railway industry has changed its funding and scale. When the first railway succeeded in constructing and it turns out that it is an advantageous business, the promoter of the railway will emphasize not only indirect benefits but also potential interests when seeking new investment. Ta. 101 Since 1847, the structure of early railway “local businesses to achieve local purposes” is no longer practical, and the expansion of railways far away in Japan has been prioritized. 102

As the scale of the railway business increased, the source of funds has also expanded. As said by Winslop Daniels, in the dawn of the railway industry, the railway was "mainly raising funds by saving in areas where railways pass." 103 railway companies have relyed on issuing bonds since the 1850s. Meanwhile, railway securities have gained popularity at the eastern financial center and are being held by big games seeking speculators and corporate control. By 1905, it was revealed that "Wall Street is on railway securities." 105

A. Governmental Provision of Infrastructure

As the railway industry developed, as the ownership and control of the railway shifted from local beneficiary to investors, citizens complain about the exclusive price of railway companies. Arthur Hadley's classic research on railway history is regarded as a source of dissatisfaction with railway owners and customers as a source of dissatisfaction with railway monopoly. "There was almost no serious conflict between turns and bridges," he said. "Because the person who owned them and those who used them were quite the same, at least because they were in contact with them at least. In contrast, they were chartered by the New York State Congress in 1826. The small Mohawk and Hudson Railway was one of the few initial railways, which was completely owned by an investor, and the Mohawk Railway, which connects the Sennectadi, is the first in New York. Unlike the railway, this railway was not a local company, but only two months after the start of the construction of New York. The first railway was the Mohawk, which was initially adopted by one share.

B. Separation of Competition Law from Corporation Law

C. Evolution and Differentiation of Standard Corporation Statutes

As the railway industry developed, as the ownership and control of the railway shifted from local beneficiary to investors, citizens complain about the exclusive price of railway companies. Arthur Hadley's classic research on railway history is regarded as a source of dissatisfaction with railway owners and customers as a source of dissatisfaction with railway monopoly. "There was almost no serious conflict between turns and bridges," he said. "Because the owner and the person who owned them were quite the same, at least because they were in contact with at least. The Ando Hudson Railway was one of the few early railways, which was completely owned by an investor, is the first New York railroad for the purpose of transporting the Sennectadi. Unlike the 97th railway, this railway is not a local company, but only two months after the start of construction of New York. The first railway was respected the ownership of the investor and adopted one share.

D. Increased Competition

The restrictions on exercising voting rights were not limited to companies that provide social infrastructure. It was frequently adopted by companies that provide financial infrastructure for business activities.

The resolution of voting rights was also common in the early US banking companies. Merick Dod says that in the early 19th century bank in Massachusetts, voting caps were "unified practices." According to a study on the 19t h-century Connecticat's articles of incorporation by 107 Drillers, banking industry has the highest incidence of voting rights, and nearly 50 % of such companies are gradually voting, or Frequently, the absolute upper limit of the number of voting rights per shareholder was stipulated. Similarly, about half of the early banks in New Jersey adopted the exercise of voting rights. 109 Banks in New York had relatively few restrictions on exercising voting rights. Hilt has revealed that 26 % of the Sample New York banks have adopted voting restrictions, and 63 % have adopted the rules of voting rights per share. 110 On the other hand, according to our analysis for multiple states, 53 % of banks adopted voting rights restrictions between 1790 and 1859, 82 in the active 10 years from 1810 to 1820. % Has adopted voting rights restrictions.

E. Ease of Evasion

Like other early business companies, the first banking of the bank was often more interested in bank services than banks. 111 The US's first official bank, Robert Morris, who promoted the establishment of the North American Bank, is that the bank's profit margin is that if there is no other paid, it is sufficient to have stocks. Not "112. 113

From the late 18th century to the early 19th century, local merchants were the major owners of most banks and the main customers. According to the words of the observers of the same era, "people who are not capitalists," were the main promotions of the early Massachusetts Bank. 114 Harold Cleveland and Thomas Feltas have written in 1812 in the history of city banks in New York, "like almost all banks at the time," and "a kind of credit for merchants." He intended to be an union. " 115

F. The Interests of Small Versus Large Shareholders

These banks usually provided funds for wholesale products and were away from other types of potential customers. 116 In particular, banks provided very mobility for these merchants, which had often been able to provide credit at both ends of sales transactions. 117, for example, a merchant paid to the seller of the product by bill, not a pile of coins. In other words, banks exchange small fees (discount fees) to exchange the company's bills with shor t-term credit at banks. The bank handed a bank ticket issued by the bank to the seller, and the seller could give the bank ticket to other merchants as consumer goods. Unlike modern commercial banks, which deposits deposits from the general public, early banks made large loans from their own capital.

Competition seems to have been limited in the end of the 18th century to the early 19th century. For example, according to the report of the dryer, "it is normal to reflect the location by the name of a bank or insurance company established by a special law between 1789 and 1856 by the Connecticut State. It is rare that there are two banks in the town and two insurance companies that have insurance for the same risk. " 118 The initial shortage of banks was further enhanced by states, states, and legal restrictions on unit e-corporate banks in states and states. 119 It is clear that these legal regulations on bank competition were products of ideology and political influence, but early banks enjoyed some monopoly as a simple economic result. There is also a possibility. For example, before the establishment of a national currency in the 1860s, it is considered that there was an important economy for issuing a private bank ticket.

Bank license supply was limited and prices under the hig h-interest lending method overlapped, and banks began to treat insiders in fund distribution. 120 Merchants who had nothing to do with banks had difficulty gaining trust. Therefore, there was a legitimate reason for local merchants, who need to get a bill to be discounted by banks (and before that, c o-invested to raise funds for the establishment of banks). 。 In other words, in this scenario, "each borrowed interest wanted his own bank." 121 These banks usually provided funds for wholesale products and were far away from other types of potential customers. 116 In particular, banks provided very mobility for these merchants, which had often been able to provide credit at both ends of sales transactions. 117, for example, a merchant paid to the seller of the product by bill, not a pile of coins. In other words, banks exchange small fees (discount fees) to exchange the company's bills with shor t-term credit at banks. The bank handed a bank ticket issued by the bank to the seller, and the seller could give the bank ticket to other merchants as consumer goods. Unlike modern commercial banks, which deposits deposits from the general public, early banks made large loans from their own capital.

G. Mixed and Muddled Motives

Bank license supply was limited and prices under the hig h-interest lending method overlapped, and banks began to treat insiders in fund distribution. 120 Merchants who had nothing to do with banks had difficulty gaining trust. Therefore, there was a legitimate reason for local merchants, who need to get a bill to be discounted by banks (and before that, c o-invested to raise funds for the establishment of banks). 。 In other words, in this scenario, "each borrowed interest wanted his own bank." 121 These banks usually provided funds for wholesale products and were far away from other types of potential customers. 116 In particular, banks provided very mobility for these merchants, which had often been able to provide credit at both ends of sales transactions. 117, for example, a merchant paid to the seller of the product by bill, not a pile of coins. In other words, banks exchange small fees (discount fees) to exchange the company's bills with shor t-term credit at banks. The bank handed a bank ticket issued by the bank to the seller, and the seller could give the bank ticket to other merchants as consumer goods. Unlike modern commercial banks, which deposits deposits from the general public, early banks made large loans from their own capital.

Bank license supply was limited and prices under the hig h-interest lending method overlapped, and banks began to treat insiders in fund distribution. It was difficult for merchants who had nothing to do with 120 banks to gain trust. Therefore, there was a legitimate reason for local merchants, who need to get a bill to be discounted by banks (and before that, c o-invested to raise funds for the establishment of banks). 。 In other words, in this scenario, "each borrowed interest wanted his own bank." 121

Furthermore, the bank was a very risky company and had broken at a considerable rate. One of the reasons for the bankruptcy was the existence of moral hazards. The bank owned by the investor has been tempted to speculate using creditor funds (for example, funds received in exchange for private bank tickets). However, if a major bank has jointly owned a bank, an incentive will work conservatively and to make it difficult to break down. This is the same reason that consumer savings have been organized as no n-profit or mutual companies before 1845, and then gradually became investors since the state began to control bank reserves. 。 122

The resolution of the voting rights in consumer finance helped the major shareholders diverted banks for themselves and prevent other employers from being disadvantaged. However, the introduction of voting restrictions in banks was not necessarily from the bank shareholder, but was sometimes imposed from outside. The Massachusetts Bank, established in 1784, is one of the first banks in the United States and shows this. The Massachusetts Bank's articles of incorporation has given the interests of merchants consumers as the main legitimate reasons for the establishment of banks. 124 Many of the bank's first shareholders were prospects, but the major founders and shareholders, William Philips, publicly indicated that they were capitalists and lenders, not bank borrower. Ta. 125 In the articles of incorporation at the beginning of the Bank, there was one voting rights per share. 126

Philips was elected Massachusetts Bank in 1786, forcing shareholder borrower to sell shares and withdraw from the company. 127 He also imposed a limit on the amount that shareholders and individuals could borrow, but later abolished. 128, however, the bank's exclusive benefits continued to cause dissatisfaction with the insider, combined with the incentive treatment and arbitrary discount refusal. 129

IV. voting restrictions in comparative perspective

Designing critics, 130, the state council revised the bank's articles of incorporation to secure the "Massachusetts Bank more secure business operation". The state council has changed various articles of incorporation, from restrictions on soundness to restrictions on bank activity, but has led to a rule of 10 votes for the maximum number of voting rights per shareholder. 。 131

A. The Dutch East India Company

Two years before the case, Alexander Hamilton was famous for adopting the resolution of voting rights restrictions at Daiichi Bank of the United States. In his words, "one vote per share is too easy for a small number of major shareholders to monopolize the power and profits of banks." Giving one vote does not give the rational weight that major shareholders should have, regardless of the size of the interests to the institution, and probably not the weight that requires their safety and bank safety. " 。 132

Hamilton's remarks did not fully disclose his motivation, which proposed the resolution of voting rights in the United States Bank. However, in light of the controversy of the same era and the overall concerns and purposes of Hamilton's Bank of Bank, this remark is more consistent with explanations on consumer protection with voting rights restrictions than investor protection. It seems. 133 North American Bank in 1781, which was the background of Hamilton's proposal, made a mistake that "in the 1790s, a small number of influential borrowers monopolized the funds, so it was almost in functional failure." do not have. 134

Hamilton has harmonized the interests of investors and the interests of the general public through the Report on the National Bank. 135 Hamilton, in particular, seems to have been interested in relieving bank shareholders that maximize profit and maximize profit and prevent Eko. For example, he defended a bank with a lot of capital, fearing a decrease in profits and could resist the security of the bank and the benefit increase for customers. "Banks are the best way to lower interest rates in one country," he claimed, who squirms critics, and 130 to secure "Massachusetts Bank's More Safety Business Operation", the state council opposes. The articles of incorporation of the bank were revised by pushing out. The state council has changed various articles of incorporation, from restrictions on soundness to restrictions on bank activity, but has led to a rule of 10 votes for the maximum number of voting rights per shareholder. 。 131

Hamilton has harmonized the interests of investors with the interests of the general public through the Report on National Bank. 135 Hamilton, in particular, seems to have been interested in relieving bank shareholders that maximize profit and maximize profit and prevent Eko. For example, he defended a bank with a lot of capital, fearing a decrease in profits and could resist the security of the bank and the benefit increase for customers. "Banks are the best way to lower interest rates in a country," he claims, soothes critics, and 130 to secure "Massachusetts Bank's More Safety Business Operation", the state council is the same. The articles of incorporation of the bank have been amended. The state council has changed various articles of incorporation, from restrictions on soundness to restrictions on bank activity, but has led to a rule of 10 votes for the maximum number of voting rights per shareholder. 。 131

B. Nineteenth-Century Voting Restrictions in England, Brazil, and France

Hamilton has harmonized the interests of investors and the interests of the general public through the Report on the National Bank. 135 Hamilton seems to have been particularly interested in relieving bank shareholders that maximize profit, which maximizes profit, and to prevent Eko. For example, he defended a bank with a lot of capital, as a fear of a decline in profits and could resist the security of banks and the increase in capital for customers. "Banks are the best way to lower the interest rate in one country," he claimed.

However, in order to have such effects, the capital must be completely worthy of all business demand, and that the convenience of such a capital is somewhat favorable. It must be something to remove your thoughts. As with all other cases, if the product is abundant, the price should be modest.

Hamilton also proposed a duty of directors to go to the circular number. This rule reduced the "combination of directors, which would allow this institution to be subordinated to the intentions of a party and preferably a specific person." 136

The ownership of bank ownership and control by commercial customers, and the restrictions on voting rights to strengthen their ruling not only suppresses the use of exclusive power, but also suppresses banks inefficient risk. However, it also played a role in suppressing the cost of bank customers. Prior to the emergence of effective regulations by the government that began in the late 1840s, the Saving Bank in the 19th century was a different kind of savvy bank that was different from the commercial bank. The reason why the company was dominant was clearly here. 137 Ineffikian risk takes given customers to customers are certainly much higher in savings banks than commercial banks, but banks have received bills discounted by commercial banks. It is clear that they were interested in continuous creditworthiness of issued bank tickets and other claims.

Conclusion

In fact, from the latter point of view, the consumer ownership of the Bank of Commercial is also useful for explaining a general articles of incorporation other than the provisions of shareholder resolution. In the early banking articles of incorporation, it was common for banks to be particularly banned from engaging in trade and product transactions. 138 It is highly likely that these provisions were intended to protect consumer rather than investor protection. In particular, it is thought that such a provision was to limit the risk of banks and probably prevent banks from competing with local merchants. However, in order to have such an effect, the capital must be completely worthy of all business demand, and the convenience of such a capital is somewhat favorable. It must be something to remove the idea of being. As with all other cases, if the product is abundant, the price should be modest.

In fact, from the latter point of view, the consumer ownership of the Bank of Commercial is also useful for explaining a general articles of incorporation other than the provisions of shareholder resolution. In the early banking articles of incorporation, it was common for banks to be particularly banned from engaging in trade and product transactions. 138 It is highly likely that these provisions were intended to protect consumer rather than investor protection. In particular, it is thought that such a provision was to limit the risk of banks and probably prevent banks from competing with local merchants. However, in order to have such effects, the capital must be completely worthy of all business demand, and that the convenience of such a capital is somewhat favorable. It must be something to remove your thoughts. As with all other cases, if the product is abundant, the price should be modest.

Appendix: Patterns Of Restricted Voting Across Industries, States, And Decades

Commercial banks in the early 19th century gradually shifted from consumer ownership to investor ownership. 139 Why did this shift occur? Because localities began to own multiple banks, and because bank entrepreneurs in the 1860s could obtain federal as well as state charters (although extensive restrictions on both interstate and intrastate branching continued to limit effective competition). 140 The expansion of state and federal regulation was probably important in reducing bank risk as well, and in giving merchants assurance that their local banks would not discriminate in favor of competitors.

Voting restrictions were also found in early property and casualty insurance companies. 141 Maximum voting restrictions were common, though not universal, in stock insurance companies in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. 142 By 1856, about one-third of the stock corporations organized by special law in Connecticut had voting restrictions. 143 In contrast, the vast majority of New York144 and New Jersey145 financial and insurance companies granted voting rights in proportion to the percentage of stock ownership. A multistate analysis found that 38% of insurers organized between 1790 and 1859 had voting restrictions.

A significant number of early insurance companies were mutuals in name and in reality. These companies were owned by their insured customers and usually had one vote per member or other strict voting restrictions. Early mutuals were particularly common in the fire insurance business. 146 Economies of scale through the creation of insurance pools gave many of these companies effective monopoly power, creating strong incentives for collective ownership by customers. 147

Many of the insurance companies owned by consumers were formally organized as a mutual company, but many of the insurance companies founded as a corporation are virtually mutual companies and mainly serve shareholder insurance. I was doing it. In this sense, the history of the insurance company is essentially similar to the history of the bank and is closely related. 148 As Alfred Chandler states in the context of maritime insurance, "By pooling resources to incorporated insurance companies, specialized shipping companies that increase in residents, importers, exporters, and increasing specialized shipping companies. I was able to get cheaper insurance premiums, "and as a result," all of these companies in the early days only handled the business of the local shipper and the owner. " 149 Early insurance companies' regional elements are clearly stipulated in the articles of incorporation, and directors are generally required to require state municipal rights and, in some cases, townspeople. 150

For example, the first US Corporation Insurance Company (Insurance Company of North America) founded in Philadelphia in 1784. It was one of the founders and later John Maxwell Nesbit, who decided to turn the tortine, which was initially sluggish, to maritime insurance companies. 151 Nasbit has begun to cover many shareholders and directors with insurance, but this is clearly assumed and permission to explicitly assume that internal stakeholders do not receive special privileges. It was the situation. 152 However, not all prospects could become a company shareholder. In fact, the Pennsylvania Congress is from the original insurance company charter because many of the Filadelphia's ship owners and traders cannot get shares (North American insurance companies) due to local reasons. Just four days later, he gave a charter to the Pennsylvania insurance company. The 153 insurance companies have adopted a ste p-based voting rights system with an absolute upper limit on the number of voting rights per shareholder. 154 Many of the insurance companies owned by consumers were formally organized as a mutual company, but most of the insurance companies founded as a stock company are virtually mutual companies and mainly shareholders. I was serving insurance. In this sense, the history of the insurance company is essentially similar to the history of the bank and is closely related. 148 As Alfred Chandler states in the context of maritime insurance, "By pooling resources to incorporated insurance companies, specialized shipping companies that increase in residents, importers, exporters, and increasing specialized shipping companies. I was able to get cheaper insurance premiums, "and as a result," all of these companies in the early days only handled the business of the local shipper and the owner. " 149 Early insurance companies' regional elements are clearly stipulated in the articles of incorporation, and directors are generally required to require state municipal rights and, in some cases, townspeople. 150

Three pillars of sustainability: in search of conceptual origins

For example, the first US Corporation Insurance Company (Insurance Company of North America) founded in Philadelphia in 1784. It was one of the founders and later John Maxwell Nesbit, who decided to turn the tortine, which was initially sluggish, to maritime insurance companies. 151 Nasbit has begun to cover many shareholders and directors with insurance, but this is clearly assumed and permission to explicitly assume that internal stakeholders do not receive special privileges. It was the situation. 152 However, not all prospects could become a company shareholder. In fact, the Pennsylvania Congress is from the original insurance company charter because many of the Filadelphia's ship owners and traders cannot get shares (North American insurance companies) due to local reasons. Just four days later, he gave a charter to the Pennsylvania insurance company. The 153 insurance companies have adopted a ste p-based voting rights system with an absolute upper limit on the number of voting rights per shareholder. 154 Many of the insurance companies owned by consumers were formally organized as a mutual company, but most of the insurance companies founded as a stock company are essentially mutual companies and are mainly shareholder insurance. I was serving. In this sense, the history of the insurance company is essentially similar to the history of the bank and is closely related. 148 As Alfred Chandler states in the context of maritime insurance, "By pooling resources to incorporated insurance companies, specialized shipping companies that increase in residents, importers, exporters, and increasing specialized shipping companies. I was able to get cheaper insurance premiums, "and as a result," all of these companies in the early days only handled the business of the local shipper and the owner. " 149 Early insurance companies' regional elements are clearly stipulated in the articles of incorporation, and directors are generally required to require state municipal rights and, in some cases, townspeople. 150

Sustainability Definitions, Historical Context, and Frameworks

Introduction: The Anthropology of Sustainability: Beyond Development and Progress

Leading merchants were also instrumental in the founding of the first stock insurance company in Connecticut, the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, in 1810. According to P. Henry Woodward, "a sense of ever-present danger, a desire to avoid the worst effects of disaster from the immediate victims by spreading the losses over the community, and a willingness to contribute equitably to a common fund led to the founding of the company," and while the insurers certainly intended to make a profit, "making money was secondary."155 However, the stockholders and directors proved to be less than enthusiastic buyers of insurance policies, and the company initially struggled due to a lack of customers. 156 The company's articles of incorporation allowed voting rights according to the percentage of stock held. 157

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The catalyst for the founding of another fire insurance company in Hartford came from merchants who were customers of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company. Interestingly, their main motivation for founding a competitor was not the Hartford Fire Insurance Company's monopoly prices, but rather its lackluster customer service. The story goes that Walter Mitchell, secretary and sole salesman of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, had an office in a very inconvenient location, irregular hours, and missed appointments. Disgruntled merchants then "made a general protest" and formed the Aetna Insurance Company in 1819. 158 Aetna Insurance Company initially operated locally, but in the face of increasing competition, it expanded to other areas and acquired outside sales through agents. 159 The original articles of incorporation limited voting rights to 50 per shareholder, but this provision was repealed in 1877 in favor of voting by stock. 160

In contrast to the abov e-mentioned type of company, one vote per vote per share from the beginning was a ruling rule of voting rights. Only one company adopted voting rights restrictions out of 135 manufacturing industries established by special law by 1856 by Connecticut State. Similarly, the resolution limit is only 2 % of the manufacturing industries established in New York between 1790 and 1825, and only 5 % of the manufacturing industries established in New Jersey between 1790 and 1867. there were. The Law of the Evezing Corporation in New York, established in 1811, has provided a voting rights per share. 163

Introduction

In our analysis of multiple states, 31 % of the manufacturing industries established between 1790 and 1859 were restricted to exercise voting rights, but this percentage is misleading. In contrast to other types of companies, manufacturing companies seem to have established a considerable number of companies from an early stage under the new fre e-establishment law of this period. 164 In fact, the pioneering New York corporate law enacted in 1811 was limited to the manufacturing industry. Therefore, these data, except for companies established under the free establishment law, are probably too small. Furthermore, there is sufficient reasons that the proportion of the excluded manufacturing companies, one share and voting rights rules, were considerably higher than the specially established manufacturing companies included in the data. One of the reasons is that early laws and regulations, which stipulate the establishment of free corporations, such as the New York State Law in 1811, were limited to manufacturing companies, but also obliged one share voting system. Therefore, in our analysis of our multiple states, it seems that the gap between the provisions of voting rights adopted by the manufacturing company and the rules of exercising voting rights adopted by companies in other industries is modest. 。 However, according to regression analysis in Table 2, the frequency of voting rights is less frequent than the type of bank, bridge, canal, insurance, and roads. In contrast to the abov e-mentioned type of company, one vote per vote per share has been dominated for voting rights from the beginning. Only one company adopted voting rights restrictions out of 135 manufacturing industries established by special law by 1856 by Connecticut State. Similarly, the resolution limit is only 2 % of the manufacturing industries established in New York between 1790 and 1825, and only 5 % of the manufacturing industries established in New Jersey between 1790 and 1867. there were. The Law of the Evezing Corporation in New York, established in 1811, has provided a voting rights per share. 163

In our analysis of multiple states, 31 % of the manufacturing industries established between 1790 and 1859 were restricted to exercise voting rights, but this percentage is misleading. In contrast to other types of companies, manufacturing companies seem to have established a considerable number of companies from an early stage under the new fre e-establishment law of this period. 164 In fact, the pioneering New York corporate law enacted in 1811 was limited to the manufacturing industry. Therefore, these data, except for companies established under the free establishment law, are probably too small. Furthermore, there is sufficient reasons that the proportion of the excluded manufacturing companies, one share and voting rights rules, were considerably higher than the specially established manufacturing companies included in the data. One of the reasons is that early laws and regulations, which stipulate the establishment of free corporations, such as the New York State Law in 1811, were limited to manufacturing companies, but also obliged one share voting system. Therefore, in our analysis of our multiple states, it seems that the gap between the provisions of voting rights adopted by the manufacturing company and the rules of exercising voting rights adopted by companies in other industries is modest. 。 However, according to regression analysis in Table 2, the frequency of voting rights is less frequent than the type of bank, bridge, canal, insurance, and roads. In contrast to the abov e-mentioned type of company, one vote per vote per share from the beginning was a ruling rule of voting rights. Only one company adopted voting rights restrictions out of 135 manufacturing industries established by special law by 1856 by Connecticut State. Similarly, the resolution limit is only 2 % of the manufacturing industries established in New York between 1790 and 1825, and only 5 % of the manufacturing industries established in New Jersey between 1790 and 1867. there were. The Law of the Evezing Corporation in New York, established in 1811, has provided a voting rights per share. 163

In our analysis of multiple states, 31 % of the manufacturing industries established between 1790 and 1859 were restricted to exercise voting rights, but this percentage is misleading. In contrast to other types of companies, manufacturing companies seem to have established a considerable number of companies from an early stage under the new fre e-establishment law of this period. 164 In fact, the pioneering New York company law enacted in 1811 was limited to the manufacturing industry. Therefore, these data, except for companies established under the free establishment law, are probably too small. Furthermore, there is sufficient reasons that the proportion of the excluded manufacturing companies, one share and voting rights rules, were considerably higher than the specially established manufacturing companies included in the data. One of the reasons is that early laws and regulations, which stipulate the establishment of free corporations, such as the New York State Law in 1811, were limited to manufacturing companies, but also obliged one share voting system. Therefore, in our analysis of our multiple states, it seems that the gap between the provisions of voting rights adopted by the manufacturing company and the rules of exercising voting rights adopted by companies in other industries is modest. 。 However, according to regression analysis in Table 2, the frequency of voting rights is less frequent than the type of bank, bridge, canal, insurance, and roads.

When the Pioneer's Pioneering Association (S. U. M.) was established in New Jersey in 1791, the trend of exercising voting rights in the manufacturing industry was already obvious. S. U. M. was a corporation sponsored by the state while being a private owner, aiming to promote the development of the manufacturing industry in the United States. S. U. M. was ultimately established in New Jersey, but most of the subscribers were New York capitalists and speculators. Unlike other companies of the same era, which stipulates the purpose of the company quite accurately, the purpose of the E s-Youem is very widespread, operating a "manufacturing industry in this state" and "not prohibited by law. It stipulates that the capital or product is manufactured or manufactured. The 166 S. U. M. articles of incorporation has limited one vote for individual shareholders, while the voting rights for US governments and state governments to become corporate shareholders are limited to 100 votes. 167 Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton, who strongly defended the adoption of resolution of voting rights in the United States Bank, was one of the main promotions of S. U. M. When the Pioneer's Pioneering Association (S. U. M.) was established in New Jersey (S. U. M.) in New Jersey, the tendency of shares to exercise voting rights in the manufacturing industry was already clear. S. U. M. was a corporation sponsored by the state while being a private owner, aiming to promote the development of the manufacturing industry in the United States. S. U. M. was ultimately established in New Jersey, but most of the subscribers were New York capitalists and speculators. Unlike other companies of the same era, which stipulates the purpose of the company quite accurately, the purpose of the E s-Youem is very widespread, operating a "manufacturing industry in this state" and "not prohibited by law. It stipulates that the capital or product is manufactured or manufactured. The 166 S. U. M. articles of incorporation has limited one vote for individual shareholders, while the voting rights for US governments and state governments to become corporate shareholders are limited to 100 votes. 167 Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton, who strongly defended the adoption of resolution of voting rights in the United States Bank, was one of the main promotions of S. U. M. When the Pioneer's Pioneering Association (S. U. M.) was established in New Jersey in 1791, the trend of exercising voting rights in the manufacturing industry was already obvious. S. U. M. was a corporation sponsored by the state while being a private owner, aiming to promote the development of the manufacturing industry in the United States. S. U. M. was ultimately established in New Jersey, but most of the subscribers were New York capitalists and speculators. Unlike other companies of the same era, which stipulates the purpose of the company quite accurately, the purpose of the E s-Youem is very widespread, operating a "manufacturing industry in this state" and "not prohibited by law. It stipulates that the capital or product is manufactured or manufactured. The 166 S. U. M. articles of incorporation has limited one vote for individual shareholders, while the voting rights for US governments and state governments to become corporate shareholders are limited to 100 votes. 167 Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton, who strongly defended the adoption of resolution of voting rights in the United States Bank, was one of the main promotions of S. U. M.

Many early companies, such as banks, insurance companies, and transport companies, were custo m-owned regional monopoly companies, while the manufacturing shareholders were almost always investors and consumers. In contrast to the public interest business at that time, most manufacturers that require enough capital to adopt a company form are mainly produced in textile products, small, but glass and metal 169. It was likely to be a part of a wide market, and thus faced a substantial competition. In addition, consumers of manufacturing companies were generally distributed, and the purchase of products was sporadic, so it was not possible to organize efficiently to become a company owner. In this regard, they were in contrast to the users of the main roads, banks, and insurance companies, which would have been trading with these service providers at a considerable amount of expenditure. Finally, as Donald Smythe observed, the manufacturer shared the ownership of the exclusive service industry because it needed more aggressive and innovative management than the early public interest business. Compared to a wide range of customers, the most suitable owners faced powerful financial incentives and responded to it. 170

Historical origins of ‘sustainability’

The recognition that many of the early companies were owned by consumers, not investors, can shed the historical aspects of corporate law other than shareholder voting rights. Another remarkable feature under the 19th century corporate law was a strong law that was later abolished, but is a strong legal that is not "Ultra Vires) (literally" exceeding authority "), and specified in the corporate articles of incorporation. Basically, the company owner deviated from the activity (or "purpose") was basically prohibited. In the 19t h-century company, the articles of incorporation generally described relatively narrow and specific corporate purposes. Corporate acts that have deviated from the scope of specific purposes are particularly strict rescue measures, and the scope is a wide variety of companies, from shareholders and state litigation to corporate managers to disabling ultr a-laws by companies and business partners. I was over. 171 Many of the early companies, such as banks, insurance companies, and transport companies, were mostly custome r-owned regional monopoly companies, while the manufacturing shareholders are almost always investors and consumers. Not. In contrast to the public interest business at that time, most manufacturers that require enough capital to adopt a company form are mainly produced in textile products, small, but glass and metal 169. It was likely to be a part of a wide market, and thus faced a substantial competition. In addition, consumers of manufacturing companies were generally distributed, and the purchase of products was sporadic, so it was not possible to organize efficiently to become a company owner. In this regard, they were in contrast to the users of the main roads, banks, and insurance companies, which would have been trading with these service providers at a considerable amount of expenditure. Finally, as Donald Smythe observed, the manufacturer shared the ownership of the exclusive service industry because it needed more aggressive and innovative management than the early public interest business. Compared to a wide range of customers, the most suitable owners faced powerful financial incentives and responded to it. 170

The recognition that many of the early companies were owned by consumers, not investors, can shed the historical aspects of corporate law other than shareholder voting rights. Another remarkable feature under the 19th century corporate law was a strong law that was later abolished, but is a strong legal that is not "Ultra Vires) (literally" exceeding authority "), and specified in the corporate articles of incorporation. Basically, the company owner deviated from the activity (or "purpose") was basically prohibited. In the 19t h-century company, the articles of incorporation generally described relatively narrow and specific corporate purposes. Corporate acts that have deviated from the scope of specific purposes are particularly strict rescue measures, and the scope is a wide variety of companies, from shareholders and state litigation to corporate managers to disabling ultr a-laws by companies and business partners. I was over. 171 While many of the early companies, such as banks, insurance companies, and transport companies, were custo m-owned regional monopoly companies, while the manufacturing shareholders were almost always investors and not consumers. 。 In contrast to the public interest business at that time, most manufacturers that require enough capital to adopt a company form are mainly produced in textile products, small, but glass and metal 169. It was likely to be a part of a wide market, and thus faced a substantial competition. In addition, consumers of manufacturing companies were generally distributed, and the purchase of products was sporadic, so it was not possible to organize efficiently to become a company owner. In this regard, they were in contrast to the users of the main roads, banks, and insurance companies, which would have been trading with these service providers at a considerable amount of expenditure. Finally, as Donald Smythe observed, the manufacturer shared the ownership of the exclusive service industry because it needed more aggressive and innovative management than the early public interest business. Compared to a wide range of customers, the most suitable owners faced powerful financial incentives and responded to it. 170

Since the late 19th century, such restrictions on corporate purposes have been gradually abandoned in both law and practical. 172 In the past, two explanations have been given to the prosperity of the superlogy. The first is that in the era when the establishment of a corporation was a special privilege, the narrow definition and interpretation of the corporate rights made sense, and this reasonable basis was the decline of the company's view of the company. The spread of general corporate establishment laws and gradual acceptance of general purpose provisions faded. The other was to guarantee that the supe r-legal doctrine played an investor protection and the funds invested by the investor would only be used in industries and activities that could be trusted to some extent. That is. 173 In recent years, the abandonment of supe r-legalism has ultimately losing effects due to the appearance of shareholder dominant norms, the increase in securities market fluidity, and the easy exit of shareholders who are dissatisfied with changes in corporate activities. It is explained because it is no longer needed. 174

A twin critique of ‘economic development’

We suggest that the initial companies, such as turns pikes, banks, and insurance companies, may have achieved more important functions in companies that were consumer cooperatives. In terms of companies owned by consumers, the nature and specific content of the business conducted by the company are very important from the standpoint of shareholders. The early turnpike incident that shareholders refused to pay the subscriber after the road construction site was changed is an example of this concern. 175 Powerful ultr a-legal principles not only guarantee that the contribution of the union members is used to the desired services, but also differ in the rents (rent) obtained from exclusive activities, and the profit distribution of the entire union members as a whole. Reduced the possibility of mutual assistance to another activity. 176 Furthermore, because the proposed business line is binding, early shareholders were convinced that corporate joining would not be used to provide fundamental funds to potential competitors. 。 This concern is Colman v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., Ltd. Companies since the latter half of the century Such restricted approaches have been gradually abandoned in both laws and practices. In the era of special privileges, the narrow definitions and interpretations of corporate rights made sense, and this rational basis was the decline of franchise views on the company, general corporate construction method. In the spread of the general purpose clauses, one of the other dutlin played the role of investor doctorin, and the funds invested in the company to some extent. It was guaranteed to be used only in industries and activities that can be used only in the recent abandonment of ove r-legalism, increasing the fluidity of the securities market, and corporate activities. It is explained for the easy exit of shareholders who are dissatisfied with the change, which has ultimately lost its effect and no longer needed.

We suggest that the initial companies, such as turns pikes, banks, and insurance companies, may have achieved more important functions in companies that were consumer cooperatives. In terms of companies owned by consumers, the nature and specific content of the business conducted by the company are very important from the standpoint of shareholders. The early turnpike incident that shareholders refused to pay the subscriber after the road construction site was changed is an example of this concern. 175 Powerful ultr a-legal principles not only guarantee that the contribution of the union members is used to the desired services, but also differ in the rents (rent) obtained from exclusive activities, and the profit distribution of the entire union members as a whole. Reduced the possibility of mutual assistance to another activity. 176 Furthermore, because the proposed business line is binding, early shareholders were convinced that corporate joining would not be used to provide fundamental funds to potential competitors. 。 This concern is Colman v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., Ltd. This for the purpose of the company Such a restricted approach has been gradually abused in both laws and practices, and the first is a special form. In the age of granted, the narrow definitions and interpretations of the corporate rights made sense, and this rational basis was the decline in the view of franchisees in the company, the spread of the general corporate establishment law, and general. In addition, with the ste p-i n-stage acceptance of the purpose clause, one of the other industries and activities that the investor invested in the company, which is the protection of investors, to some extent. It was a guarantee that it was used only in the recent abandonment of ove r-legalism, increasing the fluidity of the securities market, and changing corporate activities. It is explained because the easy exit of shareholders has ultimately lost the overview and is unnecessary.

Nevertheless, as the product market competition has pure investmen t-owned companies, the early functions of this ultr a-laws have lost their significance to most business companies. If what shareholders expect from the company is not a specific product or service, but profit, the exact purpose and activities prescribed in the corporate articles of incorporation should be relatively important. In fact, it is extremely important to switch business content flexibly according to changes in the market environment and technology. Therefore, in parallel with the decline of estheticism, the law has allowed an investo r-owned business company to create a very common objective clause that does not impose meaningful restrictions in its range of action. It is not surprising to use it. 178

As a result, as the investo r-owned companies dominated the corporate landscape, the superlogy was gradually abandoned. In line with this interpretation, (i) Super Law Laws first began to lose their effect on manufacturing companies (as described above, overwhelmingly many investor s-owned companies), and 179 (II. ) Super laws and legal laws have survived (although it is gradually weakened) only in companies where the purpose of the company, such as general no n-profit corporations, especially charitable organizations, is not profitable. In the 180 Consumer Cooperative's laws and practical laws, voting restrictions have survived as a norm, but the attitude of the court to crack down on cooperative supe r-legal acts has faded as well as operating companies. 。 181 However, unlike the operating company, the cooperatives continue to include their purpose restrictions in the articles of incorporation. This is because it is obliged by several laws and regulations and is encouraged by tax law 182, and the most important thing is that a strong conflict that causes a different owner group to have conflicting profits in company activities. This is to avoid governance problems. 183 , but as the product market competition spreads pure investo r-owned companies, the initial functions of this ultr a-laws have lost their significance to most business companies. If what shareholders expect from the company is not a specific product or service, but profit, the exact purpose and activities prescribed in the corporate articles of incorporation should be relatively important. In fact, it is extremely important to switch business content flexibly according to changes in the market environment and technology. Therefore, in parallel with the decline of estheticism, the law has allowed an investo r-owned business company to create a very common objective clause that does not impose meaningful restrictions in its range of action. It is not surprising to use it. 178

As a result, as the investo r-owned companies dominated the corporate landscape, the superlogy was gradually abandoned. In line with this interpretation, (i) Super Law Laws first began to be applied to manufacturing companies (as described above, overwhelmingly many investor s-owned companies), and began to lose their effects, 179 (II. ) Super laws and legal laws have survived (although it is gradually weakened) only in companies where the purpose of the company, such as general no n-profit corporations, especially charitable organizations, is not profitable. In the 180 Consumer Cooperative's laws and practical laws, voting restrictions have survived as a norm, but the attitude of the court to crack down on cooperative supe r-legal acts has faded as well as operating companies. 。 181 However, unlike the operating company, the cooperatives continue to include their purpose restrictions in the articles of incorporation. This is because it is obliged by several laws and regulations and is encouraged by tax law 182, and the most important thing is that a strong conflict that causes a different owner group to have conflicting profits in company activities. This is to avoid governance problems. Nevertheless, as 183, as the product market competition has pure investo r-owned companies, the early functions of this ultr a-laws have lost their significance to most business companies. If what shareholders expect from the company is not a specific product or service, but profit, the exact purpose and activities prescribed in the corporate articles of incorporation should be relatively important. In fact, it is extremely important to switch business content flexibly according to changes in the market environment and technology. Therefore, in parallel with the decline of estheticism, the law has allowed an investo r-owned business company to create a very common objective clause that does not impose meaningful restrictions in its range of action. It is not surprising to use it. 178

This paper clarifies the restrictions on shareholder resolution in the late 18th century to the early 19th century and the relevance of consumer ownership of monopoly companies. Like the 20th century, the 184 voting right limit was functioning historically as an acquisition defense measure, although the type was different. Unlike that of modern times, the resolution of voting rights at the early business company is not to protect the company's management and employees from hostile acquisitions, but rather investments and prices for the company that maximizes profits. In the setting of the policy, it was functioning to protect consumers by preventing them from being placed under the control of a merchant who prefers their business more than other regional merchants.

According to a description of consumer protection, the disappearance of voting rights will occur after the ownership of the business company will occur after the transition to a consumer to a pure investor. We suggest that for several reasons, the 19th century witnessed such a change.

Assimilation into the mainstream: the institutionalising of ‘sustainable development’

In the latter half of the 19th century, general physical infrastructure such as roads and bridges is generally funded and operated by the government, and beneficiaries buy no n-rewards of private companies. With the pseud o-pearlistic financing, there is no need to provide funds to such projects. Such a government's role was parallel with more general changes in the government structure in the first few decades in the new nation. In particular, municipal government corporations are supported by general taxes, not commissions, and flexibly organizations to provide various collective products and services from the medieval role of a commercially closed guild. It has evolved into a new appearance as a relatively democratic institution. 185 The transition from a private company that restricted voting rights to the provision of local governments was involved in replacement from a makeshift cooperative to a more durable cooperative. After all, local governments are, in fact, a local consumer cooperative, established to provide local monopoly services. 186 And, of course, the modern democratic government has abandoned the suffrage, an old practice, and has adopted the same altitude voting system, that is, the rules of each voting. There is. In this paper, we will clarify the restrictions of shareholder resolution and consumer ownership of exclusive companies from late 18th century to early 19th century. Like the 20th century, the 184 voting right limit was functioning historically as an acquisition defense measure, although the type was different. Unlike that of modern times, the resolution of voting rights at the early business company is not to protect the company's management and employees from hostile acquisitions, but rather investments and prices for the company that maximizes profits. In the setting of the policy, it was functioning to protect consumers by preventing them from being placed under the control of a merchant who prefers their business more than other regional merchants.

In the latter half of the 19th century, general physical infrastructure such as roads and bridges is generally funded and operated by the government, and beneficiaries buy no n-rewards of private companies. With the pseud o-pearlistic financing, there is no need to provide funds to such projects. Such a government's role was parallel with more general changes in the government structure in the first few decades in the new nation. In particular, municipal government corporations are supported by general taxes, not commissions, and flexibly organizations to provide various collective products and services from the medieval role of a commercially closed guild. It has evolved into a new appearance as a relatively democratic institution. 185 The transition from a private company that restricted voting rights to the provision of local governments was involved in replacement from a makeshift cooperative to a more durable cooperative. After all, local governments are, in fact, a local consumer cooperative, established to provide local monopoly services. 186 And, of course, the modern democratic government has abandoned the suffrage, an old practice, and has adopted the same altitude voting system, that is, the rules of each voting. There is. This paper clarifies the restrictions on shareholder resolution in the late 18th century to the early 19th century and the relevance of consumer ownership of monopoly companies. Like the 20th century, the 184 voting right limit was functioning historically as an acquisition defense measure, although the type was different. Unlike that of modern times, the resolution of voting rights at the early business company is not to protect the company's management and employees from hostile acquisitions, but rather investments and prices for the company that maximizes profits. In the setting of the policy, it was functioning to protect consumers by preventing them from being placed under the control of a merchant who prefers their business more than other regional merchants.

Environment, economics, and the society: three pillars of sustainability emerge?

The scope of the corporate law has become increasingly narrower during the 19th century, specializing in the rights and obligations of the company's shareholders, managers, and creditors, that is, the company's "domestic affairs." Concerns about monopoly were initially dealt with by restrictions on the Articles of Incorporation and the Corporate Law, but gradually became unrelated to this field. 187 Initial corporate articles of incorporation and corporate law include some mechanisms to regulate exclusive price settings and prevent ant i-competitive bonds, but the restrictions on exercising voting rights are an example. Not evaluated. 188 However, as time goes on, the regulation of monopoly (regardless of whether it is natural) has become subject to specialized laws such as antitrust law and public interest business regulations, and the resolution of the company based on the articles of incorporation. The focus was much focused than the restrictions, and unnecessary constraints were reduced.

Throughout the 19th century, the franchis e-like way of thinking about the company was almost abandoned. Since the Supreme Court ruling of Charles River Bridge in 1837, monopoly privileges were no longer suggested by granting a company establishment, and monopoly privileges have become more and more rare. 189 Furthermore, since the mi d-19th century, the establishment of a company without the need for a special legislative legislation, and general corporate legislation without monopolic privileges gradually became dominant, and at the end of the century. , General corporate imaging has become the basis of the establishment of a corporation, and entrepreneurs who want to procure external capital can easily use the company form. 190 The scope of the corporate law became increasingly narrower during the 19th century, specializing in the rights and obligations of the company's shareholders, managers, and creditors, that is, the company's "domestic affairs." Concerns about monopoly were initially dealt with by restrictions on the Articles of Incorporation and the Corporate Law, but gradually became unrelated to this field. 187 Initial corporate articles of incorporation and corporate law include some mechanisms to regulate exclusive price settings and prevent ant i-competitive bonds, but the restrictions on exercising voting rights are an example. Not evaluated. 188 However, as time goes on, the regulation of monopoly (regardless of whether it is natural) has become subject to specialized laws such as antitrust law and public interest business regulations, and the resolution of the company based on the articles of incorporation. The focus was much focused than the restrictions, and unnecessary constraints were reduced.

The IUCN

Throughout the 19th century, the franchis e-like way of thinking about the company was almost abandoned. Since the Supreme Court ruling of Charles River Bridge in 1837, monopoly privileges were no longer suggested by granting a company establishment, and monopoly privileges have become more and more rare. 189 Furthermore, since the mi d-19th century, the establishment of a company without the need for a special legislative legislation, and general corporate legislation without monopolic privileges gradually became dominant, and at the end of the century. , General corporate imaging has become the basis of the establishment of a corporation, and entrepreneurs who want to procure external capital can easily use the company form. The scope of 190 Company Law has become increasingly narrower during the 19th century, specializing in the rights and obligations of the company's shareholders, managers, and creditors, that is, the company's "domestic affairs." Concerns about monopoly were initially dealt with by restrictions on the Articles of Incorporation and the Corporate Law, but gradually became unrelated to this field. 187 Initial corporate articles of incorporation and corporate law include some mechanisms to regulate exclusive price settings and prevent ant i-competitive bonds, but the restrictions on exercising voting rights are an example. Not evaluated. 188 However, as time goes on, the regulation of monopoly (regardless of whether it is natural) has become subject to specialized laws such as antitrust law and public interest business regulations, and the resolution of the company based on the articles of incorporation. The focus was much focused than the restrictions, and unnecessary constraints were reduced.

In this way, the standardization and generalization of the Business Company Law are progressing, and as the legal system is particularly suitable for investmen t-owned companies, separate laws and regulations to manage consume r-owned mutual companies and cooperatives. Is now adopted. For example, Maryland enacted a special law in 1843, which stipulates mutual savings loan unions, followed by New Jersey in 1847 and Pencilvania in 1850, followed by other states. In 1857, New York adopted one of the first mutual insurance company law. 192 Initially, the early business company also contained many disguised c o-op unions, but since the mi d-19th century, cooperatives have been recognized as a characteristic organizational form, explicitly as such organizations. It has been established and displayed. 193 scholars generally have the birth of a cooperative motion and one vote for a single member, as the establishment of the Lotchdale Society of Equitable Pioniers in 1844 in 1844. It is regarded as the first announcement of the cooperative principle, including. In 1865, the first US Cooperative Law was enacted in Michigan, followed by Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Minnesota in 195 years. 196 These Cooperative Laws were regularly imposed a compulsory provisions of one members of the members. The 197 Mutual Union laws and regulations generally did not force such voting rights to exercise.

As a result, companies owned by consumers and companies owned by producers, unlike companies owned by investors, are not an arbitrary business company, but specially stipulates the establishment of cooperatives and mutual companies. I often faced the options of organizing under the laws and regulations. The voting rights restrictions have disappeared from the Basic Business Company Law, and the voting rights are limited to general listed companies, but as the rules of voting rights commonly selected by the cooperative, one vote per person. Limited rules continue to survive. 199 In this way, the standardization and generalization of the Business Company Law are progressing, and as the legal system is particularly suitable for investors owned companies, it is especially managed by consume r-owned mutual companies and cooperatives. Separate laws and regulations have been adopted. For example, Maryland enacted a special law in 1843, which stipulates mutual savings loan unions, followed by New Jersey in 1847 and Pencilvania in 1850, followed by other states. In 1857, New York adopted one of the first mutual insurance company law. 192 Initially, the early business company also contained many disguised c o-op unions, but since the mi d-19th century, cooperatives have been recognized as a characteristic organizational form, explicitly as such organizations. It has been established and displayed. 193 scholars generally have the birth of a cooperative motion and one vote for a single member, as the establishment of the Lotchdale Society of Equitable Pioniers in 1844 in 1844. It is regarded as the first announcement of the cooperative principle, including. In 1865, the first US Cooperative Law was enacted in Michigan, followed by Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Minnesota in 195 years. 196 These Cooperative Laws were regularly imposed a compulsory provisions of one members of the members. The 197 Mutual Union laws and regulations generally did not force such voting rights to exercise.

The United Nations

As a result, companies owned by consumers and companies owned by producers, unlike companies owned by investors, are not an arbitrary business company, but specially stipulates the establishment of cooperatives and mutual companies. I often faced the options of organizing under the laws and regulations. The voting rights restrictions have disappeared from the Basic Business Company Law, and the voting rights are limited to general listed companies, but as the rules of voting rights commonly selected by the cooperative, one vote per person. Limited rules continue to survive. 199 In this way, the standardization and generalization of the Business Company Law are progressing, and as the legal system is particularly suitable for investors owned companies, separate separate companies and cooperatives owned by consumer. Laws are now being adopted. For example, Maryland enacted a special law in 1843, which stipulates mutual savings loan unions, followed by New Jersey in 1847 and Pencilvania in 1850, followed by other states. In 1857, New York adopted one of the first mutual insurance company law. 192 Initially, the early business company also contained many disguised c o-op unions, but since the mi d-19th century, cooperatives have been recognized as a characteristic organizational form, explicitly as such organizations. It has been established and displayed. 193 scholars generally have the birth of a cooperative motion and one vote for a single member, as the establishment of the Lotchdale Society of Equitable Pioniers in 1844 in 1844. It is regarded as the first announcement of the cooperative principle, including. In 1865, the first US Cooperative Law was enacted in Michigan, followed by Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Minnesota in 195 years. 196 These Cooperative Laws were regularly imposed a compulsory provisions of one members of the members. The 197 Mutual Union laws and regulations generally did not force such voting rights to exercise.

By the end of the century, the antimonopoly role played by the limited vote in the early 19th century had been largely assumed by these mutual and cooperative corporations. A dramatic example is the large farmer-owned marketing cooperatives that began to form in the second half of the 19th century in direct response to the growing market power of investor-owned grain elevators, grain brokers, and railroad companies (often exercised through cartels). By about 1910, after more than a decade of economic warfare, farmer-owned marketing cooperatives had gained an advantage over investor-owned corporations in markets for major grain crops. 200 In fact, mutuals and cooperatives continue to account for a large proportion of economic activity in the United States. Agricultural cooperatives sell roughly one-quarter of all agricultural products, and a similar proportion supply oil, fertilizer, seeds, and other products to farmers. 202 But generally, these corporations are no longer organized under basic business corporation law. Increased competition in both capital and product markets may also have been important in the decline of voting restrictions. The decline of legislative charters and the rise of liberal incorporation laws meant that government monopolies became rare outside of regulated industries. The development of stock markets made it easier for companies to raise capital to undertake capital-intensive infrastructure projects such as railroads and to compete with existing monopolies. Improvements in transportation and communication expanded the potential market reach of companies and reduced the market power of local suppliers of goods and services. Also, from around the mid-19th century, government regulations were introduced to protect consumers, such as reserve requirements for banks and insurance companies, and investor-owned businesses were allowed to enter service markets that had previously been limited to non-profit and mutual companies. By the end of the century, the antimonopoly role played by limited voting in the early 19th century had been largely taken over by these mutual and cooperative corporations. A dramatic example is the large farmer-owned marketing cooperatives that began to form in the late 19th century in direct response to the growing market power of investor-owned grain elevators, grain brokers, and railroad companies (often exercised through cartels). By about 1910, after more than a decade of economic warfare, farmer-owned marketing cooperatives had gained an advantage over investor-owned corporations in markets for major grain crops. 200 Indeed, mutuals and cooperatives continue to account for a large proportion of economic activity across the United States. Agricultural cooperatives sell roughly one-quarter of all agricultural products, and a similar proportion supply oil, fertilizer, seeds, and other products to farmers. 202 But generally, these corporations are no longer organized under basic business corporation laws.

Increasing competition in both capital and product markets is also likely to have been important in the decline of voting restrictions. The decline of legislative charters and the rise of liberal incorporation laws meant that government monopolies became rare outside of regulated industries. The development of stock markets made it easier for companies to raise capital to undertake capital-intensive infrastructure projects such as railroads and to compete with existing monopolies. Improvements in transportation and communication expanded the potential market reach of companies and reduced the market power of local suppliers of goods and services. Also, beginning around the mid-19th century, government regulations to protect consumers, such as reserve requirements for banks and insurance companies, allowed investor-owned industrial companies to enter service markets previously limited to nonprofits and mutuals. 204The antimonopoly role played by the restrictive vote in the early 19th century was largely taken over by these mutuals and cooperative corporations by the end of the century. A dramatic example is the large farmer-owned marketing cooperatives that began to form in the late 19th century in direct response to the growing market power of investor-owned grain elevators, grain brokers, and railroad companies (often exercised through cartels). By 1910, after more than a decade of economic warfare, farmer-owned marketing cooperatives had gained an advantage over investor-owned corporations in markets for major grain crops. 200 Indeed, mutuals and cooperatives continue to account for a large proportion of economic activity across the United States. Agricultural cooperatives sell roughly one-quarter of all agricultural produce, and a similar proportion supply oil, fertilizer, seeds, and other products to farmers. 202 But generally, these corporations are no longer organized under basic business corporation laws.

Increasing competition in both capital and product markets has also been speculated to have been important in the decline of voting restrictions. The decline of legislative charters and the rise of liberal incorporation laws meant that government monopolies became rare outside of regulated industries. The development of stock markets made it easier for corporations to raise capital to undertake capital-intensive infrastructure projects like railroads and to compete with existing monopolies. Improvements in transportation and communication expanded the potential market reach of corporations and reduced the market power of local suppliers of goods and services. Beginning in the mid-19th century, government regulations were introduced to protect consumers, such as reserve requirements for banks and insurance companies, and investor-owned businesses were permitted to enter service markets that had previously been limited to nonprofit and mutual companies. 204

It is not completely new that intensifying market competition has led to the decline in voting restrictions on business companies. Colleen Dunlavy states that the democratic concept of a company in the United States has grown in the United States as early as Europe intensified in the United States. 205 David Latnner speculates that as a general company's legislative method has emerged, and as a franchise's view of company is abolished, external controls due to competition have been replaced by internal controls due to voting rights restrictions. 206

The academic literature

In contrast, we argue that the competition that promotes changes in the voting rights exercise pattern has occurred in products and services, rather than a capital market. Furthermore, it was not the competition itself, but the decrease in customer ownership, which was eventually abandoned by the rules of voting rights, was not possible through competition markets and government activities.

It is also a reason for the decline that the ownership of shares with resolution restricted is an unstable means to suppress exclusive behavior. As time passes, the number of consumer shareholders increases, and the profits obtained from the shares are likely to sell shares to no n-consumers (or not consumers), which are only distributed profits. No matter how subdivided the latter shareholder, if you have a majority of voting rights between you, you will have incentives to maximize the company than consumer protection. 。 In addition, in order to avoid restrictions on resolution of voting rights, various backworks are effective, such as splitting larg e-scale stock blocks and distributing nominal ownership into family and friends. It is not completely new that intensifying market competition has led to the decline of resolution of voting rights at business companies. Colleen Dunlavy states that the democratic concept of a company in the United States has grown in the United States as early as Europe intensified in the United States. 205 David Latnner speculates that as a general company's legislative method has emerged, and as a franchise's view of company is abolished, external controls due to competition have been replaced by internal controls due to voting rights restrictions. 206

It is also a reason for the decline that the ownership of shares with resolution restricted is an unstable means to suppress exclusive behavior. As time passes, the number of consumer shareholders increases, and the profits obtained from the shares are likely to sell shares to no n-consumers (or not consumers), which are only distributed profits. No matter how subdivided the latter shareholder, if you have a majority of voting rights between you, you will have incentives to maximize the company than consumer protection. 。 In addition, in order to avoid restrictions on resolution of voting rights, various backworks are effective, such as splitting larg e-scale stock blocks and distributing nominal ownership into family and friends. It is not completely new that intensifying market competition has led to the decline in voting restrictions on business companies. Colleen Dunlavy states that the democratic concept of a company in the United States has grown in the United States as early as Europe intensified in the United States. 205 David Latnner speculates that as a general company's legislative method has emerged, and as a franchise's view of company is abolished, external controls due to competition have been replaced by internal controls due to voting rights restrictions. 206

Such various forms of discrimination could be almost avoided by the unavoidable company's shares. This is often permitted or demanded under the Mutual Company Law and Cooperative Law. However, the Interpretation given to those laws and regulations, adopted in the 19th century, generally demanded free shares. Probably, the possibility of transferring is that the latent life of the business company and the shareholder who acts as an individual cannot settle investment in the company as in the case of partnership, so otherwise loses. It was based on the theory that it was necessary to provide. It has been recognized in the 20th century that strong restrictions on the transfer of shares of business companies. 207

The fact that each share of each share is more superior from the economic point of view compared to the voting rights restriction rules, which gives large shareholders a surveillance and influence. However, in the early 19th century consume r-owned companies, it is considered that increasing the incentive of shareholder surveillance was as important as today's average listed companies. Early shareholders were regularly trading with the company in their roles as a consumer, so they were more likely to observe dismissal than small investors. In addition, early turnpike, bridges, canals, and banks were basically local companies, geographically close to the company's headquarters and operations, making it easier to monitor. Finally, it is estimated that the ratio of the consume r-owned company was generally relatively equal, as in a mutual company or cooperative. This is because the amount of fire insurance purchased by local merchants and the use of short turns by local farmers and merchants are probably not big. Only investors who pursue profits are motivated to buy a large amount of shares in such companies. Such various forms of abnormalities were almost avoided by the unavoidable company's shares. This is often permitted or demanded under the Mutual Company Law and Cooperative Law. However, the Interpretation given to those laws and regulations, adopted in the 19th century, generally demanded free shares. Probably, the possibility of transferring is that the latent life of the business company and the shareholder who acts as an individual cannot settle investment in the company as in the case of partnership, so otherwise loses. It was based on the theory that it was necessary to provide. It has been recognized in the 20th century that strong restrictions on the transfer of shares of business companies. 207

The fact that each share of each share is more superior from the economic point of view compared to the voting rights restriction rules, which gives large shareholders a surveillance and influence. However, in the early 19th century consume r-owned companies, it is considered that increasing the incentive of shareholder surveillance was as important as today's average listed companies. Early shareholders were regularly trading with the company in their roles as a consumer, so they were more likely to observe dismissal than small investors. In addition, early turnpike, bridges, canals, and banks were basically local companies, geographically close to the company's headquarters and operations, making it easier to monitor. Finally, it is estimated that the ratio of the consume r-owned company was generally relatively equal, as in a mutual company or cooperative. This is because the amount of fire insurance purchased by local merchants and the use of short turns by local farmers and merchants are probably not big. Only investors who pursue profits are motivated to buy a large amount of shares in such companies. Such various forms of discrimination could be almost avoided by the unavoidable company's shares. This is often permitted or demanded under the Mutual Company Law and Cooperative Law. However, the Interpretation given to those laws and regulations, adopted in the 19th century, generally demanded free shares. Probably, the possibility of transferring is that the latent life of the business company and the shareholder who acts as an individual cannot settle investment in the company as in the case of partnership, so otherwise loses. It was based on the theory that it was necessary to provide. It has been recognized in the 20th century that strong restrictions on the transfer of shares of business companies. 207

In contrast, one share, one vote was the natural rule in the pure investor-owned companies that became increasingly common among industrial companies throughout the 19th century. In addition to stimulating efficient monitoring as mentioned above, this rule avoided the threat that restrictions on the exercise of voting rights could create, such as exploitation of large shareholders by small ones, which could inhibit efficient trading in order to induce redistribution from large to small shareholders.

In short, as consumer ownership became increasingly inefficient or was addressed by specialized statutes for cooperatives and mutuals, the one share, one vote rule naturally became the dominant practice among industrial companies, the default rule in industrial company statutes, and a requirement for listing shares on the nation's largest stock exchanges.

While I have aimed here at making the consumer protection theory of proxy voting restrictions more persuasive, I do not mean to suggest that there were no other motives behind the adoption of proxy voting restrictions, or that consumer protection or other reasons for adopting proxy voting restrictions were always clearly in the minds of individuals who established business corporations, or of the legislators who authorized the establishment of individual corporations or enacted general corporate law.

It is clear that concerns about the power and autonomy of corporations were widespread in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. These concerns were vague but strong, and were not limited to the possibility that corporations might exploit their customers monopolistically. Thus, legislators imposed relatively arbitrary restrictions on various corporations, such as maximum lifespans and maximum capitalization, that had nothing to do with consumer protection. In this light, the various restrictions imposed on early business corporations, including restrictions on voting rights, seem to be largely consistent with Dunlavy's interpretation that they were an expression of the democratic spirit of the nation.

It is also quite possible that the investor protection theory has merit. Some companies may have adopted voting restrictions to protect small shareholders from large ones. This would not be illogical. The difficulty is that, in contrast to the consumer protection theory, there is little direct evidence of this motive. Moreover, the general explanation seems inconsistent with both the pattern of voting restrictions across industries and their gradual disappearance during the 19th century.

Discussion

Eric Hilt, in a paper written in response to an earlier draft of this paper, compares our consumer protection theory with the investor protection theory previously developed by him and others. 208 To this end, Hilt reviews the data from his earlier work and supplements it with an impressive survey of the wealth and general occupations of New York City-resident shareholders of New York corporations in 1826. 209 Hilt acknowledges the strength of the consumer protection theory, and in particular the pattern of voting restrictions he observed that is consistent with it. Only insurance companies in Hilt's sample used very few restricted voting practices, which is different from the pattern we observed in other states. 210 Nevertheless, Hilt argues that there is other evidence to support the investor protection theory.

First, Hilt shows that the median wealth of shareholders in manufacturing firms was significantly greater than that of median shareholders in other types of firms, and the value of the stock held by the median shareholder was much greater in manufacturing firms than in other types of firms. Indeed, the par value of stock in manufacturing firms was set much higher than in other industries, making it impossible for anyone other than the wealthy to purchase shares. Hilt concludes from this that "consistent with the investor protection theory, manufacturing firms did not adopt graduated voting because they had no small investors to protect."211 But this logic is easier to follow in the other direction: why did manufacturing firms have no small shareholders? The most plausible answer is that manufacturing firms with no market power had no consumers to protect. (Hilt himself points out that "manufacturers often produced undifferentiated products, such as cotton cloth, and faced intense competition from domestic and foreign producers, so they did not have much market power."212) As a result, the articles of incorporation of manufacturing companies were not subject to voting restrictions. For the main purpose of such rules was to facilitate the distribution of shares, and correspondingly voting rights, among the company's (prospective) customers, as a protection against exploitation of the product market by the company. First, Hilt shows that the median wealth of shareholders in manufacturing companies was significantly greater than that of median shareholders in other types of companies, and the value of the shares held by the median shareholder was much greater in manufacturing companies than in other types of companies. In fact, the par value of shares in manufacturing companies was set much higher than in other types of companies, making them unaffordable to all but the wealthy. From this, Hilt concludes that "consistent with the investor protection theory, manufacturing companies did not adopt graduated voting because they had no small investors to protect." "211 But this logic is easier in the other direction: why did manufacturing companies have no small shareholders? The most plausible answer is that manufacturing companies, which had no market power, had no consumers to protect. (Hilt himself points out that "manufacturers often produced undifferentiated products, such as cotton cloth, and faced strong competition from domestic and foreign producers, so they did not have much market power." 212) As a result, the articles of incorporation of manufacturing companies were not subject to voting restrictions, since the main purpose of such rules was to facilitate the distribution of shares, and the corresponding distribution of voting rights, among the company's (prospective) customers, as a protection against the exploitation of product markets by the company. First, Hilt shows that the median wealth of shareholders in manufacturing companies was significantly greater than that of median shareholders in other types of companies, and that the value of the shares held by the median shareholder was much greater in manufacturing companies than in other types of companies. Indeed, the nominal value of shares in manufacturing companies was set much higher than in other types of companies, making it impossible for anyone other than the wealthy to purchase shares. Hilt concludes from this that "consistent with the investor protection theory, manufacturing companies did not adopt graduated voting because they had no small investors to protect."211 But this logic is easier the other way around: why did manufacturing companies have no small shareholders? The most plausible answer is that manufacturing companies, which had no market power, had no consumers to protect. (Hilt himself points out that "manufacturers often produced undifferentiated products, such as cotton cloth, and faced strong competition from domestic and foreign producers, and therefore did not have much market power."212) As a result, the articles of incorporation of manufacturing companies were not subject to voting restrictions, since the main purpose of such rules was to facilitate the distribution of shares, and therefore the corresponding distribution of voting rights, among the company's (prospective) customers, as a protection against the exploitation of product markets by the company.

Competing realities

Secondly, Hilt points out that if the company's articles of incorporation stipulate the resolution of voting rights, the articles of incorporation often clearly contain other restrictions for the purpose of protection. In particular, the articles of incorporation of turnpike companies and bridge companies generally stipulated in detail the tolls that the company can impose according to the type of transportation. From this, Hilt concluded that the turnpike company and the bridge company concluded that there was no discretion for pricing, and the restricted vote may have been motivated by concerns that are unrelated to market dominance. High. " 213 However, the strength of this inference remains questionable. In short, as the Hilt has acknowledged, the fact that the company articles of incorporation has a price limit is an obvious evidence that the legislative government was concerned about the exercise of a company's exclusive power. 214 Another is that it is unlikely that the legislature has thought that if a price limit is set up in the company's articles of incorporation, all corporate market control can be eliminated. The set price is the highest price, and it seems that the company managed by the customer is free to set a lower toll or not set a traffic fee at all. Furthermore, it is estimated that companies that have been applied to the articles of incorporation that restricts prices have maintained the ability to increase profits by reducing operating and maintenance costs to inefficient low levels. And it is necessary to question how much the price set clause in the chartering ship was implemented. A more persuasive interpretation is as follows: Second, Hilt pointed out that if the company's articles of incorporation stipulate the exercise of voting rights, the articles of incorporation often clearly contain other restrictions for customer protection. do. In particular, the articles of incorporation of turnpike companies and bridge companies generally stipulated in detail the tolls that the company can impose according to the type of transportation. From this, Hilt concluded that the turnpike company and the bridge company concluded that there was no discretion for pricing, and the restricted vote may have been motivated by concerns that are unrelated to market dominance. High. " 213 However, the strength of this inference remains questionable. In short, as the Hilt has acknowledged, the fact that the company articles of incorporation has a price limit is an obvious evidence that the legislative government was concerned about the exercise of a company's exclusive power. 214 Another is that it is unlikely that the legislature has thought that if a price limit is set up in the company's articles of incorporation, all corporate market control can be eliminated. The set price is the highest price, and it seems that the company managed by the customer is free to set a lower toll or not set a traffic fee at all. Furthermore, it is estimated that companies that have been applied to the articles of incorporation that restricts prices have maintained the ability to increase profits by reducing operating and maintenance costs to inefficient low levels. And it is necessary to question how much the price set clause in the chartering ship was implemented. A more persuasive interpretation is as follows: Secondly, Hilt points out that if the company's articles of incorporation stipulate the resolution of voting rights, the articles of incorporation often clearly contain other restrictions for the purpose of protection. In particular, the articles of incorporation of turnpike companies and bridge companies generally stipulated in detail the tolls that the company can impose according to the type of transportation. From this, Hilt concluded that the turnpike company and the bridge company concluded that there was no discretion for pricing, and the restricted vote may have been motivated by concerns that are unrelated to market dominance. High. " 213 However, the strength of this inference remains questionable. In short, as the Hilt has acknowledged, the fact that the company articles of incorporation has a price limit is an obvious evidence that the legislative government was concerned about the exercise of a company's exclusive power. 214 Another is that it is unlikely that the legislature has thought that if a price limit is set up in the company's articles of incorporation, all corporate market control can be eliminated. The set price is the highest price, and it seems that the company managed by the customer is free to set a lower toll or not set a traffic fee at all. Furthermore, it is estimated that companies that have been applied to the articles of incorporation that restricts prices have maintained the ability to increase profits by reducing operating and maintenance costs to inefficient low levels. And it is necessary to question how much the price set clause in the chartering ship was implemented. A more persuasive interpretation is as follows:

But we don't want to exaggerate our claims. The pattern of voting restrictions revealed in the appendix Table 1 is roughly in line with consumer protection theory, but in the industry, between the state, and the consumer protection theory and the simple function theory. It contains a lot of variation that seems to be difficult to explain. In addition to stakeholders, ideologies, and understanding in understanding, we do not think so deeply about whether it is meaningful in the context in which the old rules have been changed, from a certain company to another company, from a certain law to another law. Many articles of incorporation seem to have been copied. 215 These further evidence of noisy can be seen by focusing on the historical experience of exercising restricted voting rights in other countries.

It is not limited to early US corporations that have adopted the rules of exercising voting rights to limit the number of voting rights of major shareholders. The same system was in the nearest predecessor of modern stocks dating back to the Dutch East India Company, and in many other judicial jurisdictions in the 19th century. In this part, we will examine the characteristics of the exercise of restricted voting rights in these contexts and the basis of adoption. Evidence of consumer ownership in these cases varies, but the resolution of voting rights is more appropriate as a mechanism to protect small investors' economic interests. It seems to play a role.

The Dutch East India Company, the Dutch East India Company, is also known as the VOC with the initials of the Dutch company name VEREENIGDE OOST-indiSche Compagnie, and is widely known as the first public company. The 216 VOC was established in 1602 by the merger of six existing trading companies to eliminate competition. The 217 VOC has also fulfilled public functions, including the government giving the government's monopoly on the Kibomine and the Magellan Strait, but also the assistance in the Spanish Independence War. But we don't want to exaggerate our claims. The pattern of voting restrictions revealed in the appendix Table 1 is roughly in line with consumer protection theory, but in the industry, between the state, and the consumer protection theory and the simple function theory. It contains a lot of variation that seems to be difficult to explain. In addition to stakeholders, ideologies, and understanding in understanding, we do not think so deeply about whether it is meaningful in the context in which the old rules have been changed, from a certain company to another company, from a certain law to another law. Many articles of incorporation seem to have been copied. 215 These further evidence of noisy can be seen by focusing on the historical experience of exercising restricted voting rights in other countries.

Historical emergence?

The Dutch East India Company, the Dutch East India Company, is also known as the VOC with the initials of the Dutch company name VEREENIGDE OOST-indiSche Compagnie, and is widely known as the first public company. The 216 VOC was established in 1602 by the merger of six existing trading companies to eliminate competition. The 217 VOC has also fulfilled public functions, including the government giving the government's monopoly on the Kibomine and the Magellan Strait, but also the assistance in the Spanish Independence War. But we don't want to exaggerate our claims. The pattern of voting restrictions revealed in the appendix Table 1 is roughly in line with consumer protection theory, but in the industry, between the state, and the consumer protection theory and the simple function theory. It contains a lot of variation that seems to be difficult to explain. In addition to stakeholders, ideologies, and understanding in understanding, we do not think so deeply about whether it is meaningful in the context in which the old rules have been changed, from a certain company to another company, from a certain law to another law. Many articles of incorporation seem to have been copied. 215 These further evidence of noisy can be seen by focusing on the historical experience of exercising restricted voting rights in other countries.

The VOC Charter restricted the voting rights of the major shareholders, but did not benefit a minority of shareholders. The VOC shareholder composition is tw o-layered, one is called Governor (Bind Hepver), the person in charge of the six trading companies and the aggressio n-based active merchant, the other is an external investor. He was a shareholder called a party. Vie w-i n-Deverse had one voting right, each of which was selected as the VOC's rule of 17, "17 Births." 218 In contrast to this, the party has no voting right or information. In the initial articles of incorporation at the beginning of the VOC, shareholders were given the right to withdraw funds in the first ten years, but this right was abolished due to the distribution of wind theories and the change in articles of incorporation, and in effect. Investors have been fixed contrary to their will. 219

‘Sustainability’ vs. ‘sustainable development’

VOC gradually boasts most of the major elements of the company we know today, such as corporate personalities, limited liability, management delegation, and transferable shares. Despite the 220, the company was also partially owned as a consumer cooperative because it was partially owned and completely managed by merchants in charge of the substitute partnership. As the scholars in the Netherlands have stated, as in the early days, "(VOC) Governor is also a supplier sent to Asia, as well as the spices and other products brought by the ship. It was also a key buyer. " Until 221, until 1623, the governor had the right to buy the product shipped from the company and resell it as a profit. From an outside investor, the governor, the governor, was substantially trading by purchasing products at a low price that would impair the profitability of the company. Despite the 222 imperial license, dividends were not held until 1610 and 1612, but only mace, pepper, and nutmeg were in the actual thing. 223 VOC Charter restricted the voting rights of major shareholders, but did not have a minority of shareholders. The VOC shareholder composition is tw o-layered, one is called Governor (Bind Hepver), the person in charge of the six trading companies and the aggressio n-based active merchant, the other is an external investor. He was a shareholder called a party. Vie w-i n-Deverse had one voting right, each of which was selected as the VOC's rule of 17, "17 Births." 218 In contrast to this, the party has no voting right or information. In the initial articles of incorporation at the beginning of the VOC, shareholders were given the right to withdraw funds in the first ten years, but this right was abolished due to the distribution of wind theories and the change in articles of incorporation, and in effect. Investors have been fixed contrary to their will. 219

VOC gradually boasts most of the major elements of the company we know today, such as corporate personalities, limited liability, management delegation, and transferable shares. Despite the 220, the company was also partially owned as a consumer cooperative because it was partially owned and completely managed by merchants in charge of the substitute partnership. As the scholars in the Netherlands have stated, as in the early days, "(VOC) Governor is also a supplier sent to Asia, as well as the spices and other products brought by the ship. It was also a key buyer. " Until 221, until 1623, the governor had the right to buy the product shipped from the company and resell it as a profit. From an outside investor, the governor, the governor, was substantially trading by purchasing products at a low price that would impair the profitability of the company. Despite the 222 imperial license, dividends were not held until 1610 and 1612, but only mace, pepper, and nutmeg were in the actual thing. The 223voc Charter restricted the voting rights of the major shareholders, but did not benefit a small number of shareholders. The VOC shareholder composition is tw o-layered, one is called Governor (Bind Hepver), the person in charge of the six trading companies and the aggressio n-based active merchant, the other is an external investor. He was a shareholder called a party. Vie w-i n-Deverse had one voting right, each of which was selected as the VOC's rule of 17, "17 Births." 218 In contrast to this, the party has no voting right or information. In the initial articles of incorporation at the beginning of the VOC, shareholders were given the right to withdraw funds in the first ten years, but this right was abolished due to the distribution of wind theories and the change in articles of incorporation, and in effect. Investors have been fixed contrary to their will. 219

Conclusions

In this context, the rules of one vote per person unable to monopolize the ownership of the company at the expense of other merchants at the expense of other merchants. The famous episode related to Isaac Le Mail shows this concern. Initially, L e-e -mail, the largest shareholder of the Amsterdam Chamber and a member of the Governor's Society, was one of the handful of directors, but it was not a company account but on his own account. He seems to have tried to make the company's potential transaction profits his own. Despite having a large shares, the 225 L e-e -mail was immediately expelled by other Governor in 1605 due to embezzlement charges in 1605, and eventually VOC. I was signed by an agreement that would not compete. 226

In 1609, L e-e -mail retained the company's shares after the incident and made one of the first statements of the protection of shareholders. The 227 L e-e -mail submitted a petition to the VOC board, accusing VOC's "powerlessness", a failure of discoveries, and the number of ships to be sailed too small. In addition to writing complaints, the 22 8-Le email began a bear rush to the company, and eventually entered the 22 9-t o-bare ai r-selling ban. 230 However, L e-email's main dissatisfaction is not the lack of payment of dividends by the company, but rather the company's monopoly, which (although not actually). Le Mail has no longer possible to launch a competing business. 231 In fact, Le Mail

The company's corporate governance) ..................................... Crit Go to be to be to's I was subordinate to that. Large merchants, such as Le Email and De Mochelon, were eager to expand the scope of interpretal trade, and were dissatisfied with the fact that VOC's monopoly was not worthwhile. 232 In this context, the rules of one voting for the governor made it unable to monopolize the ownership of the company at the expense of other merchants. The famous episode related to Isaac Le Mail shows this concern. Initially, L e-e -mail, the largest shareholder of the Amsterdam Chamber and a member of the Governor's Society, was one of the handful of directors, but it was not a company account but on his own account. He seems to have tried to make the company's potential transaction profits his own. Despite having a large shares, the 225 L e-e -mail was immediately expelled by other Governor in 1605 due to embezzlement charges in 1605, and eventually VOC. I was signed by an agreement that would not compete. 226

The company's corporate governance) ..................................... Crit Go to be to be to's I was subordinate to that. Large merchants, such as Le Email and De Mochelon, were eager to expand the scope of interpretal trade, and were dissatisfied with the fact that VOC's monopoly was not worthwhile. 232 In this context, the rules of one vote per person unable to monopolize the company's monopoly at the expense of other merchants. The famous episode related to Isaac Le Mail shows this concern. Initially, L e-e -mail, the largest shareholder of the Amsterdam Chamber and a member of the Governor's Society, was one of the handful of directors, but it was not a company account but on his own account. He seems to have tried to make the company's potential transaction profits his own. Despite having a large shares, the 225 L e-e -mail was immediately expelled by other Governor in 1605 due to embezzlement charges in 1605, and eventually VOC. I was signed by an agreement that would not compete. 226

Notes

References

The company's corporate governance) ..................................... Crit Go to be to be to's I was subordinate to that. Large merchants, such as Le Email and De Mochelon, were eager to expand the scope of interpretal trade, and were dissatisfied with the fact that VOC's monopoly was not worthwhile. 232
However, over time, protests of external investors began to be heard. In 1623, the VOC Charter inhabited the Governor's Governor's sel f-transactions, and at the same time expanded the rights of large investors. The New Charter acknowledged that Kazakibo would purchase products from the company only if the governor's prior purchase right was eliminated and the list price was set or the public auction was purchased. 233 In addition, the reward system of the directors has also been changed, and one percent of the net revenue has been provided in place of the reward system based on the equipment value of the ship. 234 At the same time, the Charter gave a voting right and supervision right to the large shareholders. The major shareholders have become members of the newly established nine committee (one form of the early coaching committee), and have begun to speak on the appointment of the Governor, but the rights of small shareholders thoroughly. It was still robbed. 235
In short, the early VOC is an essentially exclusive dealer cooperative, that is, the carter, and its restricted exercise rules are not to protect external small shareholders, but instead, outside investors. It is clear that it was designed to protect the company's trader members from the control of famous insiders, such as Le Mail.
In recent years, economic and historical researchers have recorded that the rules of incorporation have restricted the number of major shareholders in various judicial jurisdictions in the early 19th century. 236 This has raised the question of whether the transition from the exercise of restricted voting rights to the exercise of the proportional voting rights was as parallel with the separation of ownership and consumption in other countries. 237
In Grand, the pattern of exercising the voting rights of shareholders from the end of the 18th century to the early 19th century seems to be almost the same as in the United States and supports the explanation of consumer protection with the resolution of voting rights. The resolution limit is particularly common in companies that provide infrastructure services that are essential to merchant owners, such as canal companies, insurance companies, and gas lamp companies, but are rare in pure investors owned. Ta. 238 Like US turnpike, British gas lamp companies rarely paid dividends, but this is unlikely to be dissatisfied with shareholders, and shareholders will receive a reward for investment in the form of reducing gas rates. He seemed to be satisfied with. 239 But over time, external investors began to be heard. In 1623, the VOC Charter inhabited the Governor's Governor's sel f-transactions, and at the same time expanded the rights of large investors. The New Charter acknowledged that Kazakibo would purchase products from the company only if the governor's prior purchase right was eliminated and the list price was set or the public auction was purchased. 233 In addition, the reward system of the directors has also been changed, and one percent of the net revenue has been provided in place of the reward system based on the equipment value of the ship. 234 At the same time, the Charter gave a voting right and supervision right to the large shareholders. The major shareholders have become members of the newly established nine committee (one form of the early coaching committee), and have begun to speak on the appointment of the Governor, but the rights of small shareholders thoroughly. It was still robbed. 235
In short, the early VOC is an essentially exclusive dealer cooperative, that is, the carter, and its restricted exercise rules are not to protect external small shareholders, but instead, outside investors. It is clear that it was designed to protect the company's trader members from the control of famous insiders, such as Le Mail.
In recent years, economic and historical researchers have recorded that the rules of incorporation have restricted the number of major shareholders in various judicial jurisdictions in the early 19th century. 236 This has raised the question of whether the transition from the exercise of restricted voting rights to the exercise of the proportional voting rights was as parallel with the separation of ownership and consumption in other countries. 237
In Grand, the pattern of exercising the voting rights of shareholders from the end of the 18th century to the early 19th century seems to be almost the same as in the United States and supports the explanation of consumer protection with the resolution of voting rights. The resolution limit is particularly common in companies that provide infrastructure services that are essential to merchant owners, such as canal companies, insurance companies, and gas lamp companies, but are rare in pure investors owned. Ta. 238 Like US turnpike, British gas lamp companies rarely paid dividends, but this is unlikely to be dissatisfied with shareholders, and shareholders will receive a reward for investment in the form of reducing gas rates. He seemed to be satisfied with. 239 However, over time, protests of external investors began to be heard. In 1623, the VOC Charter inhabited the Governor's Governor's sel f-transactions, and at the same time expanded the rights of large investors. The New Charter acknowledged that Kazakibo would purchase products from the company only if the governor's prior purchase right was eliminated and the list price was set or the public auction was purchased. 233 In addition, the reward system of the directors has also been changed, and one percent of the net revenue has been provided in place of the reward system based on the equipment value of the ship. 234 At the same time, the Charter gave a voting right and supervision right to the large shareholders. The major shareholders have become members of the newly established nine committee (one form of the early coaching committee), and have begun to speak on the appointment of the Governor, but the rights of small shareholders thoroughly. It was still robbed. 235
In short, the early VOC is an essentially exclusive dealer cooperative, that is, the carter, and its restricted exercise rules are not to protect external small shareholders, but instead, outside investors. It is clear that it was designed to protect the company's trader members from the control of famous insiders, such as Le Mail.
In recent years, economic and historical researchers have recorded that the rules of incorporation have restricted the number of major shareholders in various judicial jurisdictions in the early 19th century. 236 This has raised the question of whether the transition from the exercise of restricted voting rights to the exercise of the proportional voting rights was as parallel with the separation of ownership and consumption in other countries. 237
In Grand, the pattern of exercising the voting rights of shareholders from the end of the 18th century to the early 19th century seems to be almost the same as in the United States and supports the explanation of consumer protection with the resolution of voting rights. The resolution limit is particularly common in companies that provide infrastructure services that are essential to merchant owners, such as canal companies, insurance companies, and gas lamp companies, but are rare in pure investors owned. Ta. 238 Like US turnpike, British gas lamp companies rarely paid dividends, but this is unlikely to be dissatisfied with shareholders, and shareholders will receive a reward for investment in the form of reducing gas rates. He seemed to be satisfied with. 239
In contrast, the Brazilian State Agency and the French Conceilles Data have uniformly impose voting rights, regardless of the type of business or ownership. 240 This has raised issues in both investor protection and consumer protection. Certainly, the considerable number of companies in both areas is the roots of the insurance and public business industries, suggesting the character of a cooperative and a mutual company. Despite the 241, the resolution of voting rights is clearly widespread in pure investo r-owned companies, contradicting the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom between consume r-owned and voting restriction schemes.
However, even if the exercise of voting rights observed in Brazil and France in the 19th century does not support consumer protection of voting rights, these rules are devices for investor protection. It is certain that it will help to interpret it. First, the State Agency in the two countries not only claims strict resolution restrictions, but also has recognized the minimum shareholding requirements for attending a general meeting of shareholders and exercising voting rights, which has taken the right of small shareholders. Ta. 242 In the jurisdiction of these judicial jurisdictions, after the emergence of a general company, merchants have substantial options for the exercise of voting rights, and at the same time, the incidence of resolution of voting rights is rapidly. It has dropped. In Brazil, the maximum voting rights limit was made, contrary to the view that the voting rights restriction scheme was indispensable to encourage small investors to participate in shareholding shares. Abandoned. In contrast to 244 , Brazilian State Agency and France's Conceilles Data have uniformly impose voting rights, regardless of the type of business or ownership. 240 This has raised issues in both investor protection and consumer protection. Certainly, the considerable number of companies in both areas is the roots of the insurance and public business industries, suggesting the character of a cooperative and a mutual company. Despite the 241, the resolution of voting rights is clearly widespread in pure investo r-owned companies, contradicting the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom between consume r-owned and voting restriction schemes.
However, even if the exercise of voting rights observed in Brazil and France in the 19th century does not support consumer protection of voting rights restrictions, these rules are devices for investor protection. It is certain that it will help to interpret it. First, the State Agency in the two countries not only claims strict resolution restrictions, but also has recognized the minimum shareholding requirements for attending a general meeting of shareholders and exercising voting rights, which has taken the right of small shareholders. Ta. 242 In the jurisdiction of these judicial jurisdictions, after the emergence of a general company, merchants have substantial options for the exercise of voting rights, and at the same time, the incidence of resolution of voting rights is rapidly. It has dropped. In Brazil, the maximum voting rights limit is exactly the time when the capital market of the country has been booming, contrary to the view that the voting rights restricted scheme was indispensable to encourage small investors to participate in shares. Abandoned. 244 In contrast, the Brazilian State Agency and the France's Conceilles Data have uniformly imposed voting rights, regardless of the type of business or ownership. 240 This has raised issues in both investor protection and consumer protection. Certainly, the considerable number of companies in both areas is the roots of the insurance and public business industries, suggesting the character of a cooperative and a mutual company. Despite the 241, the resolution of voting rights is clearly widespread in pure investo r-owned companies, contradicting the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom between consume r-owned and voting restriction schemes.
However, even if the exercise of voting rights observed in Brazil and France in the 19th century does not support consumer protection of voting rights, these rules are devices for investor protection. It is certain that it will help to interpret it. First, the State Agency in the two countries not only claims strict resolution restrictions, but also has recognized the minimum shareholding requirements for attending a general meeting of shareholders and exercising voting rights, which has taken the right of small shareholders. Ta. 242 In the jurisdiction of these judicial jurisdictions, after the emergence of a general company, merchants have substantial options for the exercise of voting rights, and at the same time, the incidence of resolution of voting rights is rapidly. It has dropped. In Brazil, the maximum voting rights limit is exactly the time when the capital market of the country has been booming, contrary to the view that the voting rights restricted scheme was indispensable to encourage small investors to participate in shares. Abandoned. 244
Today, business companies around the world are generally investors who are the first and usually only interests to the company. The need to protect external investors due to abuse by insiders, such as managers and dominant shareholders, accounts for the majority of corporate laws and corporate policies. 246 The advantage of companies owned by investors is the application of the US Federal Law system that appeared in the 20th century as a result of the 1933 Securities Law and the 1934 Securities and Exchange Law, and the major interest in the company is "the company's major interest in the company. It was based on the existence of an "investment contract", an investment for profits. 247 In this way, the separation of investment and consumption is an element that stipulates the scope of securities regulations, and the possibility of abuse of shareholders and consumers in cooperatives is outside the category of securities law, no matter how large it is. 248.
However, before the late 19th century, a considerable number of business companies were not interested in obtaining financial returns to investment, but rather interested in using company services at reasonable costs. There was. Therefore, the initial corporate law and practical work had the special feature of protecting shareholders as investors, especially, such as restrictions on exercising voting rights.
In the latter half of the 19th century, the government's infrastructure was expanded, while the legal rules that deal with market dominance issues were separated from the Business Company Law (ant i-trade law, public interest business regulations, banks and insurance regulations, etc. ) The separate legal system was set up in a separate legal system, and a separate organizational system for a cooperative corporation was developed. With this evolution, the corporate law, which manages it, focuses on the agencies in the company owned by investors (between dominance shareholders and no n-controlled shareholders, between managers and shareholders). I can now do it. 249
Understanding the distinctive ownership structure of 19th-century corporations cautions us against automatically drawing policy lessons from historical practice for the development of today's capital markets. Contrary to existing suggestions based on misreadings of 19th-century corporate practices, a 250-vote limit is unlikely to protect investors' interests today as it was in the past. In part, it is not clear that, for a proxy rule to be effective, a company subject to a proxy rule would require a more developed legal system than one operating under a one-share-one-vote rule. Moreover, there are obvious costs to proxy restrictions, which appear to be relatively greater for pure investor-owned companies than for consumer-owned companies. Proxy restrictions are likely to discourage investors from investing relatively large amounts of money in corporations. Moreover, when proxy restrictions are imposed, corporations may be subject to the control of entrenched managers who lack strong incentives to maximize profits. Also, over time, proxy restrictions may be circumvented, especially if the courts do not develop and enforce a relatively sophisticated proxy restriction doctrine. Similar problems would have been faced by early 19th century cooperative-type companies, but they may have been relatively modest. These companies may not have primarily involved donations to purchase shares. Understanding the distinctive ownership structure of 19th century companies warns us from automatically drawing policy lessons from historical practice for the development of today's capital markets. Contrary to existing suggestions based on misreadings of 19th century corporate practice, a 250-vote limit is unlikely to protect investors' interests today as it was in the past. In part, it is not clear that, for a voting restriction rule to be effective, a company subject to a voting restriction rule would require a more developed legal system than one operating under a one-share-one-vote rule. Moreover, there are obvious costs to voting restrictions, which seem relatively greater for purely investor-owned companies than for consumer-owned companies. Voting restrictions are likely to discourage investors from investing relatively large amounts of money in companies. Moreover, restrictions on proxy voting may place firms under the control of entrenched managers who lack strong incentives to maximize profits. Over time, proxy voting rules may be circumvented, especially if the courts do not develop and enforce a relatively sophisticated doctrine of proxy voting restrictions. Similar problems would have been faced by early 19th-century cooperative firms, but they may have been relatively modest. These firms may not have primarily engaged in share purchases through donations. Understanding the distinctive ownership structures of 19th-century firms cautions us against automatically drawing policy lessons from historical practice for the development of capital markets today. Contrary to existing suggestions based on misreadings of 19th-century corporate practice, a 250-vote limit is as unlikely today as it was in the past to protect investors' interests. For one thing, it is not clear that firms subject to proxy voting restrictions would require a more developed legal system than firms operating under one-share-one-vote rules in order for the rules to be effective. Moreover, there are obvious costs to proxy restrictions that may be relatively greater for pure investor-owned companies than for consumer-owned companies. Proxy restrictions are likely to discourage investors from investing relatively large amounts of money in companies. Furthermore, proxy restrictions may leave companies under the control of entrenched managers who lack a strong incentive to maximize profits. Over time, proxy restrictions may be circumvented, especially if the courts do not develop and enforce relatively sophisticated proxy restriction doctrines. Similar problems would have been faced by early 19th century cooperatives, but they may have been relatively modest. These companies may not have had essentially donation-based share purchases.
Today's legal and economics focuses on agency issues on management and dominant shareholders and the evolution of ownership and separation of ownership and control that have worsened those issues. However, if you go back to the 19th century, you will be overlooked, but you will see another important turning point in the history of a corporation, that is, ownership and consumption. That is, it is separation of ownership and consumption. Ignoring such an early stage in the development of a business company may have an anachronistic incorrect interpretation of the voting restriction structure, which has been widely adopted in the past and is almost gone. Furthermore, not to understand the role that has been exercised in restricted voting rights in the past, is overestimating the potential advantages of the current proposal in both developing countries and the maturity economy calling for a return to restricted voting rights. It could lead to doing so.
The results reported in Table 1 and 2 below are obtained from the Sylla/Wright dataset. 251 This dataset contains a company that was royal by legislation, but it is like the 1811 New York law 252 for manufacturing companies, which stipulates that it will be established as a right without any special legislative measures. Companies established based on laws and regulations have been excluded. It is clear that most industries were dominated by legislation, even in the mi d-19th century, even in the case of laws and regulations on establishment of corporations. 253 For these reasons, the Patoon of the Rules of exercising the company voting rights reflected in the Sylla/Wright dataset is probably the restrictions on exercise of voting rights in different industries, states, and decades. It seems that the relative spread is accurately indicated. However, as described in the text, it is clear that the manufacturing industry is not. As a result, the results of the table below may be modest in the difference between the rules of voting rights adopted by the manufacturing company and the rules of exercising voting rights adopted by companies in other industries.
Complete datasets include 22, 419 objects. The rules of exercising voting rights for each company are code as "on e-shaped resolution", "on e-person voting right", "cautious average" (including all maximum and step voting rights exercise rules), or "no specified". It was converted. Companies with a voting system per person and average average system are consolidated in a single category of exercising "restriction" voting rights, and codes each company with a variety variable that indicates whether the restrictions are exercised or one vote system. I was able to do it.
Proxy voting rules were identified in less than half of the companies in the sample, possibly because they were included in the bylaws rather than the articles of incorporation, or because the proxy voting rules were enacted by a different statute not known to the data coders. For the analyses reported here, we excluded all companies with missing proxy voting rules, but of course questions remain about systematic bias in the sample. This left a sample of 10, 996 companies. We then excluded all companies incorporated in states other than the original 13, companies operating in industries (usually small) other than those reported in the table below, and companies incorporated in Massachusetts or South Carolina (255 because of irregularities suggesting systematic errors or missing data). We also excluded all observations from the 10-year period of the 1860s. We were left with a final sample of 6, 387 companies, which we used for the analyses reported here.
The Sylla/Wright dataset does not include any information on the ownership of the companies involved beyond the names of the founders. As a result, we cannot directly examine the relationship between a firm's proxy voting rules and the number or nature of its shareholders.
Table 1 below provides a simple breakdown of the frequency of proxy voting restrictions by industry and decade. Table 2 presents a regression analysis in which the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if there is a proxy voting restriction rule and 0 if the proxy voting restriction rule is one vote per share. The omitted variables in the regression are manufacturing (industry), Georgia (state), and the 1850s (decade). Thus, each regression coefficient in Table 2 reflects the difference between (1) the probability that a firm in a given industry, state, and decade has a proxy voting restriction rule and (2) the probability that a proxy voting restriction rule is found among firms engaged in manufacturing in Georgia in the 1850s.
Table 1. Percentage of restrictive voting provisions by industry and decade
Table 2. Logistic regression
The concept of three pillars of sustainability (society, economy, and environment) is generally represented by three intersections, focusing on the overall sustainability. In this paper, we review and discuss related historical sustainability, with the aim of clarifying the origin and theoretical basis of this concept. As a result, the concept of these three pillars is not one, but various criticisms on social and ecological perspectives in the early academic literature and social and ecological issues on the United Nations. It was found that it was gradually born from the movement seeking harmony of economic growth as a solution. The diagrams of the three circles seem to have been first presented by Barbier (Environ Consanserv 14: 101, DOI: 10. 1017/S0376892900011449, 1987), but for developing countries that have a different focus from modern interpretations. It is intended. However, the concept of the three pillars seems to be earlier. There is no theoretically strict description of the three pillars anywhere. This is one of the reasons why sustainability discourse was formed historically by various schools. The theoretical absence of a solid concept is frustrated by the theoretical approach of "sustainability" for strict operation.
Chapter © 2018
Chapter © 2017
Article 02 June 2022
Avoid mistakes that are common in manuscripts
For the past 20 years, the number of publications on "sustainability" has increased rapidly, and "sustainability science" is often regarded as a separate field (Kates et al. 2001; komiyama and takechi 2006; schoolman et al.) However, "sustainability" is an open concept with countless interpretations and context. The concept of the three pillars of sustainability (society, economy, and environment) is generally represented by three crossing circles, focusing on the overall sustainability. In this paper, we review and discuss related historical sustainability, with the aim of clarifying the origin and theoretical basis of this concept. As a result, the concept of these three pillars is not one, but various criticisms on social and ecological perspectives in the early academic literature and social and ecological issues on the United Nations. It was found that it was gradually born from the movement seeking harmony of economic growth as a solution. The diagrams of the three circles seem to have been first presented by Barbier (Environ Consanserv 14: 101, DOI: 10. 1017/S0376892900011449, 1987), but for developing countries that have a different focus from modern interpretations. It is intended. However, the concept of the three pillars seems to be earlier. There is no theoretically strict description of the three pillars anywhere. This is one of the reasons why sustainability discourse was formed historically by various schools. The theoretical absence of a solid concept is frustrated by the theoretical approach of "sustainability" for strict operation.
Chapter © 2018
Chapter © 2017
Article 02 June 2022
Avoid mistakes that are common in manuscripts
For the past 20 years, the number of publications on "sustainability" has increased rapidly, and "sustainability science" is often regarded as a separate field (Kates et al. 2001; komiyama and takechi 2006; schoolman et al.) However, "sustainability" is an open concept with countless interpretations and context. The concept of three pillars of sustainability (society, economy, and environment) is generally represented by three intersections, focusing on the overall sustainability. In this paper, we review and discuss related historical sustainability, with the aim of clarifying the origin and theoretical basis of this concept. As a result, the concept of these three pillars is not one, but various criticisms on social and ecological perspectives in the early academic literature and social and ecological issues on the United Nations. It was found that it was gradually born from the movement seeking harmony of economic growth as a solution. The diagrams of the three circles seem to have been first presented by Barbier (Environ Consanserv 14: 101, DOI: 10. 1017/S0376892900011449, 1987), but for developing countries that have a different focus from modern interpretations. It is intended. However, the concept of the three pillars seems to be earlier. There is no theoretically strict description of the three pillars anywhere. This is one of the reasons why sustainability discourse was formed historically by various schools. The theoretical absence of a solid concept is frustrated by the theoretical approach of "sustainability" for strict operation.
Chapter © 2018
Chapter © 2017
Article 02 June 2022
Avoid mistakes that are common in manuscripts
For the past 20 years, the number of publications on "sustainability" has increased rapidly, and "sustainability science" is often regarded as a separate field (Kates et al. 2001; komiyama and takechi 2006; schoolman et al.) However, "sustainability" is an open concept with countless interpretations and context.
One of the most widely used explanations of “sustainability” is the concept of three interrelated “pillars” (Basiago 1999; Pope et al. 2004; Gibson 2006; Waas et al. 2011; Moldan et al. 2012; Schoolman et al. 2012; Boyer et al. 2016), “dimensions” (Stirling 1999; Lehtonen 2004; Carter and Moir 2012; Mori and Christodoulou 2012), “components” (Du Pisani 2006; Zijp et al. 2015), “legs” (Dawe and Ryan 2003; Vos 2007), “aspects” (Goodland 1995; Lozano 2008; Tanguay et al. 2010) and “perspectives” (Brown et al. 1987; Arushanyan et al. 2012). 2017) encompass economic, social, and environmental (or ecological) factors or “goals.” It should be noted here that these competing terms are largely used interchangeably, and our preference for the “pillars” is largely arbitrary. This tripartite structure is often depicted as three intersecting circles: social, environmental, and economic, as shown in Figure 1. This diagram appears in various forms in explanations of “sustainability” in academic literature, policy documents, business literature, and online, and is often depicted as a “Venn diagram,” although it generally lacks the strict logical properties associated with such diagrams. Alternative representations include visual depictions as nested concentric circles or literal “pillars,” or with sustainability goals and indicators as distinct categories independent of visual aids. On the other hand, attractive
Fig. 1
Left: A typical expression of sustainability as a cross that crosses. Right: Alternative expression: Approximately an approach of concentric circles with literally "pillars"
Many of the documents on modern sustainability may focus on the United Nations, a diverse sustainable development target (SDGs), but the "three pillars" itself is clearly incorporated into the formulation. (UN 2012a). In this paper, the historical appearance of the concept of "sustainability" is an overview of the origin of "sustainable development" from the early variety of roots to the 1970s to the 1980s. The purpose is to shine light to the origin of the pillars. Next, the initial development of these concepts is based on the aim of exploring the origin of three pillars before 2001, which was first described as a "common view" (Giddings et al. 2002). Conduct a literature survey to track. In the last discussion, the emergence of three pillars, which has little theoretical foundation, is a product of the specific formation of "sustainability" as a concept, and to form its early history. He claims that there are some parts of the agenda of various actors who contributed.
In order to understand that "sustainability" became the mainstream in the 1980s, it is important to know what roots this concept came from. However, the fact that many studies have been conducted on the concept before the word "sustainability" appeared has made this problem. Left: A typical expression of sustainability as a cross to cross. Right: Alternative expression: Approximately an approach of concentric circles with literally "pillars"
Many of the documents on modern sustainability may focus on the United Nations, a diverse sustainable development target (SDGs), but the "three pillars" itself is clearly incorporated into the formulation. (UN 2012a). In this paper, the historical appearance of the concept of "sustainability" is an overview of the origin of "sustainable development" from the early variety of roots to the 1970s to the 1980s. The purpose is to shine light on the origin of the pillars. Next, the initial development of these concepts is based on the aim of exploring the origin of three pillars before 2001, which was first described as a "common view" (Giddings et al. 2002). Conduct a literature survey to track. In the last discussion, the emergence of three pillars, which has little theoretical foundation, is a product of the specific formation of "sustainability" as a concept, and to form its early history. He claims that there are some parts of the agenda of various actors who contributed.
In order to understand that "sustainability" became the mainstream in the 1980s, it is important to know what roots this concept came from. However, the fact that many studies have been conducted on the concept before the word "sustainability" appeared has made this problem. Left: A typical expression of sustainability as a cross that crosses. Right: Alternative expression: Approximately an approach of concentric circles with literally "pillars"
Many of the documents on modern sustainability may focus on the United Nations, a diverse sustainable development target (SDGs), but the "three pillars" itself is clearly incorporated into the formulation. (UN 2012a). In this paper, the historical appearance of the concept of "sustainability" is an overview of the origin of "sustainable development" from the early variety of roots to the 1970s to the 1980s. The purpose is to shine light to the origin of the pillars. Next, the initial development of these concepts is based on the aim of exploring the origin of three pillars before 2001, which was first described as a "common view" (Giddings et al. 2002). Conduct a literature survey to track. In the last discussion, the emergence of three pillars, which has little theoretical foundation, is a product of the specific formation of "sustainability" as a concept, and to form its early history. He claims that there are some parts of the agenda of various actors who contributed.
In order to understand that "sustainability" became the mainstream in the 1980s, it is important to know what roots this concept came from. However, the fact that many studies have been conducted on the concept before the word "sustainability" appeared has made this problem.
Authors, such as GROBER, CARADONNA, and DU PISANI, have contributed to lighting the initial roots (Du Pisani 2006; GROBER 2012; CARADONNA 2014). In particular, the 17th and 18t h-century forestry experts, such as Evrin and Carlwitz, have introduced the concept of sustainable yield (Warde 2011; GROBER 2012. ) Early political economists such as Smith, Mill, Ricardo, and Marsus also questioned the limits of economic growth and population increase in the shadow of the Industrial Revolution, and recognize the essential trad e-off between wealth and social justice. It is the person who did it (Lumley and Armstrong 2004; Caradonna 2014). Natural scientists and ecologists from the 19th to the early 20th century also have humanis t-centered natural protection theorists who stipulate natural resources for sustainable consumption, and their maintenance because of the value of nature. Callicott and Mumford 1997 was a help to promote the division of the biologica l-centered natural protection theorist.
However, it was only in the late 20th century that modern concepts appeared with the word sustainability in a global sense. Roman Club's "Growth Limit" is a "Sustainable World System" (Meadows et al. The same year, "Blue Photos for Survival" (A Blueprint for " In Survival, the editor of the Ecology Magazine has published a proposal for the construction of a sustainable society (the Ecologist 1972). The committee regarded the concept of sustainable society than the word limit (Grober 2012, P167) in 1975. A series of books have been published (The Ecology Party 1975) and a series of books that have taken up the word sustainability have been published (Stivers 1976; Meadows 1977; Pirages 1977; Cleveland 1979; COOMER 1979).
In order to summarize it concisely, many of the previous discussions are handed over to the authors who have already mentioned. Instead, we decided to start talking from the beginning of the environmental movement of the 1960s, focus on how the criticism contributed to the rise of the "sustainable development" in the 1980s. do.
Soon after World War II, consensus was born in the western countries that urgently needed an international initiative to help the "development" of "Gokutoku" (Arndt 1987, P49). At this time, outside the Marxist discourse, the concept of "economic development" means exploitation of natural resources in colonial context, and increased in income and income per capita. It evolved into a material that means the rise of material happiness (Arndt 1981). Thus, since the 1950s, "economic development" has become almost the same as "economic growth", which has become a major goal of economic policy in Europe and the United States, but the former terms are applied only to poor countries. (Arndt 1987, P51). "Point For" launched in 1949 was the first larg e-scale technical support and development program, followed by concept of capital growth, and in 1961, the United Nations was "the main means of economic development with international trade. "Do" (the same book P72).
From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, modern environmental protection movements emerged in Europe and the United States (Rome 2003; Du Pisani 2006; Tulloch 2013). Popular publications such as Carson's "Spring of Silence" (1962), Erich's "Population Bomb" (1968), Ecologist's "Survival Blue Photos" (1972), and Santa Barbra crude oil flowing accidents (1969) Combined reports on environmental disasters such as the year, the recognition of the magnitude of the widespread environmental destruction caused by humans has increased. It is also argued that postwar economic growth has filled the "basic economic needs" and that the problem of environmental and life quality has been pushed to the forefront in Europe and the United States (Dunlap and Mertig). 1991; Martínez-Alier 1995). In order to summarize briefly, many previous discussions will be handed over to the authors who have already mentioned. Instead, we decided to start talking from the beginning of the environmental movement of the 1960s, focus on how the criticism contributed to the rise of the "sustainable development" in the 1980s. do.
Soon after World War II, consensus was born in the western countries that urgently needed an international initiative to help the "development" of "Gokutoku" (Arndt 1987, P49). At this time, outside the Marxist discourse, the concept of "economic development" means exploitation of natural resources in colonial context, and increased in income and income per capita. It evolved into a material that means the rise of material happiness (Arndt 1981). Thus, since the 1950s, "economic development" has become almost the same as "economic growth", which has become a major goal of economic policy in Europe and the United States, but the former terms are applied only to poor countries. (Arndt 1987, P51). "Point For" launched in 1949 was the first larg e-scale technical support and development program, followed by concept of capital growth, and in 1961, the United Nations was "the main means of economic development with international trade. "I will do it (the same book P72).
From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, modern environmental protection movements emerged in Europe and the United States (Rome 2003; Du Pisani 2006; Tulloch 2013). Popular publications such as Carson's "Spring of Silence" (1962), Erich's "Population Bomb" (1968), Ecologist's "Survival Blue Photos" (1972), and Santa Barbra crude oil flowing accidents (1969) Combined reports on environmental disasters such as the year, the recognition of the magnitude of the widespread environmental destruction caused by humans has increased. It is also argued that postwar economic growth has filled the "basic economic needs" and that the problem of environmental and life quality has been pushed to the forefront in Europe and the United States (Dunlap and Mertig). 1991; Martínez-Alier 1995). In order to summarize it concisely, many of the previous discussions are handed over to the authors who have already mentioned. Instead, we decided to start talking from the beginning of the environmental movement of the 1960s, focus on how the criticism contributed to the rise of the "sustainable development" in the 1980s. do.
Soon after World War II, consensus was born in the western countries that urgently needed an international initiative to help the "development" of "Gokutoku" (Arndt 1987, P49). At this time, outside the Marxist discourse, the concept of "economic development" means exploitation of natural resources in colonial context, and increased in income and income per capita. It evolved into a material that means the rise of material happiness (Arndt 1981). Thus, since the 1950s, "economic development" has become almost the same as "economic growth", which has become a major goal of economic policy in Europe and the United States, but the former terms are applied only to poor countries. (Arndt 1987, P51). "Point For" launched in 1949 was the first larg e-scale technical support and development program, followed by concept of capital growth, and in 1961, the United Nations was "the main means of economic development with international trade. "I will do it (the same book P72).
From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, modern environmental protection movements emerged in Europe and the United States (Rome 2003; Du Pisani 2006; Tulloch 2013). Popular publications such as Carson's "Spring of Silence" (1962), Erich's "Population Bomb" (1968), Ecologist's "Survival Blue Photos" (1972), and Santa Barbra crude oil flowing accidents (1969) Combined reports on environmental disasters such as the year, the recognition of the magnitude of the widespread environmental destruction caused by humans has increased. It is also argued that postwar economic growth has filled the "basic economic needs" and that the problem of environmental and life quality has been pushed to the forefront in Europe and the United States (Dunlap and Mertig). 1991; Martínez-Alier 1995).
Both his book The Limits to Growth (1972) and Schumacher's Small is Beautiful (1973) argued that the modern growth economy was unsustainable on a finite planet. However, the 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent global recession helped crystallize the idea of the limits to growth in both mainstream and academic discourse (Du Pisani 2006). This early discourse was radical, arguing that capitalist economic growth in the Western world was fundamentally incompatible with ecological and social sustainability, and called for structural reform (Van Der Heijden 1999; Tulloch 2013; Tulloch and Neilson 2014).
Combined with the environmental critique of the economic growth paradigm in the West, it led to widespread criticism of the lack of environmental considerations in economic development plans implemented in developing countries. Caldwell details a number of failed development projects presented at the 1968 Airlie House Conference on Ecological Aspects of International Development (Caldwell 1984). A recurring theme in these projects was the tendency to prioritize short-term profits over serious consideration of ecological impacts such as biodiversity and ecosystem services. This is part of a broader critique of the hubristic belief inherent in mainstream development discourse that humans can control and manage natural ecological processes (Woodhouse 1972). Both Woodhouse's The Limits to Growth (1972) and Schumacher's Small is Beautiful (1973) argued that the modern growth economy was unsustainable on a finite planet. However, the 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent global recession helped crystallize the idea of the limits to growth in both mainstream and academic discourse (Du Pisani 2006). This early discourse was radical, arguing that capitalist economic growth in the Western world was fundamentally incompatible with ecological and social sustainability, and calling for structural reform (Van Der Heijden 1999; Tulloch 2013; Tulloch and Neilson 2014).
Coupled with the environmental critique of the economic growth paradigm in the West, a widespread critique arose of the lack of environmental consideration in economic development plans implemented in developing countries. Caldwell detailed a number of failed development projects presented at the 1968 Airlie House Conference on Ecological Aspects of International Development (Caldwell 1984). A recurring theme in these projects was the tendency to prioritise short-term profits over serious consideration of ecosystem impacts such as biodiversity and ecosystem services. This was part of a broader critique of the hubristic belief inherent in mainstream development discourse that humans could dominate and manage natural ecological processes (Woodhouse 1972). Both his book The Limits to Growth (1972) and Schumacher's Small is Beautiful (1973) argued that the modern growth economy was unsustainable on a finite planet. However, the 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent global recession helped crystallize the idea of the limits to growth in both mainstream and academic discourse (Du Pisani 2006). This early discourse was radical, arguing that capitalist economic growth in the Western world was fundamentally incompatible with ecological and social sustainability, and called for structural reform (Van Der Heijden 1999; Tulloch 2013; Tulloch and Neilson 2014).
Combined with the environmental critique of the economic growth paradigm in the West, it led to widespread criticism of the lack of environmental considerations in economic development plans implemented in developing countries. Caldwell provides a detailed account of the failure of a number of development projects presented at the 1968 Airlie House Conference on Ecological Aspects of International Development (Caldwell 1984). A recurring theme in these projects was the tendency to prioritise short-term profits over serious consideration of ecological impacts such as biodiversity and ecosystem services. This is part of a broader critique of the arrogant belief inherent in mainstream development discourse that humans can dominate and control natural ecological processes (Woodhouse 1972).
At the same time, it has become clear that the "progress" promised by the early economic growth plan has not been realized in many ways. Due to the pos t-war boosted economy, Western countries have increased their standards of living, but have begun to focus on serious and poverty that still exists in many of these society (Hicks and Streeten 1979). For this reason, criticizing the focus on economic growth, changing the focus from means to the purpose, taking into account social issues, and seeking a conversion to the "Basic Needs" approach, the second literature on development. A prominent opposition was born. According to the ant, the first remarkable example is Sears's "meaning of development" (1969), arguing that economic growth is not only a solution to social difficulties, but also often the cause. 。 Seers claimed that the indicators of poverty, unemployment, and inequality more accurately describe the state of "development" and "progress" (Seers 1969; Arndt 1987, P91). Notable is Hersche's "Social Limit of Growth" (1976). Hersche pursues growth at the social level and pursues its fetishism, which has the effect of permanent inequality, and in fact, the social limit that is, for example, social limits for productivity improvement. He argues that it is more likely to be foreseeable (HIRSCH 1995). This widespread social criticism of development focused on growth has attracted attention from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Bank. At the same time, it has become clear that the "progress" promised by the early economic growth plan has not been realized in many ways. Due to the pos t-war boosted economy, Western countries have increased their standards of living, but have begun to focus on serious and poverty that still exists in many of these society (Hicks and Streeten 1979). For this reason, criticizing the focus on economic growth, changing the focus from means to the purpose, taking into account social issues, and seeking a conversion to the "Basic Needs" approach, the second literature on development. A prominent opposition was born. According to the ant, the first remarkable example is Sears's "meaning of development" (1969), arguing that economic growth is not only a solution to social difficulties, but also often the cause. 。 Seers claimed that the indicators of poverty, unemployment, and inequality more accurately describe the state of "development" and "progress" (Seers 1969; Arndt 1987, P91). Notable is Hersche's "Social Limit of Growth" (1976). Hersche pursues growth at the social level and pursues its fetishism, which has the effect of permanent inequality, and in fact, the social limit that is, for example, social limits for productivity improvement. He argues that it is more likely to be foreseeable (HIRSCH 1995). This widespread social criticism of development focused on growth has attracted attention from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Bank. At the same time, it has become clear that the "progress" promised by the early economic growth plan has not been realized in many ways. Due to the pos t-war boosted economy, Western countries have increased their standards of living, but have begun to focus on serious and poverty that still exists in many of these society (Hicks and Streeten 1979). For this reason, criticizing the focus on economic growth, changing the focus from means to the purpose, taking into account social issues, and seeking a conversion to the "Basic Needs" approach, the second literature on development. A prominent opposition was born. According to the ant, the first remarkable example is Sears' meaning of development (1969), claiming that economic growth is not only a solution to social difficulties, but often the cause. 。 Seers claimed that the indicators of poverty, unemployment, and inequality more accurately describe the state of "development" and "progress" (Seers 1969; Arndt 1987, P91). Notable is Hersche's "Social Limit of Growth" (1976). Hersche pursues growth at the social level and pursues its fetishism, which has the effect of permanent inequality, and in fact, the social limit to productivity improvement is far away. He argues that it is more likely to be foreseeable (HIRSCH 1995). This extensive social criticism of development focusing on growth has attracted attention from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Bank.
The United Nations Human and Environment Council held in Stockholm in 1972 is the first worldwide summit to examine the impact of humans on the environment, and the first is to achieve both economic development and environmental conservation, which was generally considered. It was a big attempt (Caldwell 1984). The concept of "environmentally friendly development" was born from this meeting, and in 1973 the coined word "ec o-development" was born (Clinton 1977; Mebratu 1998). In 1978, Ignacy Sachs was defined by Ignacy Sachs as "development approach aimed at harmony between social and economic goals and ecology, based on the spirit of solidarity with future generations." , In addition, he is looking for "another kind of qualitative growth" (Glaeser 1984, P25). One of the earliest ecological economists, as an advisor to the United Nations Environmental Plan (UNEP), was impacted in the 1970s policy world to promote this growth concept (Gómez-). Baggethun and noredo 2015; Martinez-Alier 2015).
The core element of "ec o-development" is explained that it is a unified principle of satisfying "human essential needs", participation, consideration for the environment, and "independence", simply structural dependence on other countries. It is understood not only as freedom from political power and the pressure of multinational companies (Glaeser 1984, PP25-28). The important thing was to discuss both regional and international power structures, and how difficult environmental development faced. In this series of documents, economic growth plays a neutral role. Saxophone neglects the concept of "trad e-off" between environmental management and economic growth, and instead claims "environmentally cautious, sustainable, socially responsible, different growth." , Later, has a remarkable similarity with the rhetoric of the United Nations (Glaeser 1984, P216; BERR 2015). This approach seems to be different from other early ecology economists, such as Daly and Mishan, which proposed the growth and lo w-growth economy (DALY 1973; Mishan 1977). The United Nations Human Human and Environmental Conference held in Stockholm in 1972 is the first worl d-class summit to examine the impact of humans on the environment, and is commonly regarded as not being compatible with economic development and environmental conservation. It was the first big attempt to do (Caldwell 1984). The concept of "environmentally friendly development" was born from this conference, and in 1973 the coined word "Eco Development" was born (Clinton 1977; Mebratu 1998). In 1978, Ignacy Sachs was defined by Ignacy Sachs as "development approach aimed at harmony between social and economic goals and ecology, based on the spirit of solidarity with future generations." , In addition, he is looking for "another kind of qualitative growth" (Glaeser 1984, P25). One of the earliest ecological economists, as an advisor to the United Nations Environmental Plan (UNEP), was impacted in the 1970s policy in promoting this growth skepticism (Gómez-). Baggethun and noredo 2015; Martinez-Alier 2015).
The core element of "ec o-development" is explained that it is a unified principle of satisfying "human essential needs", participation, consideration for the environment, and "independence", simply structural dependence on other countries. It is understood not only as freedom from political power and the pressure of multinational companies (Glaeser 1984, PP25-28). The important thing was to discuss both regional and international power structures, and how difficult environmental development faced. In this series of documents, economic growth plays a neutral role. Saxophone neglects the concept of "trad e-off" between environmental management and economic growth, and instead claims "environmentally cautious, sustainable, socially responsible, different growth." , Later, has a remarkable similarity with the rhetoric of the United Nations (Glaeser 1984, P216; BERR 2015). This approach seems to be different from other early ecology economists, such as Daly and Mishan, which proposed the growth and lo w-growth economy (DALY 1973; Mishan 1977). The United Nations Human and Environment Council held in Stockholm in 1972 is the first worldwide summit to examine the impact of humans on the environment, and the first is to achieve both economic development and environmental conservation, which was generally considered. It was a big attempt (Caldwell 1984). The concept of "environmentally friendly development" was born from this meeting, and in 1973 the coined word "ec o-development" was born (Clinton 1977; Mebratu 1998). In 1978, Ignacy Sachs was defined by Ignacy Sachs as "development approach aimed at harmony between social and economic goals and ecology, based on the spirit of solidarity with future generations." , In addition, he is looking for "another kind of qualitative growth" (Glaeser 1984, P25). One of the earliest ecological economists, as an advisor to the United Nations Environmental Plan (UNEP), was impacted in the 1970s policy in promoting this growth skepticism (Gómez-). Baggethun and noredo 2015; Martinez-Alier 2015).
The core element of "ec o-development" is explained that it is a unified principle of satisfying "human essential needs", participation, consideration of the environment, and "independence", simply structural dependence on other countries. It is understood not only as freedom from political power and the pressure of multinational companies (Glaeser 1984, PP25-28). The important thing was to discuss both regional and international power structures, and how difficult environmental development faced. In this series of documents, economic growth plays a neutral role. Saxophone neglects the concept of "trad e-off" between environmental management and economic growth, and instead claims "environmentally cautious, sustainable, socially responsible, different growth." , Later, has a remarkable similarity with the rhetoric of the United Nations (Glaeser 1984, P216; BERR 2015). This approach seems to be different from other early ecology economists, such as Daly and Mishan, which proposed the growth and lo w-growth economy (DALY 1973; Mishan 1977).
After the global economic recession in the late 1970s, the desire of "modernization" and the construction of the "new international economic order" are more important than the basic needs approaches, and it is incompatible with the basic needs approach. A tendency to be considered (Arndt 1987, PP104-111). In combination with this, saxophone claims that the "eco-development", which emphasizes basic needs, was rejected by the US administration as an international policy term (Gómezz-Baggetchun and Naredo 2015). With the a bit of a social criticism, McNamala, the governor of the World Bank, appealed for the need to "regain the momentum of economic growth" (Arndt 1987).
In the 1980s, the early environmental movement was gaining momentum due to the broken waves of the rapid social movement and rewinding (Van Der HEIJDEN 1999). Throughout the 1980s, both ecological criticism of economic development and social criticism became interweaved with economic development, which became called "sustainable development" (O'Riordan 1985; Barbier 1987; Brown et al.) In 1987, the United Nations World Committee on the environment and development of the United Nations published the report, "We Communist Future," (Brontrand Report), and "at the same time, socially environmentally environmentally friendly. The discussion was on the goal when he sought a sustainable new era of economic growth. A new "Winwin" scenario has been born by repainting the same economic growth as the same as the past in cooperation with the theory of environmental development of "different quality" in the "quality of the economic growth". Ta. After the global economic recession in the late 1970s, the desire of "modernization" and the construction of the "new international economic order" are more important than the basic needs approach, and what is the basic needs approach? There was a tendency to be considered incompatible (Arndt 1987, PP104-111). In combination with this, saxophone claims that the "eco-development", which emphasizes basic needs, was rejected by the US administration as an international policy term (Gómezz-Baggetchun and Naredo 2015). With the a bit of a social criticism, McNamala, the governor of the World Bank, appealed for the need to "regain the momentum of economic growth" (Arndt 1987).
In the 1980s, the early environmental movement was gaining momentum due to the broken waves of the rapid social movement and rewinding (Van Der HEIJDEN 1999). Throughout the 1980s, both ecological criticism of economic development and social criticism became interweaved with economic development, which became called "sustainable development" (O'Riordan 1985; Barbier 1987; Brown et al.) In 1987, the United Nations World Committee on the environment and development of the United Nations published the report, "We Communist Future," (Brontrand Report), and "at the same time, socially environmentally environmentally friendly. The discussion was on the goal when he sought a sustainable new era of economic growth. A new "Winwin" scenario has been born by repainting the same economic growth as the same as the past in cooperation with the theory of environmental development of "different quality" in the "quality of the economic growth". Ta. After the global economic recession in the late 1970s, the desire of "modernization" and the construction of the "new international economic order" are more important than the basic needs and are incompatible with the basic needs approach. A tendency to be considered (Arndt 1987, PP104-111). In combination with this, saxophone claims that the "eco-development", which emphasizes basic needs, was rejected by the US administration as an international policy term (Gómezz-Baggetchun and Naredo 2015). With the a bit of a social criticism, McNamala, the governor of the World Bank, appealed for the need to "regain the momentum of economic growth" (Arndt 1987).
In the 1980s, the early environmental movement was gaining momentum due to the broken waves of the rapid social movement and rewinding (Van Der HEIJDEN 1999). Throughout the 1980s, both ecological criticism of economic development and social criticism became interweaved with economic development, which became called "sustainable development" (O'Riordan 1985; Barbier 1987; Brown et al.) In 1987, the United Nations World Committee on the environment and development of the United Nations published the report, "We Communist Future," (Brontrand Report), and "at the same time, socially environmentally environmentally friendly. The discussion was on the goal when he sought a sustainable new era of economic growth. A new "Winwin" scenario has been born by repainting the same economic growth as the same as the past in cooperation with the theory of environmental development of "different quality" in the "quality of the economic growth". Ta.
Although this term has been used for a long time (IUCN, UNEP, WWF 1980, etc.), it has been widely appreciated that the Bruntranders have introduced the concept of "sustainable development" into international policy discourses and spread. (Basiago 1999; Castro 2004; Johnston et al.) Sustainable development was defined as "development that satisfies the current needs without impairing the ability to meet their needs." For several years since the Bruntrant Report, "Sustainable Development" became a dominant paradigm of the environmental protection movement, and the literature to consider it has increased dramatically.
The institutionalization of sustainable development will be continued in the Rio Process, which was launched at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, and the world's political leaders in the world are sustainable development. I vowed to support (Jordan and Voisey 1998). At the center of that was the announcement of the "Rio Declaration" consisting of 27 principles, which will be the guideline of the future "sustainable development", and the "Agenda 21", which clearly indicates a plan to practice these principles. there were. Agenda 21 emphasized the need to emphasize the problem of developmental gaps in the north and south, defending economic growth, free trade, and linking social and economic development and environmental protection (United Nations 1992 (UN 1992). year). The subsequent summit was held in 1997, 2002 and 2012. This term has been used for a long time (IUCN, UNEP, WWF 1980, etc.), but the Bruntrant Committee has introduced the concept of "sustainable development" into an international policy discourse and spread it. He has defined a wid e-ranging (Basiago 1999; Castro 2004; Johnston et al.) Sustainable Development as "development that satisfies the current needs without impairing the ability to meet their needs." For several years since the Bruntrant Report, "Sustainable Development" became a dominant paradigm of the environmental protection movement, and the literature to consider it has increased dramatically.
The institutionalization of sustainable development will be continued in the Rio Process, which was launched at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, and the world's political leaders in the world are sustainable development. I vowed to support (Jordan and Voisey 1998). At the center of that was the announcement of the "Rio Declaration" consisting of 27 principles, which will be the guideline of the future "sustainable development", and the "Agenda 21", which clearly indicates a plan to practice these principles. there were. Agenda 21 emphasizes the need to emphasize the problem of development gaps in the north and south, defend economic growth and free trade, and to link social and economic development and environmental protection (United Nations 1992). year). The subsequent summit was held in 1997, 2002 and 2012. Although this term has been used for a long time (IUCN, UNEP, WWF 1980, etc.), it has been widely appreciated that the Bruntranders have introduced the concept of "sustainable development" into international policy discourses and spread. (Basiago 1999; Castro 2004; Johnston et al.) Sustainable development was defined as "development that satisfies the current needs without impairing the ability to meet their needs." For several years since the Bruntrant Report, "Sustainable Development" became a dominant paradigm of the environmental protection movement, and the literature to consider it has increased dramatically.
The institutionalization of sustainable development will be continued in the Rio Process, which was launched at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, and the world's political leaders in the world are sustainable development. I vowed to support (Jordan and Voisey 1998). At the center of that was the announcement of the "Rio Declaration" consisting of 27 principles, which will be the guideline of the future "sustainable development", and the "Agenda 21", which clearly indicates a plan to practice these principles. there were. Agenda 21 emphasizes the need to emphasize the problem of development gaps in the north and south, defend economic growth and free trade, and to link social and economic development and environmental protection (United Nations 1992). year). The subsequent summit was held in 1997, 2002 and 2012.
Although global initiatives such as the Rio Declaration and the Brundtland Report have been important in bringing “sustainability” into the mainstream of policy discourse, they have been criticized for their compromise approach to consensus building. Tulloch argues that these documents are responsible for transforming what was a “fringe counter-hegemonic radical movement” into a platform for legitimizing and obfuscating globalized neoliberal policies (Tulloch 2013). Indeed, the approach taken by the UN follows the assumptions that poverty causes environmental degradation, that reducing poverty can reduce environmental degradation, and that reducing poverty requires economic growth in developing countries, which in turn requires freer markets (Castro 2004). This logic is at best simplistic (Lélé 1991) and at worst smuggles an essentially ideological agenda under the guise of a benevolent necessity (Tulloch 2013). In fact, in his classification of environmental discourses, Dryzek describes sustainability as “reformist” and in opposition to “radical” discourses that advocate systemic change, such as marginal discourses (Dryzek 2005, pp13-16).
Criticism of the mostly “business as usual” approach of “sustainable development” pushed into the mainstream by institutions such as the United Nations has led to heterogeneous counter-discourses. A common criticism is the “vague enough” (Daly 1996) definition promoted by the international mainstream, vague enough to allow consensus building but without much substance. By the mid-1990s, the concepts of “sustainable development” and “sustainability” had become fashionable (Gatto 1995) and could be found in academic literature and policy agendas around the world.
Despite the relatively small amount of literature that conceptually explores "sustainability" or "sustainable development", one concept of "three pillars" is widely supported: environmental, economic and social. This is generally realised as balancing trade-offs between seemingly equally desirable goals within these three categories, but its use varies widely. However, one problem with the concept is the lack of theoretical development. There appears to be no original source from which the concept originates, and it appears in the literature and is generally taken at face value. In 2001, this approach was introduced as a “common view” on sustainable development (Giddings et al. 2001). The three pillars are common throughout the literature, but not universal. Some studies have considered further pillars, such as the institutional pillar (Spangenberg et al. 2002; Turcu 2012), the cultural pillar (Soini and Birkeland 2014), or the technological pillar (Hill and Bowen 1997). Other frameworks avoid sustainability categorization altogether. For example, Milbrath presents a vision of a “sustainable society” based on a defined set of values (Milbrath 1989), the “Natural Step” framework is based on four guiding criteria (Upham 2000), and Giddings et al.’s conceptualization includes the principle of equity (Giddings et al. 2001). More recently, the SDGs developed by the United Nations have been adapted to a smaller set of categorizations. In the following, we attempt to clarify the origins of the three pillars by analyzing the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) documents that first widely cited the concept of “sustainable development” (Pezzey 1992; Sneddon 2000) and the 1987 UN report that is widely credited with bringing sustainable development into the mainstream. We then turn to academic literature from the 1980s and 1990s that conceptualized sustainability before it was described as a “common view” in 2001.
The term "sustainable development" first appeared in published literature in 1980, when IUCN, in collaboration with UNEP and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), published the World Conservation Strategy, subtitled "Living Resources Conservation for Sustainable Development" (IUCN, UNEP, WWF 1980). This early concept of sustainable development was driven by the need to consider resource limitations and ecosystem carrying capacity, and to consider conservation, in economic development with social and economic objectives. Sustainable development is succinctly defined as "taking into account not only economic factors, but also social and ecological factors" (ibid. pI). It should be emphasized that these three aspects are not framed or judged on the basis of them. The implication is that current development policies are primarily focused on economic goals, and that it is essential to integrate conservation objectives into policies. There is no "trade-off" or discussion of the relative importance of the three objectives. In 1986, the IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) Conference on Conservation and Development in Ottawa was convened to assess the implementation of the World Conservation Strategy. The conference concluded that: "The new paradigm of sustainable development seeks to address five broad requirements: integrating conservation and development, meeting basic human needs, achieving equity and social justice, providing for social self-determination and cultural diversity, and maintaining ecosystem integrity" (Jacobs et al.). These requirements are well aligned with the social and environmental dimensions, but there is nothing to suggest a precursor to anything close to the economic pillar.
This seems to be consistently spoken through the entire IUCN activity. The successor to the World Conservation Strategy, the "Caring for the Earth", is called "IUCN" (IUCN. " , UNEP, WWF 1991). This strategy is based on the "Sustainable Society" in the principles of "mutual and mutually supported", and among which, the consciousness, the preservation of the vitality and diversity of the earth, and sustainable. Includes global cooperation to achieve sex (the same book PP8-12). In addition, the indicator of sustainability is indicated only on the two themes, "quality of life" and "sustainability of ecosystem" (the same book P198). In 1996, it was pointed out that the "emphasis on people" emerged as a new problem, and it was also necessary to expand the use of "legal and economic means for conservation" (IUCN 1997, PP43-45). ) At the same time, the models of sustainability that IUCN has been considering include "eggs of sustainability" and "barometer of sustainability", all of which are the essence of sustainability, the ecosystem welby swing and humans. I was thinking about two goals to improve Welbying (IUCN 1996).
In the early 2000s, IUCN used three pillars, except for the short-term consideration presented by the intersecting circle as the "Traditional Model of Sustainable Development" (IUCN 2004, PP9-11). We almost avoid, and instead, we prefer a sustainable model that focuses on the goal of improving the ecosystem and human benefits. In general, the debate on the economy focuses on the negative effects of the current practices on the earth's ecosystem and the need for an "environmentally friendly" economy.
Clarification of the social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainable development can be seen in Agenda 21 (1992), and the Bruntrant Report (1987) also culturally, political / systems. Although there are aspects, it is definitely an implicit understanding. In fact, Agenda 21 mentions sustainable development "economy, society, and environmental aspects" (8. 4. 1), but no conceptual justification or framework is shown (UN 1992). This seems to be consistently spoken through the entire IUCN activity. The successor to the World Conservation Strategy, "Caring for the Earth", is called "IUCN" (IUCN. , UNEP, WWF 1991). This strategy is based on the "Sustainable Society" in the principles of "mutual and mutually supported", and among which, the consciousness, the preservation of the vitality and diversity of the earth, and sustainable. Includes global cooperation to achieve sex (the same book PP8-12). In addition, the indicator of sustainability is indicated only on the two themes, "quality of life" and "sustainability of ecosystem" (the same book P198). In 1996, it was pointed out that the "emphasis on people" emerged as a new problem, and it was also necessary to expand the use of "legal and economic means for conservation" (IUCN 1997, PP43-45). ) At the same time, the models of sustainability that IUCN has been considering include "eggs of sustainability" and "barometer of sustainability", all of which are the essence of sustainability, the ecosystem welby swing and humans. I was thinking about two goals to improve Welbying (IUCN 1996).
In the early 2000s, IUCN used three pillars, except for the short-term consideration presented by the intersecting circle as the "Traditional Model of Sustainable Development" (IUCN 2004, PP9-11). We almost avoid, and instead, we prefer a sustainable model that focuses on the goal of improving the ecosystem and human benefits. In general, the debate on the economy focuses on the negative effects of the current practices on the earth's ecosystem and the need for an "environmentally friendly" economy.
Clarification of the social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainable development can be seen in Agenda 21 (1992), and the Brun Rander Report (1987) also culturally, political / systems. Although there are aspects, it is definitely an implicit understanding. In fact, Agenda 21 mentions sustainable development "economy, society, and environmental aspects" (8. 4. 1), but no conceptual justification or framework is shown (UN 1992). This seems to be consistently spoken through the entire IUCN activity. The successor to the World Conservation Strategy, the "Caring for the Earth", is called "IUCN" (IUCN. " , UNEP, WWF 1991). This strategy is based on the "Sustainable Society" in the principles of "mutual and mutually supported", and among which, the consciousness, the preservation of the vitality and diversity of the earth, and sustainable. Includes global cooperation to achieve sex (the same book PP8-12). In addition, the indicator of sustainability is indicated only on the two themes, "quality of life" and "sustainability of ecosystem" (the same book P198). In 1996, it was pointed out that "priority to people" emerged as a new problem, and it was also necessary to expand the use of "legal and economic means for conservation" (IUCN 1997, PP43-45). ) At the same time, the models of sustainability that IUCN has been considering include "eggs of sustainability" and "barometer of sustainability", all of which are the essence of sustainability, the ecosystem welby swing and humans. I was thinking about two goals to improve Welbying (IUCN 1996).
In the early 2000s, IUCN used three pillars, except for the short-term consideration presented by the intersecting circle as the "Traditional Model of Sustainable Development" (IUCN 2004, PP9-11). We almost avoid, and instead, we prefer a sustainable model that focuses on the goal of improving the ecosystem and human benefits. The debate on the economy generally focuses on the needs of the current practices of the current practices on the global ecosystem and the need for an "environmentally friendly" economy.
Clarification of the social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainable development can be seen in Agenda 21 (1992), and the Bruntrant Report (1987) also culturally, political / systems. Although there are aspects, it is definitely an implicit understanding. In fact, Agenda 21 mentions sustainable development "economy, society, and environmental aspects" (8. 4. 1), but no conceptual justification or framework is shown (UN 1992).
After the 1992 Rio Summit, the United Nations established a sustainable development committee (CSD) for guidance and progress in the implementation of the Rio Declaration with Agenda 21. In 1995, a workshop was held to participate in policy proprietors, international organizations, and scientists to review the indicators of "three major aspects of sustainability" (environment, society, economy). (UN 1995, P3). The conclusion is that CSD should work on the core indicator set that equally emphasizes the "sustainable development of economic, social, environmental, and institutional aspects", and includes additional institutional aspects. Was unraveled (the same book P5). The institutional aspect is argued that such a comprehensive was done because it is essential to deal with the problem of sustainable development practices (Spangerg et al.).
The following year, CSD announced a test bed selection consisting of 130 indicators with the goal of getting an "excellent indicator set" by 2000. These indicators are classified into four aspects presented in the 1995 workshop (UN 1996). Nevertheless, CSD does not use these four aspects universally. The report on the progress of Rio in 1997 consists of three sustainable developments, "the components that reinforce each other," based on "economic growth, social development, and environmental sustainability". (UN 1997, PP4-5) aims to "achieve sustainable economic development, social fairness, and environmental sustainability" (UN 1997, PP4-5). Not discussed. The CSD's 6th Assembly Report (UN 1998, P3) emphasizes the existence of "three elements-economic and social development and environmental protection".
In 2001, CSD announced the second edition of an indicator framework that maintained the category of sustainable development economic, social, institutional, and environmental "dimensions" (UN 2001a). The goal is to promote social and institutional development, maintain the integrity of ecosystem, and secure economic prosperity. However, in the third edition, the four aspects were no longer explicitly explained to emphasize the "multidimensional properties" of sustainable development (UN 2007). After the 1992 Rio Summit, the United Nations established a sustainable development committee (CSD) for guidance and progress in the implementation of the Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. In 1995, a workshop was held to participate in policy proprietors, international organizations, and scientists to review the indicators of "three major aspects of sustainability" (environment, society, economy). (UN 1995, P3). The conclusion is that CSD should work on the core indicator set that equally emphasizes the "sustainable development of economic, social, environmental, and institutional aspects", and includes additional institutional aspects. Was unraveled (the same book P5). The institutional aspect is argued that such a comprehensive was done because it is essential to deal with the problem of sustainable development practices (Spangerg et al.).
The following year, CSD announced a test bed selection consisting of 130 indicators with the goal of getting an "excellent indicator set" by 2000. These indicators are classified into four aspects presented in the 1995 workshop (UN 1996). Nevertheless, CSD does not use these four aspects universally. The report on the progress of Rio in 1997 consists of three sustainable developments, "the components that reinforce each other," based on "economic growth, social development, and environmental sustainability". (UN 1997, PP4-5) aims to "achieve sustainable economic development, social fairness, and environmental sustainability" (UN 1997, PP4-5). Not discussed. The CSD's 6th Assembly Report (UN 1998, P3) emphasizes the existence of "three elements-economic and social development and environmental protection".
In 2001, CSD announced the second edition of an indicator framework that maintained the category of sustainable development economic, social, institutional, and environmental "dimensions" (UN 2001a). The goal is to promote social and institutional development, maintain the integrity of ecosystem, and secure economic prosperity. However, in the third edition, the four aspects were no longer explicitly explained to emphasize the "multidimensional properties" of sustainable development (UN 2007). After the 1992 Rio Summit, the United Nations established a sustainable development committee (CSD) for guidance and progress in the implementation of the Rio Declaration with Agenda 21. In 1995, a workshop was held to participate in policy proprietors, international organizations, and scientists to review the indicators of "three major aspects of sustainability" (environment, society, economy). (UN 1995, P3). The conclusion is that CSD should work on the core indicator set that equally emphasizes the "sustainable development of economic, social, environmental, and institutional aspects", and includes additional institutional aspects. Was unraveled (the same book P5). The institutional aspect is argued that such a comprehensive was done because it is essential to deal with the problem of sustainable development practices (Spangerg et al.).
The following year, CSD announced a test bed selection consisting of 130 indicators with the goal of getting an "excellent indicator set" by 2000. These indicators are classified into four aspects presented in the 1995 workshop (UN 1996). Nevertheless, CSD does not use these four aspects universally. The report on the progress of Rio in 1997 consists of three sustainable developments, "the components that reinforce each other," based on "economic growth, social development, and environmental sustainability". (UN 1997, PP4-5) aims to "achieve sustainable economic development, social fairness, and environmental sustainability" (UN 1997, PP4-5). Not discussed. The CSD's 6th Assembly Report (UN 1998, P3) emphasizes the existence of "three elements-economic and social development and environmental protection".
In 2001, CSD announced the second edition of an index framework that maintained the category of sustainable development economic, social, institutional, and environmental "dimensions" (UN 2001a). The goal is to promote social and institutional development, maintain the integrity of ecosystem, and secure economic prosperity. However, in the third edition, the four aspects were no longer explicitly explained to emphasize the "multidimensional properties" of sustainable development (UN 2007).
In parallel with CSD activities, the United Nations has announced eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) that the international community should achieve by 2015 (UN 2001b). Interestingly, the goal 7 was to "ensure the sustainability of the environment," but the concept of social and economic sustainability has not been clearly considered. According to the 2002 Earth Summit report, "promote integration of three elements of sustainable development-economic development, social development, and environmental protection as mutual dependent and mutual reinforcements" ( Un 2002, p8) The necessity is specified. The necessity of "integration" and "balanced overall approach" of these pillars emphasize (the same book P128).
The story of sustainable development, the integration of economic, social, and environmental aspects, continues through the next 10 years of the World Summit report (UN 2012B). After the 2012 Summit, the "Open Working Group", which formulates SDGs for the United Nations "Post 2015 Process", has been established, "Balance between all three aspects of sustainable development and its relevance. Incorporating it in the outline was part of the outline (P47). In fact, when the General Assembly adopted the final version of SDGs in 2015, how to "be integrated, inseparable and inseparable, the three dimensions are balanced in the economy, society, and the environment." Is stated (Un 2015, P1). However, these three dimensions are not specified in any of the 17 goals.
IUCN introduced the word "sustainable development" in 1980, but was rarely conceptual in academic literature until the Bruntrant report was published in 1987. At this time, Coldwell, who considered the history of "ecologically sustainable development" as a "disturbing bond" of ecological value and economic value, especially. With no clear pillars exist, the need for overall thoughts was emphasized, as well as the factors of "social, legal, religious, and population statistical" (Caldwell 1984). Oriodan also advocates that there are two types of sustainable use: ecological and social cultural (later "social and economic things") "(O'Riordan 1985,." p1443). In parallel with CSD activities, the United Nations has announced eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) that the international community should achieve by 2015 (UN 2001b). Interestingly, the goal 7 was to "ensure the sustainability of the environment," but the concept of social and economic sustainability has not been clearly considered. According to the 2002 Earth Summit report, "promote integration of three elements of sustainable development-economic development, social development, and environmental protection as mutual dependent and mutual reinforcements" ( Un 2002, p8) The necessity is specified. The necessity of "integration" and "balanced overall approach" of these pillars emphasize (the same book P128).
The story of sustainable development, the integration of economic, social, and environmental aspects, continues through the next 10 years of the World Summit report (UN 2012B). After the 2012 Summit, the "Open Working Group", which formulates SDGs for the United Nations "Post 2015 Process", has been established, "Balance between all three aspects of sustainable development and its relevance. Incorporating it in the outline was part of the outline (P47). In fact, when the General Assembly adopted the final version of SDGs in 2015, how to "be integrated, inseparable and inseparable, the three dimensions are balanced in the economy, society, and the environment." Is stated (Un 2015, P1). However, these three dimensions are not specified in any of the 17 goals.
IUCN introduced the word "sustainable development" in 1980, but was rarely conceptual in academic literature until the Bruntrant report was published in 1987. At this time, Coldwell, who considered the history of "ecologically sustainable development" as a "disturbing bond" of ecological value and economic value, especially. With no clear pillars exist, the need for overall thoughts was emphasized, as well as the factors of "social, legal, religious, and population statistical" (Caldwell 1984). Oriodan also advocates that there are two types of sustainable use: ecological and social cultural (later "social economic things") "(O'Riordan 1985,." p1443). In parallel with CSD activities, the United Nations has announced eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) that the international community should achieve by 2015 (UN 2001b). Interestingly, the goal 7 was to "ensure the sustainability of the environment," but the concept of social and economic sustainability has not been clearly considered. According to the 2002 Earth Summit report, "promote integration of three elements of sustainable development-economic development, social development, and environmental protection as mutual dependent and mutual reinforcements" ( Un 2002, p8) The necessity is specified. The need for "integration" and "balanced overall approach" of these pillars emphasizes (the same book P128).
The story of sustainable development, the integration of economic, social, and environmental aspects, continues through the next 10 years of the World Summit report (UN 2012B). After the 2012 Summit, the "Open Working Group", which formulates SDGs for the United Nations "Post 2015 Process", has been established, "Balance between all three aspects of sustainable development and its relevance. Incorporating it in the outline was part of the outline (P47). In fact, when the General Assembly adopted the final version of SDGs in 2015, how to "be integrated, inseparable and inseparable, the three dimensions are balanced in the economy, society, and the environment." Is stated (Un 2015, P1). However, these three dimensions are not specified in any of the 17 goals.
IUCN introduced the word "sustainable development" in 1980, but was rarely conceptual in academic literature until the Bruntrant report was published in 1987. At this time, Coldwell, who considered the history of "ecologically sustainable development" as a "disturbing bond" of ecological value and economic value, especially. With no clear pillars exist, the need for overall thoughts was emphasized, as well as the factors of "social, legal, religious, and population statistical" (Caldwell 1984). Oriodan also advocates that there are two types of sustainable use: ecological and social cultural (later "social and economic things") "(O'Riordan 1985,." p1443).
In 1987, Brown et al. (Brown et al.) The perspective of Brown and others revealed three "perspectives or context" (Brown et al.) Social perspective. The continuous fulfillment of human basic needs and the "ecological" perspective are "continuous productivity and functions of ecosystem", "protection of genetic resources and conservation of biodiversity", and "conservation of biodiversity". The unbeatable "economical" and "economic" definitions solve the "restrictions that sustainable society must impose economic growth" (PP716-717). Brown et al., These are different perspectives of the same concept emerged from the literature, closer to observation than those approaching the conceptual framework.
In the same year, Barbier clarified the development process as a "interaction between three systems, a biological (and other resources) systems, economic systems, and a social system" and presented the early stage of the diagram of intersection (Barbier). 1987). Each system is given a goal: each system has "genetic diversity, recovery, biological productivity", "satisfaction of basic needs (reduction of poverty), and fairness. Goals such as increasing useful goods and services, "cultural diversity, sustainability of the system, social justice, participation" are set. The purpose of sustainable development is to maximize the goals that straddle all these systems through a trad e-off adaptation process (P104). This book seems to be the first clear concept that formulates pillars and discusses the unique "trad e-off". In fact, Barbier first presented this concept was the result of the meeting held in IIED in 1986, where he is an analytical approach to understand sustainable development as an economist. It is claimed to have proposed (Holmberg 1992, P23). Barbier also acknowledged that he was the founder of "Ben" in his later books (Barbier and Burgess 2017), and said at some point that he was "infamous" (Barbier 2011).
Cocklin has a concept of "sustainability" from a series of goals related to the subsystem of society, economy, and environment, based on Barbier. The relationship between sustainability and other management goals such as resilience and economic efficiency is the ultimate ideologic, and as a result, trading off both internally and externally. It will occur (Cocklin 1989).
Dixon and Fallon distinguish between sustainability between purely "biological / physics" definitions and "social and economic" definitions, centered on "social / economic wellbying". It suggests the structural changes necessary for current economic activities (Dixon and Fallon 1989). Lélé distinguishes the two conflicts of sustainable development, which considers sustainable developments as inconsistent and ecological and healthy development with implicit social goals (Lélé 1991). Lélé, who needs to clarify the concept of sustainable development, claims the need to deny attempts to focus on economic growth and recognize the inappropriation of neoclassical economics.
Hancock (HANCOCK 1993) is approaching three pillars in efforts to consider the problem of "health" with a sustainable local community (Hancock 1993). Hancock claims to focus from economic development to the "system of economic activity that enhances human development, while being environmentally and socially sustainable" (P43). Health, that is, a "Ben" model that is a junction of three systems that meet several requirements. In other words, it is an "symbiotic" "community", "executable" and "environment" for the community, "easy to live", and "enriched", "fair" and "sustainable" for the environment. On the surface, this model is very similar to the modern three pillars of models, but presented the economy as "subordinate" to the local community and the environment, not as having to trade off. I am.
In Munashinha, "Sustainable Development" includes "three major perspectives of economic, social, and ecology", and progress by integrating the "comparable" goals in which they compete. He claims to be brought. In addition, "sustainability" and "sustainable development" are economic approaches that maximize income while maintaining capital stock, ecology approach that aims to preserve biological and physical systems. There are three different approaches: fairness and social cultural approaches (Munasinghe 1993). Dixon and Fallon have a purely "biological / physician" definition for sustainability, and a "social and economic definition" centered on "social / economic welbying". Dixon and Fallon 1989, which distinguishes the current economic activity. Lélé distinguishes the two conflicts of sustainable development, which considers sustainable developments as inconsistent and ecological and healthy development with implicit social goals (Lélé 1991). Lélé, who needs to clarify the concept of sustainable development, claims the need to deny attempts to focus on economic growth and recognize the inappropriation of neoclassical economics.
Hancock (HANCOCK 1993) is approaching three pillars in efforts to consider the problem of "health" with a sustainable local community (Hancock 1993). Hancock claims to focus from economic development to the "system of economic activity that enhances human development, while being environmentally and socially sustainable" (P43). Health, that is, a "Ben" model that is a junction of three systems that meet several requirements. In other words, it is an "symbiotic" "community", "executable" and "environment" for the community, "easy to live", and "enriched", "fair" and "sustainable" for the environment. On the surface, this model is very similar to the modern three pillars of models, but presented the economy as "subordinate" to the local community and the environment, not as having to trade off. I am.
In Munashinha, "Sustainable Development" includes "three major perspectives of economic, social, and ecology", and progress by integrating the "comparable" goals in which they compete. He claims to be brought. In addition, "sustainability" and "sustainable development" are economic approaches that maximize income while maintaining capital stock, ecology approach that aims to preserve biological and physical systems. There are three different approaches: fairness and social cultural approaches (Munasinghe 1993). Dixon and Fallon distinguish between sustainability between purely "biological / physics" definitions and "social and economic" definitions, centered on "social / economic wellbying". It suggests the structural changes necessary for current economic activities (Dixon and Fallon 1989). Lélé distinguishes the two conflicts of sustainable development, which considers sustainable developments as inconsistent and ecological and healthy development with implicit social goals (Lélé 1991). Lélé, who needs to clarify the concept of sustainable development, claims the need to deny attempts to focus on economic growth and recognize the inappropriation of neoclassical economics.
Hancock (HANCOCK 1993) is approaching three pillars in efforts to consider the problem of "health" with a sustainable local community (Hancock 1993). Hancock claims to focus from economic development to the "system of economic activity that enhances human development, while being environmentally and socially sustainable" (P43). Health, that is, a "Ben" model that is a junction of three systems that meet several requirements. In other words, it is an "symbiotic" "community", "executable" and "environment" for the community, "easy to live", and "enriched", "fair" and "sustainable" for the environment. On the surface, this model is very similar to the modern three pillars of models, but presented the economy as "subordinate" to the local community and the environment, not as having to trade off. I am.
In Munashinha, "Sustainable Development" includes "three major perspectives of economic, social, and ecology", and progress by integrating the "comparable" goals in which they compete. He claims to be brought. In addition, "sustainability" and "sustainable development" are economic approaches that maximize income while maintaining capital stock, ecology approach that aims to preserve biological and physical systems. There are three different approaches: fairness and social cultural approaches (Munasinghe 1993).
Yunlong and SMIT have developed three general definitions, such as "sustainable agriculture". They emphasize the necessity of integration, but not in detail how to realize it (Yunlong and Smit 1994). Altieri has presented a "Ben figure" version in a sustainable agricultural discussion. Here, specific economic, social, and environmental goals are detailed, and the junction represents "Agr o-Eecology" (Altieri 1995, P376). Thompson (2017) suggests that Ultieri refers to Douglass (1984) when clarifying these three regions, but this figure is the first edition of Ultieli's book (Altieri 1987). It should be noted that there is no. Douglas was derived from a conference on the theme of "sustainability of agriculture in changing world order" held in 1982, and in line with "economic, biological, cultural" concepts. Separate viewpoints: Resources, technology, economy, "Stewardship: Biology, ecology, population", "Community: justice, participation, development". Despite the focus on agriculture, these classifications have many similarities and many similarities in the literature on a widespread sustainability. However, like Brown et al., These are separate perspectives observed in the literature, rather than having a theoretical basis. Altoi's research is positioned in the "Stewardship" camp here, but his conclusions emphasize the connection between biology and agriculture.
Basiago states the sustainability as "methodology designed to maximize the vitality of social and environmental systems" (Basiago 1995, P119). As a way to define sustainability, as well as biological, sociology, planned, and ethical methods, Basiago is "economic methods in economic methods. A larg e-scale rebuilding is implemented. " Yunlong and SMIT have developed three general definitions, such as "Sustainable Agriculture". They emphasize the necessity of integration, but not in detail how to realize it (Yunlong and Smit 1994). Altieri has presented a "Ben figure" version in a sustainable agricultural discussion. Here, specific economic, social, and environmental goals are detailed, and the junction represents "Agr o-Eecology" (Altieri 1995, P376). Thompson (2017) suggests that Ultieri refers to Douglass (1984) when clarifying these three regions, but this figure is the first edition of Ultieli's book (Altieri 1987). It should be noted that there is no. Douglas was derived from a conference on the theme of "sustainability of agriculture in changing world order" held in 1982, and in line with "economic, biological, cultural" concepts. Separate viewpoints: Resources, technology, economy, "Stewardship: Biology, ecology, population", "Community: justice, participation, development". Despite the focus on agriculture, these classifications have many similarities and many similarities in the literature on a widespread sustainability. However, like Brown et al., These are separate perspectives observed in the literature, rather than having a theoretical basis. Altoi's research is positioned in the "Stewardship" camp here, but his conclusions emphasize the connection between biology and agriculture.
Basiago states the sustainability as "methodology designed to maximize the vitality of social and environmental systems" (Basiago 1995, P119). As a way to define sustainability, as well as biological, sociology, planned, and ethical methods, Basiago is "economic methods in economic methods. A larg e-scale rebuilding is implemented. " Yunlong and SMIT have developed three general definitions, such as "sustainable agriculture". They emphasize the necessity of integration, but not in detail how to realize it (Yunlong and Smit 1994). Altieri has presented a "Ben figure" version in a sustainable agricultural discussion. Here, specific economic, social, and environmental goals are detailed, and the junction represents "Agr o-Eecology" (Altieri 1995, P376). Thompson (2017) suggests that Ultieri refers to Douglass (1984) when clarifying these three regions, but this figure is the first edition of Ultieli's book (Altieri 1987). It should be noted that there is no. Douglas was derived from a conference on the theme of "sustainability of agriculture in changing world order" held in 1982, and in line with "economic, biological, cultural" concepts. Separate viewpoints: Resources, technology, economy, "Stewardship: Biology, ecology, population", "Community: justice, participation, development". Despite the focus on agriculture, these classifications have many similarities and many similarities in the literature on a widespread sustainability. However, like Brown et al., These are separate perspectives observed in the literature, rather than having a theoretical basis. Altoi's research is positioned in the "Stewardship" camp here, but his conclusions emphasize the connection between biology and agriculture.
Basiago states the sustainability as "methodology designed to maximize the vitality of social and environmental systems" (Basiago 1995, P119). As a method of defining sustainability, as well as biological, social, planned, and ethical methods, Bassiago is "economic methods in economic methods. A larg e-scale rebuilding is implemented. "
Goodland and Daly (Goodland 1995; Goodland and Daly 1996) is trying to distinguish the concept of "environmental sustainability" from social and economic sustainability. Goodland and Daily (GOODLAND AND DALY 1996) are trying to distinguish the concept of "sustainability of the environment" from social and economic sustainability. It is critical that the term "sustainability" is becoming "the landfill of everyone's environmental and social desired list" (GOODLAND and DALY 1996, P1002). In contrast to the overall integrated approach, they are "the most clear" of the "type" of sustainability, and "Ideal for analyzing each type of sustainability. The learning field is different. "(The same book).
In contrast, Milne is "balanced" while saying that "sustainability" is generally accepted as integrating social, economic and ecological value. " He distinguishes the author who seeks and the author who prioritizes biological aspects, and has warned that there is no interpretation (Milne 1996). Milne is leaned to the latter, concluding that "sustainability needs to subordinate traditional economic standards on social and ecological values." The World Resources Research Institute, which is trying to create environmental indicators for sustainable development, "" the minimum amount of economic, social and environmental factors needs to interact with the sustainability. " He argues that the latter has not paid enough precautions (PP2-3). It also argues that sustainable development is an attempt to "adjust or establish equilibrium" (P31) between these factors (Hammond et al 1995). GOODLAND and DALY (GOODLAND 1995; GOODLAND and DALY 1996) is trying to distinguish the concept of "sustainability of the environment" from social and economic sustainability. Goodland and Daily (GOODLAND AND DALY 1996) are trying to distinguish the concept of "sustainability of the environment" from social and economic sustainability. It is critical that the term "sustainability" is becoming "the landfill of everyone's environmental and social desired list" (GOODLAND and DALY 1996, P1002). In contrast to the overall integrated approach, they are "the most clear" of the "type" of sustainability, and "Ideal for analyzing each type of sustainability. The learning field is different. "(The same book).
In contrast, Milne is "balanced" while saying that "sustainability" is generally accepted as integrating social, economic and ecological value. " He distinguishes the author, who seeks, and the author who prioritizes biological aspects, and is warrior to having no interpretation (Milne 1996). Milne is leaned to the latter, concluding that "sustainability needs to subordinate traditional economic standards on social and ecological values." The World Resources Research Institute, which is trying to create environmental indicators for sustainable development, "" the minimum amount of economic, social and environmental factors needs to interact with the sustainability. " He argues that the latter has not paid enough precautions (PP2-3). It also argues that sustainable development is an attempt to "adjust or establish equilibrium" (P31) between these factors (Hammond et al 1995). Goodland and Daly (Goodland 1995; Goodland and Daly 1996) is trying to distinguish the concept of "environmental sustainability" from social and economic sustainability. Goodland and Daily (GOODLAND AND DALY 1996) are trying to distinguish the concept of "sustainability of the environment" from social and economic sustainability. It is critical that the term "sustainability" is becoming "the landfill of everyone's environmental and social desired list" (GOODLAND and DALY 1996, P1002). In contrast to the overall integrated approach, they are "the most clear" of the "type" of sustainability, and "Ideal for analyzing each type of sustainability. The learning field is different. "(The same book).
In contrast, Milne is "balanced" while saying that "sustainability" is generally accepted as integrating social, economic and ecological value. " He distinguishes the author who seeks and the author who prioritizes biological aspects, and has warned that there is no interpretation (Milne 1996). Milne is leaned to the latter, concluding that "sustainability needs to subordinate traditional economic standards on social and ecological values." The World Resources Research Institute, which is trying to create environmental indicators for sustainable development, "" the minimum amount of economic, social and environmental factors needs to interact with the sustainability. " He argues that the latter has not paid enough precautions (PP2-3). It also argues that sustainable development is an attempt to "adjust or establish equilibrium" (P31) between these factors (Hammond et al 1995).
Macnaghten and Jacobs (1997) argue that the "general model" of sustainable development emerging from the literature emphasizes the trade-off between economic growth, the deterioration of environmental conditions, and the decline of quality of life (Macnaghten and Jacobs 1997). The authors argue for a model in which "economic welfare" constitutes the quality of life, which is ultimately constrained by "environmental limits". Such a nested model, shown on the right side of Figure 1, is considered by many authors to be preferable to the "Venn diagram" of trade-offs, since it emphasizes that the three systems represented by the columns cannot be separated, but are in fact subsystems of each other (Mebratu 1998; Giddings et al.). There are striking similarities between this nested model and a much earlier model by René Passé, a contemporary of Ignacy Sachs (Passé 1979). Passé's systems approach emphasizes that the economic sphere is located within the sphere of human activity, and that social welfare cannot be reduced to the mere accumulation of goods and services. It is unclear whether this model was widespread in the sustainability literature. Passet's work would have been familiar to Sachs, but it was only much later that the model was noticed in English primary sources.
Custance and Hillier (1998) detail their work in developing a set of sustainable development indicators for the UK government (Custance and Hillier 1998). Here again, sustainable development is understood as "a balance between three broad goals: sustained economic growth, protection of the environment... and social progress." Building on a set of indicators developed in 1996 that focused primarily on the interactions between the economy and the environment, they acknowledge the importance of including the social dimension, but question whose role it is to define sustainable development. This work reflects a broader body of literature that appears to have emerged around this time that considers “indicators” of sustainable development using three pillars ( Bradley Guy and Kibert 1998 ; Fricker 1998 ; Stirling 1999 ; Azapagic and Perdan 2000 ; Valentin and Spangenberg 2000 ).
The similarities with these three pillars can be seen in the Campbell's "triangular triangle". Campbell created models that are recognized as three major goals and priority items in urban planning: social justice, economic growth, and environmental protection (Campbell 1996). Campbell claims that these goals have three fundamental conflicts, but there are "sustainable developments" in the outstanding center of the three goals, and these goals are balanced. 。 Campbell is aware of the difficulty of finding this balance, emphasizes the need to go into a shared language, and promote the cooperation of development planners and environmental planners. Campbell's debate clearly emphasizes the concept of conflicts and competition between these goals, emphasizing the need for an interdisciplinary approach to elephant them for a more comprehensive and strict conceptual framework. The similarities with these three pillars can be seen in the Campbell's "triangular triangle". Campbell created models that are recognized as three major goals and priority items in urban planning: social justice, economic growth, and environmental protection (Campbell 1996). Campbell claims that these goals have three fundamental conflicts, but there are "sustainable developments" in the outstanding center of the three goals, and these goals are balanced. 。 Campbell is aware of the difficulty of finding this balance, emphasizes the need to go into a shared language, and promote the cooperation of development planners and environmental planners. Campbell's debate clearly emphasizes the concept of conflicts and competition between these goals, emphasizing the need for an interdisciplinary approach to elephant them for a more comprehensive and strict conceptual framework. The similarities with these three pillars can be seen in the Campbell's "triangular triangle". Campbell created models that are recognized as three major goals and priority items in urban planning: social justice, economic growth, and environmental protection (Campbell 1996). Campbell claims that these goals have three fundamental conflicts, but there are "sustainable developments" in the outstanding center of the three goals, and these goals are balanced. 。 Campbell is aware of the difficulty of finding this balance, emphasizes the need to go into a shared language, and promote the cooperation of development planners and environmental planners. Campbell's debate clearly emphasizes the concept of conflicts and competition between these goals, emphasizing the need for an interdisciplinary approach to elephant them for a more comprehensive and strict conceptual framework.
Finally, what should be noted is the treatment of sustainability in business literature. Since the late 1990s, Elkinton's "Triple Bottom Line" (TBL) accounting method has gained popularity along with his popular book "Cannibals with Forks" (Elkinton 1997). A strong similarity with the three pillars, the traditional financial "bottom line" of a company is complemented by the social and environmental performance bottom line called "people, the earth, profit", and the company intends. In the decision, we are encouraging to consider a longe r-term perspective. However, TBL's corporate use is skeptical in the academic world, and there is almost no evidence that it is used effectively among organizations claiming TBL. TBL's jargon has been argued that it is essentially empty, ambiguous, misleading (Norman and Macdonald 2004), paradoxically, to make the business as the ugly approach (Milne and Gray 2013). The roots of the "sustainability of a company" may be in the "corporate social responsibility" born in the 1950s, but it has been 1990 that large companies have published reports that emphasize environmental issues. After the age, specific health problems have been taken up, but the word sustainability was rarely used (Milne and Gray 2013). There have been many sustainable "sustainability" methods before TBL, but ELKINGTON's research seems to have used three pillars for the first time (Lamberton 2005). This literature group does not seem to be the origin of the three pillars, but the last notable is the treatment of sustainability in business literature. Since the late 1990s, Elkinton's "Triple Bottom Line" (TBL) accounting method has gained popularity along with his popular book "Cannibals with Forks" (Elkinton 1997). A strong similarity with the three pillars, the traditional financial "bottom line" of a company is complemented by the social and environmental performance bottom line called "people, the earth, profit", and the company intends. In the decision, we are encouraging to consider a longe r-term perspective. However, TBL's corporate use is skeptical in the academic world, and there is almost no evidence that it is used effectively among organizations claiming TBL. TBL's jargon has been argued that it is essentially empty, ambiguous, misleading (Norman and Macdonald 2004), paradoxically, to make the business as the ugly approach (Milne and Gray 2013). The roots of the "sustainability of a company" may be in the "corporate social responsibility" born in the 1950s, but it has been 1990 that large companies have published reports that emphasize environmental issues. After the age, specific health problems have been taken up, but the word sustainability was rarely used (Milne and Gray 2013). There have been many sustainable "sustainability" methods before TBL, but ELKINGTON's research seems to have used three pillars for the first time (Lamberton 2005). This literature group does not seem to be the origin of the three pillars, but the last thing to note is the treatment of sustainability in business literature. Since the late 1990s, Elkinton's "Triple Bottom Line" (TBL) accounting method has gained popularity along with his popular book "Cannibals with Forks" (Elkinton 1997). A strong similarity with the three pillars, the traditional financial "bottom line" of a company is complemented by the social and environmental performance bottom line called "people, the earth, profit", and the company intends. In the decision, we are encouraging to consider a longe r-term perspective. However, TBL's corporate use is skeptical in the academic world, and there is almost no evidence that it is used effectively among organizations claiming TBL. TBL's jargon has been argued that it is essentially empty, ambiguous, misleading (Norman and Macdonald 2004), paradoxically, to make the business as the ugly approach (Milne and Gray 2013). The roots of the "sustainability of a company" may be in the "corporate social responsibility" born in the 1950s, but it has been 1990 that large companies have published reports that emphasize environmental issues. After the age, specific health problems have been taken up, but the word sustainability was rarely used (Milne and Gray 2013). There have been many sustainable "sustainability" methods before TBL, but ELKINGTON's research seems to have used three pillars for the first time (Lamberton 2005). Although this literature group does not seem to be the origin of the three pillars
Motivated to explore the origins of the "three pillars" paradigm, I scanned much of the early literature but found no clear answers, which is puzzling. Barbier's (1987) work provides the origins of the widespread circle diagram and seems to offer a framework that encourages maximization of three system goals, with implicit trade-offs, but differs from its later use, especially in its treatment of economic systems. However, the "three pillars" formulation itself, at least implicitly, predates Barbier and appears in works that predate the term sustainability, such as the IUCN's 1980 "World Conservation Strategy," O'Riordan (1985), the contemporary Brown et al. (1987), and even Sachs and Passet's 1979 work on "eco-development."
Among the various works reviewed here, we can roughly distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the pillars: One is Barbier's approach of presenting the individual dimensions as distinct but interacting systems, as seen in Cocklin (1989), Hancock (1993), Basiago (1995), etc. Second, others follow Brown et al. by finding three distinct but interrelated perspectives or schools of thought, as seen in Lélé (1991), Munasinghe (1993), Goodland and Daly (1996), etc. Motivated to explore the origins of the "three-pillar" paradigm, I scanned much of the early literature, but it is puzzling that I did not find a clear answer. Barbier's (1987) work provides the origins of the widespread circle diagram and seems to offer a framework that encourages the maximization of three system goals, assuming implicit trade-offs, but it differs from its later use, especially in the treatment of economic systems. However, the formulation of the "three pillars" itself, at least implicitly, predates Barbier, having appeared in works that predate the term sustainability, such as the IUCN's 1980 World Conservation Strategy, O'Riordan (1985), the contemporary Brown et al. (1987), and even the discussion of "eco-development" in Sachs and Passet's 1979 work.
Among the various works reviewed here, we can roughly distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the pillars. One is Barbier's approach, which presents the individual dimensions as distinct but interacting systems, as seen, for example, in Cocklin (1989), Hancock (1993), and Basiago (1995). Second, some, such as Lélé (1991), Munasinghe (1993), and Goodland and Daly (1996), follow Brown et al. in finding three distinct but interrelated perspectives or schools of thought. Motivated by a desire to explore the origins of the "three-pillar" paradigm, I scanned much of the earlier literature but was troubled to find no clear answer. Barbier's (1987) work provides the origins of the widespread circle diagram and appears to offer a framework that encourages the maximization of three system objectives, subject to implicit trade-offs, but its later use, especially in the treatment of economic systems, has differed. However, the formulation of the "three pillars" itself, at least implicitly, predates Barbier, having appeared in works that predate the term sustainability, such as the IUCN's 1980 World Conservation Strategy, O'Riordan (1985), the contemporary Brown et al. (1987), and even the discussion of "eco-development" in Sachs and Passet's 1979 work.
Among the various works reviewed here, we can roughly distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the pillars. One is Barbier's approach, which presents the individual dimensions as distinct but interacting systems, as seen, for example, in Cocklin (1989), Hancock (1993), and Basiago (1995). Second, some, such as Lélé (1991), Munasinghe (1993), and Goodland and Daly (1996), follow Brown et al. in identifying three distinct but interrelated perspectives or schools of thought.
The systems approach was used earlier by Passet, who may have indirectly contributed to its use. This approach typically presents three different systems, each with its own "goals", and the interactions of these systems must be managed to achieve these goals and the emergent goal of sustainability or sustainable development. The clearest examples of this are from Barbier (1987) and Cocklin (1989), who emphasize the integration of systems and managing trade-offs between them. Hancock (1993) and Basiago (1995) also take a systems approach, but what they mean is that the individual systems reinforce and enhance each other. Campbell (1996) also emphasizes reconciliation. Here we will take the approach taken by the United Nations and IUCN, who generally avoid the word systems, but talk about these individual dimensions having specific goals. In a similar vein, Munasinghe (1993), Altieri (1995), Milne (1996), and Custance and Hillier (1998) all discuss the integration and balancing of goals, and Macnaghten and Jacobs (1997) use the term trade-offs. The language used here frequently invokes the need for "integration," "balance," and "harmony," but it is not always clear what this actually means. Whether this requires unpleasant "trade-offs" seems to depend on the degree of optimism that the work in question posits. This missing link between theory and application is problematized by Barbier et al. as follows:
An author who speaks three pillars as a different perspective of sustainability, replacing the interpretation of the system. These arguments are brown et al: Brown et al. (1987), Dixon and Fallon (1989), Lélé (1991), etc. There is also a discussion that has not been theoretized for the integration of these viewpoints: Douglass (1984), Yunlong and Smit (1994), and Discussions to maintain the distinction between academic and dialy (1996). "Social scientists are the most good at defining sustainability of society," (P1002). It is a later description of Elkington's "3P" and "3E" (environmental, economic, fairness) (caradonna 2014), which blends the border between systems and viewpoint distinctions, and these are clear conceptualization. It embodies a widespread value far away.
In addition to this distinction, the meaning of economic support is a central point where many of the early literature deviations. Critical of dominant global economic paradigm, regarding the pillars of the economy as a means of creating a systematic change, deviations from the story of growth, and subordinates the "economy" to social benefits and environmental soundness. What you think stands out. This is found in the consideration of establishing restrictions on the growth of Brown et al., Call for the economic economic economy, and Miln's "subordinate of traditional economic standards". Barbier and Altieri have denied economic growth as economic goals, and IUCN has also been alert to the economic system throughout the literature, and instead focuses on the balance between environmental goals and social goals. There is an author who speaks three pillars as a different perspective of sustainability, replacing the interpretation of the system. These arguments are brown et al: Brown et al. (1987), Dixon and Fallon (1989), Lélé (1991), etc. There is also a discussion that has not been theoretized for the integration of these viewpoints: Douglass (1984), Yunlong and Smit (1994), and Discussions to maintain the distinction between academic and dialy (1996). "Social scientists are the most good at defining sustainability of society," (P1002). It is a later description of Elkington's "3P" and "3E" (environmental, economic, fairness) (caradonna 2014), which blends the border between systems and viewpoint distinctions, and these are clear conceptualization. It embodies a widespread value far away.
In addition to this distinction, the meaning of economic support is a central point where many of the early literature deviations. Critical of dominant global economic paradigm, regarding the pillars of the economy as a means of creating a systematic change, deviations from the story of growth, and subordinates the "economy" to social benefits and environmental soundness. What you think stands out. This is found in the consideration of establishing restrictions on the growth of Brown et al., Call for the economic economic economy, and Miln's "subordinate of traditional economic standards". Barbier and Altieri have denied economic growth as economic goals, and IUCN has also been alert to the economic system throughout the literature, and instead focuses on the balance between environmental goals and social goals. An author who speaks three pillars as a different perspective of sustainability, replacing the interpretation of the system. These arguments are brown et al: Brown et al. (1987), Dixon and Fallon (1989), Lélé (1991), etc. There is also a discussion that has not been theoretized for the integration of these viewpoints: Douglass (1984), Yunlong and Smit (1994), and Discussions to maintain the distinction between academic and dialy (1996). "Social scientists are the most good at defining sustainability of society," (P1002). It is a later description of Elkington's "3P" and "3E" (environmental, economic, fairness) (caradonna 2014), which blends the border between systems and viewpoint distinctions, and these are clear conceptualization. It embodies a widespread value far away.

Acknowledgements

In addition to this distinction, the meaning of economic support is a central point where many of the early literature deviations. Critical of dominant global economic paradigm, regarding the pillars of the economy as a means of creating a systematic change, deviations from the story of growth, and subordinates the "economy" to social benefits and environmental soundness. What you think stands out. This is found in the consideration of establishing restrictions on the growth of Brown et al., Call for the economic economic economy, and Miln's "subordinate of traditional economic standards". Barbier and Altieri have denied economic growth as economic goals, and IUCN has also been alert to the economic system throughout the literature, and instead focuses on the balance between environmental goals and social goals.

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Last modified: 27.08.2024

Economic History Review, forthcoming. Cheffins, B.R. (). Dividends as a substitute for corporate law: the separation of ownership and control in the. (a)'The case for limited shareholder voting rights'UCLA Law Review ownership and control'Yale Law Journal, Cools,S. (). History for. Corporate Law' () 89 Georgetown Law Journal See also Separation of Ownership and Control' () Yale Law Journal 1, 6.

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accepted

Yale Law Journal The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights Separation of Ownership and

The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption

Introduction

I. corporate ownership and voting rights in early u.s. history

A. Physical Infrastructure

1. Turnpikes

2. Bridges

3. Canals

4. Railroads

B. Financial Infrastructure

1. Banks

2. Insurance

C. Manufacturing

II. ultra vires as consumer protection

III. the decline of voting restrictions

A. Governmental Provision of Infrastructure

B. Separation of Competition Law from Corporation Law

C. Evolution and Differentiation of Standard Corporation Statutes

D. Increased Competition

E. Ease of Evasion

F. The Interests of Small Versus Large Shareholders

G. Mixed and Muddled Motives

IV. voting restrictions in comparative perspective

A. The Dutch East India Company

B. Nineteenth-Century Voting Restrictions in England, Brazil, and France

Conclusion

Appendix: Patterns Of Restricted Voting Across Industries, States, And Decades

Three pillars of sustainability: in search of conceptual origins

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Sustainability Definitions, Historical Context, and Frameworks

Introduction: The Anthropology of Sustainability: Beyond Development and Progress

A global view on sustainability: a review of the book “Sustainability perspectives: science, policy and practice” by Peter A. Khaiter and Marina G. Erechtchoukova (eds.), Springer Nature Publishing, Cham, Switzerland, 1st ed. 2020, 362 pp., ISBN: 978-3-030-19552-6 (Softcover), US$ 109.99

Introduction

Historical origins of ‘sustainability’

A twin critique of ‘economic development’

Assimilation into the mainstream: the institutionalising of ‘sustainable development’

Environment, economics, and the society: three pillars of sustainability emerge?

The IUCN

The United Nations

The academic literature

Discussion

Competing realities

Historical emergence?

‘Sustainability’ vs. ‘sustainable development’

Conclusions

Notes

References

Acknowledgements